Editing Battle of Fraustadt (section)

==Background==
{{Further|Civil war in Poland (1704-1706)}}
After [[Charles XII|King Karl XII's]] of Sweden victory against the Saxon-Russian army in the [[Crossing of the Düna|Battle of Düna]], he was able to begin his campaign against Poland. After the victory at the [[Battle of Kliszów]] in July 1702, Karl XII negotiated to depose August II from the throne of [[Poland]], but to no avail. The Swedish army then subjected the well-fortified city of [[Toruń|Thorn]] (Torun) on the river Weichsel to a long-term blockade from May to October 1703.<ref>Liljegren, Bengt (2000). Karl XII: en biografi. Lund: Historiska media. Libris 7776628. ISBN 91-88930-99-8 (inb.), p. 156-160.</ref> The city fell and its entire garrison of 4,800 Saxon soldiers was taken prisoner. The strength of the Swedish army, combined with August's agreement with [[Peter the Great|Tsar Peter I]], caused many Polish nobles to defect to the pro-Swedish opposition. In February 1704, [[Augustus II the Strong|August]] was declared no longer king of Poland, and in July of the same year [[Stanisław Leszczyński]] was elected king.<ref>Kuvaja, Christer (2008). Karolinska krigare 1660–1721. Stockholm: Schildts Förlags AB. ISBN 978-951-50-1823-6
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However, August II was not defeated and the Russians had an interest in supporting him. The Russo-Saxon strategic plan was for a Saxon army under [[Johann Matthias von der Schulenburg]] to break into Poland to join a larger cavalry force led by August II himself and then with the main Russian force, which was in [[Livonia]], defeat the Swedish main army. In western Poland, however, there was a Swedish army corps under [[Carl Gustav Rehnskiöld|Rehnskiöld]], which either had to be bypassed or fought by Schulenburg before the unification could take place.

In early March 1705, the Russian field marshal [[Boris Sheremetev]] organized a meeting with the Saxon general [[Otto Arnold von Paijkull]] to agree on a joint plan of action to defeat [[Charles XII of Sweden|Charles XII]]. The basis of the strategy was a plan drawn up by the nobleman [[Johann Patkul]] as early as 1703, which included a combined attack that would neutralize the Swedish army. Von Paijkull was impressed by Patkul's plans, and advocated that the plan could be used as a way to lure Charles XII and the main Swedish army out of Greater Poland and move east towards [[Brest-litovsk|Brest-Litovsk]]. This was to be achieved by the convergence of the main Russian army under [[Georg Benedikt von Ogilvy]] and von Paijkull's troops stationed at Brest, forcing Charles XII to meet them in battle. At the same time, the main Saxon army from Saxony would march past Poland and attack Charles XII from the rear. Patkul considered the plan too risky and suggested that the Allies should first crush Lewenhaupt's Courland army, before Ogilvy's troops would face Charles XII. Otherwise, Ogilvy's back would be threatened.<ref>Sjöström, Oskar; Nilsson, Bengt (2008). Fraustadt 1706: ett fält färgat rött. Lund: Historiska media. Libris 10741767. ISBN 978-91-85507-90-0 (inb.), p. 70.</ref> A compromise was made between the two strategies, in which it was agreed that Sheremetev would engage Lewenhaupt while Ogilvy marched on the fortified city of [[Grodno]]. There, the allies believed that Ogilvy could hold out against Charles XII's troops long enough for the main Saxon army to arrive from Kraków. Meanwhile, von Paykull would attack with his combined Saxon-Polish troops on Warsaw to interrupt Stanisław's coronation.<ref>Sjöström, Oskar; Nilsson, Bengt (2008). Fraustadt 1706: ett fält färgat rött. Lund: Historiska media. Libris 10741767. ISBN 978-91-85507-90-0 (inb.), p. 72.</ref>