Editing Cairo Conference (section)

== Background ==
=== International relations ===
After the outbreak of the [[Pacific War]], the [[British Empire]], the [[United States]], and the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]] signed a new treaty, formally renouncing their extraterritoriality in China and upholding China's sovereignty.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Fairbank |first=J. K. |title=The Cambridge History of China Volume II |publisher=[[Cambridge]] |year=1991 |isbn=9780521243377}}</ref> On January 11, Britain and the United States issued a joint declaration, announcing the abrogation of all unequal treaties against China over the past century.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hsu |first=C. Y. |title=The Rise of Modern China |publisher=[[OxfordUniversityPress]] |year=2000 |isbn=9780195125047 |pages=607}}</ref> On the other hand, [[China–United Kingdom relations|Sino-British relations]] were not harmonious, as it became apparent that the British [[sphere of influence]] in [[East Asia]] was crumbling.

In 1942, the Chinese government was both surprised and angry when the British did not agree to the Chinese National Army's military interference in Burma (now Myanmar). China wanted to end imperialism, but British imperialism had a long history. [[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] also held on to the conservative British colonialist mindset and refused to believe that Asians could unite and fight for an Allied victory<ref name=":1">{{Cite book |last=van de Van |first=H. J. |title=War and Nationalism in China: 1925–1945 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2012 |isbn=9780415514996 |pages=40}}</ref> He was also prejudiced against China and did not want it to become a world power.<ref name="WSC_Closing the Ring"/>

Politically, the [[United Kingdom]] was both suspicious and contemptuous of China to the point of hoping to isolate it. The British feared that China's strong independence from Western powers could influence [[independence]] movements in its [[Colony|Asian colonies]], such as [[British Raj|India]], where discontent was already brewing. They were therefore reluctant to spend material or troops to assist China. Even if both the [[Kingdom of Italy]] and [[Nazi Germany]] surrendered, the British Navy still preferred to field its spare forces in the Pacific Ocean, rather than Burma. Lord [[Alan Brooke, 1st Viscount Alanbrooke|Alan Brooke]], the British [[Chief of staff|Chief of Staff]], was even more contemptuous of China.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Wu |first=S. Y. |title=Churchill and Wartime Britain, 1939–1945 |publisher=[[Taiwan Commercial Press]] |year=1993 |isbn=9570506512 |location=Taiwan}}</ref>

There was a fundamental difference between the British and the Americans in their post-war expectations. Churchill wanted the post-war world to be dominated by the United Kingdom and the United States, but Roosevelt envisioned a new world in which the European colonialists would grant independence to their colonies and shape [[Woodrow Wilson]]'s vision of [[self-determination]] for all countries alike. Furthermore, Roosevelt wanted the [[Four Policemen]] (the United States, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China) to guide and guard the post-war world from potential conflicts. That was partly due to the rise of the [[Soviet Union]], as US military experts became increasingly worried of the Soviet Union losing or making peace with [[Nazi Germany]], since that meant Britain would be defeated as well. The US was not confident of winning the war even if it had mobilised all its forces into the European battlefield. Hence, the US military believed that consolidating relations with the Soviet Union was necessary for victory.<ref name=":1"/>

=== Development war ===
After the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], the [[Empire of Japan]] took control of [[Southeast Asia]], and [[Burma campaign|Burma]] became the only area in which the Chinese, British, and American military forces could jointly fight the Japanese.<ref name=":2"/> Each of their forces were then under their own command and rarely conducted joint military operations. Furthermore, the British commander in India and [[Chiang Kai-shek]] had conflicting views on how to counterattack the Japanese in Burma. As such, no real alliance was formed between the three.

In Asia, the primary task of the Allies was to unite the Asian countries and to open up the [[China Burma India Theater|China Burma India]] theatre of war.<ref name=":0"/> However, there was a disagreement between China and Britain about the restoration of Burma. Burma was strategically important to China, and with the fall of Burma in April 1942, China's last international supply route was blocked, the only available supply route now being the 500-mile airlift, Hump route, over the [[Himalayas]].

