Editing Carter Doctrine (section)

==Background==
[[File:Oil_and_Gas_Infrastructure_Persian_Gulf_(large).gif|thumb|upright=1.5|Oil and gas resources in the [[Persian Gulf]] region]]
The Persian Gulf region was first proclaimed to be of national interest to the United States during [[World War II]]. [[Petroleum]] is centrally important to modern armies. The U.S., the world's leading oil producer at the time, supplied most of the oil for the [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] armies. Many American strategists were concerned that the war would dangerously reduce the country's oil supply and so they sought to establish good relations with [[Saudi Arabia]], a kingdom with large oil reserves. On February 16, 1943, U.S. president [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] stated that, "the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States."<ref>{{harv|Klare|2004|p=33}}</ref>

On February 14, 1945, while returning from the [[Yalta Conference]], Roosevelt met with Saudi king [[Ibn Saud]] on the [[Great Bitter Lake]] in the [[Suez Canal]], the first time a U.S. president had visited the Persian Gulf. During [[Gulf War#Operation Desert Shield|Operation Desert Shield]] in 1990, [[United States Secretary of Defense|U.S. defense secretary]] [[Dick Cheney]] cited the landmark meeting between Roosevelt and Ibn Saud as one of the justifications for sending troops to protect Saudi Arabia's border.<ref>{{harv|Klare|2004|p=36}}</ref>

In World War II, [[United Kingdom|Britain]] and the Soviet Union had [[Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran|jointly invaded and partitioned]] [[Pahlavi Iran|Iran]] in 1941 which was to end with the conclusion of the war. However, Soviet-aligned rebellions, the [[Azerbaijan People's Government]] and [[Republic of Mahabad]], created a crisis in the Allied occupation zone, the [[Iran crisis of 1946]], which was one of the first struggles of the Cold War. U.S. pressure on the Soviets to withdraw from Iran was one of the first postwar conflicts between the two superpowers.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hess |first=Gary R. |date=1974 |title=The Iranian Crisis of 1945-46 and the Cold War |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2148118 |journal=Political Science Quarterly |volume=89 |issue=1 |pages=117–146 |doi=10.2307/2148118 |jstor=2148118 |issn=0032-3195|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=LEFFLER |first=MELVYN P. |date=1983 |title=From the Truman Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine: Lessons and Dilemmas of the Cold War |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/24911371 |journal=Diplomatic History |volume=7 |issue=4 |pages=245–266 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-7709.1983.tb00394.x |jstor=24911371 |issn=0145-2096|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

The Persian Gulf was still regarded as an area of vital importance to the U.S. during the [[Cold War]]. Three Cold War [[United States presidential doctrines|American presidential doctrines]] (the [[Truman Doctrine|Truman]], [[Eisenhower Doctrine|Eisenhower]], and [[Nixon Doctrine]]s) played roles in forming the Carter Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine, which stated that the U.S. would send military aid to countries threatened by Soviet aggression, was used to strengthen both Iran and Saudi Arabia's security. In October 1950, President [[Harry S. Truman]] wrote to Ibn Saud that "the United States is interested in the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. No threat to your Kingdom could occur which would not be a matter of immediate concern to the United States."<ref>{{harv|Yergin|1991|p=428}}</ref>

The Eisenhower Doctrine called for U.S. troops to be sent to the [[Middle East]] to defend American allies against their Soviet-backed adversaries. Ultimately, the Nixon Doctrine's application provided military aid to Iran and Saudi Arabia so that U.S. allies could ensure peace and stability there. In 1979, the [[Iranian revolution]] and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prompted the restatement of U.S. interests in the region in the form of the Carter Doctrine.<ref>{{harv|Klare|2004|pp=33–45}}</ref> The [[Second Yemenite War|Yemenite War of 1979]], with Soviet support to [[South Yemen]], may also have been a "smaller shock" contributing to the crisis of that year, and Carter's foreign policy shift.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Jimmy Carter and the Second Yemenite War: A Smaller Shock of 1979? {{!}} Wilson Center|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/jimmy-carter-and-second-yemenite-war-smaller-shock-1979|access-date=2021-11-13|website=www.wilsoncenter.org|language=en}}</ref> National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski advised Carter that the United States's "greatest vulnerability" lay on an arc "stretching from [[Chittagong]] through [[Islamabad]] to [[Aden]]." [[Henry Kissinger]] gave Carter similar advice.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Collins|first=N.W.|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1255527666|title=Grey wars : a contemporary history of U.S. special operations|date=2021|isbn=978-0-300-25834-9|location=New Haven|oclc=1255527666}}</ref>

