Editing Brabazon Committee (section)

==Background== 
Soon after the start of World War II, with no recorded discussion in government, a decision was taken to concentrate all efforts of the British aircraft industry on combat aircraft, and two embryo airliner projects, the [[Fairey FC1]] and the [[Short S.32]], were both cancelled.<ref name=MandG79>Masefield and Gunston, 2002, pp.79-81</ref> Subsequently, Britain had to purchase three [[Boeing 314]] flying boats for BOAC to operate an air service between the US and the UK.<ref name=MandG79/> It has been suggested that there was then some agreement with the United States that the US would concentrate on [[Military transport aircraft|transport aircraft]] while the UK would concentrate on their [[heavy bomber]]s. However, [[Peter Masefield]] was certain that such a policy was never even suggested, far less implemented.<ref name=MandG97>Masefield and Gunston, 2002, p.97</ref> On the contrary, the action was simply to do nothing - no orders were ever placed for new British transport aircraft.<ref name=MandG97/> It was stated in Parliament in December 1942 that "the work of aircraft designers must, at the present stage of the war, be devoted wholly to war requirements".<ref>https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1942/1942%20-%202664.html ''Flight'' 1942</ref> The UK was simply too busy producing military aircraft to find the capacity to build transports, and the materials required were in any case in very short supply.

When [[Winston Churchill]] attended the [[Moscow Conference (1942)|1942 Moscow Conference]], travelling in the freezing bomb bay of a [[Consolidated Liberator]] bomber, it brought home to him the absence of modern British airliners and the need for action with regard to transport aircraft. After discussion with Sir [[Stafford Cripps]], the [[Minister of Aircraft Production]], and his predecessor Lord Brabazon,<ref name=MandG79/> he recognized that as a result of that neglect the United Kingdom was to be left at the close of the war with little experience in the design, manufacture and final assembly of transport aircraft, and no infrastructure or trained personnel for the doing of same. Yet, the massive infrastructure created in the US would allow them to produce civilian aircraft based upon military transport designs; and crucially these would have to be purchased by the UK, Empire and Commonwealth to meet their post-war civilian transport aviation needs.

In consequence, Churchill asked [[John Moore-Brabazon, 1st Baron Brabazon of Tara|Lord Brabazon]] to form a Committee to investigate the issue and make suitable recommendations. Following this the Cabinet authorized a Second Committee to undertake more detailed work and prepare a list of requirements for each type to provide a basis for design and development.<ref name=MandG82>Masefield and Gunston, 2002, p.82</ref>

On 24 Dec 1942, a two-part article in ''[[Flight International|Flight]]'' concluded "The whole British Empire at the present time has an operational fleet of transport aircraft, comprising conversions, makeshifts and cast-offs, totally inadequate to represent the Empire in serving the air routes of the world in the peace to come. Have we to rely upon other nations to do it for us? The British aircraft industry is equal to the task. The Government should decide this vital question at once."<ref>https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1942/1942%20-%202678.html ''Flight'' 1942</ref>