The British wanted to concentrate all their forces in Europe and attached far less importance to the Far East than to the European theatre of war. The recovery of Burma was only a political affair for Britain, not a matter of immediate interest, and the only real beneficiary from the opening of the Yunnan-Burma highway was China. As such, Britain, which was less than enthusiastic about the Chinese war effort, was not willing to fight for the opening of the Yunnan-Burma highway. After the defeat of [[Yangon|Rangoon]], Britain lost its enthusiasm for Burma. The British military felt that its navy was needed to recover Burma, but the British Navy was engaged in the [[Battle of the Atlantic|Atlantic]], the [[Mediterranean and Middle East theatre of World War II|Mediterranean]], and the [[Pacific Ocean theater of World War II|Pacific Ocean]]. Politically, after the [[Imperial Japanese Army|Japanese Army]] conquered Burma, the Burmese became pro-Japanese and anti-British. Roosevelt raised the notion of an independent Burma yet again, but since Burma would cease to be a British colony after the war, the British were wholly uninterested.<ref name=":2"/>

=== First Quebec Conference (1943) ===
In October 1942, British and American generals had already reached a preliminary agreement to participate in the battle to recover Burma with British and Indian divisions. However, Britain repeatedly tried to overturn the decision afterwards.<ref name=":2"/> In August 1943, Churchill and Roosevelt decided at the [[First Quebec Conference|Quebec Conference]], codenamed Quadrant, to establish a new joint "[[South East Asia Command]]" with British [[Field marshal|Field Marshal]] [[Louis Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma|Lord Mountbatten]] as Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in the region.<ref name=":1"/> He would be directly under the command of the British-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, with the main task of establishing an [[airlift]] route through China as soon as possible and sending troops to seize Myanmar and link up with Chinese troops invading from Yunnan.

Churchill, however, wanted Britain to defeat Japan by force and to restore Britain's position in her Asian colonies<ref name=":1"/> even though he and the British military had no real intention of retaking Rangoon and fighting all the way to China. Eventually, he agreed reluctantly when he was prompted by the Americans to mobilise the British Navy to move east from Europe in preparation for a counterattack on Burma.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web |last=Liang |first=J.D. |date=1972 |title=The Background of the Cairo Conference |url=http://www.mh.sinica.edu.tw/MHDocument/PublicationDetail/PublicationDetail_1218.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210322223415/http://www.mh.sinica.edu.tw/MHDocument/PublicationDetail/PublicationDetail_1218.pdf |archive-date=2021-03-22 |website=[[Institute of Modern History]] |pages=1–24 |language=zh}}</ref>

On October 2, Mountbatten went to Chongqing with the Quebec Resolution to present it to Chiang Kai-shek with a secret letter from Churchill that specifically mentioned that military action in southern Burma would depend on Chinese military action in northern Burma.<ref name=":2"/> Mountbatten wanted the Chinese troops to support the British in their recovery of Burma and suggested for him to be in command all Chinese troops entering Burma along with the Allied Southeast Asian Command.<ref name=":1"/> China believed that the counterattack on Burma should be carried out simultaneously in southern and northern Burma and that fighting in southern Burma should be to cut off the enemy's rear and that otherwise attacking from only the north would be a waste of manpower. This made China reluctant to field troops.<ref name=":2"/>

Meanwhile, the US military had established an [[island-hopping]] strategy in the Pacific,<ref>{{Cite web |title=Island-Hopping |url=https://www.historycrunch.com/island-hopping.html#/ |access-date=2024-10-04 |website=HISTORY CRUNCH - History Articles, Biographies, Infographics, Resources and More |language=en}}</ref> the efficacy of which had not yet been tested,<ref name=":3"/> but the Allies already had already developed the tendency of ignoring the Chinese Theatre. In October 1943, the British and American Joint Chiefs of Staff began to formulate a plan to attack Japan from the Pacific without going through mainland China, and the US military hierarchy doubted the strategic importance of China.<ref name=":11">{{Cite book |last=Zou |first=D. |title=America's Failure in China |publisher=[[Shanghai People's Publisher]] |year=1997 |isbn=7208024901}}</ref>

Regarding the European Theatre, Churchill and Roosevelt had several disagreements. Churchill wanted to meet Roosevelt alone before the Cairo Conference to discuss the Grand Alliance plan of action in Europe for fear of heavy casualties to British forces, but the United States did not want to postpone the counterattack because of Stalin's insistence for the Anglo-Americans to open a second front to relieve the pressure faced by Soviet troops against Germany. Churchill strongly advocated action in the eastern Mediterranean to hold the Germans back so that they could not be drawn into France since if the Allies controlled the eastern Mediterranean, they would not have to go through Iran to support the Soviet Union, and the British Navy in the Indian Ocean could be used elsewhere. The United States, however, resolutely opposed action in the eastern Mediterranean.<ref name=":1"/>