In July 1979, responding to a [[1979 oil crisis|national energy crisis]] that resulted from the Iranian revolution, Carter delivered his "Crisis of Confidence" speech, urging Americans to reduce their energy use to help lessen U.S. dependence on foreign oil supplies.<ref name="Crisisconfidence">{{citation |last=Carter|first=Jimmy|title=Crisis of Confidence|publisher=[[The Carter Center]]|url=http://www.cartercenter.org/news/editorials_speeches/crisis_of_confidence.html|access-date=2008-07-27}}</ref> In 2008, some scholars claimed that Carter's energy plan, had it been fully enacted, would have prevented some of the economic difficulties caused by [[United States energy independence|American dependency on foreign oil]].<ref name="Wheelan">{{citation |last=Wheelan|first=Joseph|title=Second Hearing for Carter|newspaper=[[Atlanta Journal-Constitution]]|date=2008-07-15|url=http://www.ajc.com/search/content/opinion/stories/2008/07/15/energyed.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080730011920/http://www.ajc.com/search/content/opinion/stories/2008/07/15/energyed.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=2008-07-30|access-date=2008-07-27}} [http://hnn.us/article/52030 Reprinted] at [[History News Network]]</ref>

The 1979 oil crisis also led to a vast surge in energy wealth for the oil-rich Soviet Union, which along the lines of [[resource curse]] literature, has been hypothesized to have caused the boldness of the Soviet [[Politburo]] in the intervention in Afghanistan in the first place.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Brown|first=James D. J.|date=2013-01-01|title=Oil Fueled? The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan|journal=Post-Soviet Affairs|volume=29|issue=1|pages=56–94|doi=10.1080/1060586X.2013.778543|s2cid=153875812 |issn=1060-586X|doi-access=free}}</ref> Previously, the Soviet Union's "[[Third World]]" strategy combined largely cautious support of revolutions with covert action. However, the invasion of Afghanistan indicated that Soviet policy had become more direct and belligerent. This was seen to advance a long-term Soviet geopolitical goal, the acquisition of strategic presence on the Indian Ocean, closer to the realm of possibility.<ref name=":1" /> This caused previous critics of [[Containment|containment policy]] to become some of its major supporters.

Over the course of January 1980 in response to the invasion, Carter withdrew the [[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks|SALT II treaty]] from consideration before the [[United States Senate|Senate]],<ref>{{Cite web|last=Andrew Glass|title=Carter withdraws SALT II accord, Jan. 2, 1980|url=http://politi.co/2qejDLf|access-date=2021-11-13|website=POLITICO|date=January 2018 |language=en}}</ref> recalled U.S. ambassador [[Thomas J. Watson Jr.|Thomas J. Watson]] from [[Moscow]],<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Walsh|first1=Edward|last2=Goshko|first2=John M.|date=1980-01-03|title=U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Recalled|language=en-US|newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/01/03/us-ambassador-to-moscow-recalled/11954a73-b0b4-435a-8fde-170d3c757217/|access-date=2021-11-13|issn=0190-8286}}</ref> [[United States grain embargo against the Soviet Union|curtailed grain sales]] to the Soviet Union,<ref name=":2">{{Cite web|last=G|first=Jeffrey|title=The Soviet Grain Embargo|url=https://www.heritage.org/trade/report/the-soviet-grain-embargo|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170217200213/http://www.heritage.org/trade/report/the-soviet-grain-embargo|url-status=unfit|archive-date=February 17, 2017|access-date=2021-11-13|website=The Heritage Foundation|language=en}}</ref> and suspended high-technology exports to the Soviet Union.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":1" />