Editing Causality (section)

== Concept ==
=== Metaphysics ===
The nature of cause and effect is a concern of the subject known as [[metaphysics]]. [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]] thought that time and space were notions prior to human understanding of the progress or evolution of the world, and he also recognized the priority of causality. But he did not have the understanding that came with knowledge of [[Minkowski space#Causal structure|Minkowski geometry]] and the [[Special relativity|special theory of relativity]], that the notion of causality can be used as a prior foundation from which to [[Causal structure|construct notions]] of time and space.<ref name=Robb1911/><ref name=Whitehead1929/><ref name=Malament/>

==== Ontology ====
A general metaphysical question about cause and effect is: "what kind of entity can be a cause, and what kind of entity can be an effect?"

One viewpoint on this question is that cause and effect are of one and the same kind of entity, causality being an asymmetric relation between them. That is to say, it would make good sense grammatically to say either "''A'' is the cause and ''B'' the effect" or "''B'' is the cause and ''A'' the effect", though only one of those two can be actually true. In this view, one opinion, proposed as a metaphysical principle in [[process philosophy]], is that every cause and every effect is respectively some process, event, becoming, or happening.<ref name=Whitehead1929/> An example is 'his tripping over the step was the cause, and his breaking his ankle the effect'. Another view is that causes and effects are 'states of affairs', with the exact natures of those entities being more loosely defined than in process philosophy.<ref>[[David Malet Armstrong|Armstrong, D.M.]] (1997). ''A World of States of Affairs'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, {{ISBN|0-521-58064-1}}, pp.&nbsp;89, 265.</ref>

Another viewpoint on this question is the more classical one, that a cause and its effect can be of different kinds of entity. For example, in Aristotle's efficient causal explanation, an action can be a cause while an [[enduring]] object is its effect. For example, the generative actions of his parents can be regarded as the efficient cause, with Socrates being the effect, Socrates being regarded as an enduring object, in philosophical tradition called a 'substance', as distinct from an action.

==== Epistemology ====
Since causality is a subtle metaphysical notion, considerable intellectual effort, along with exhibition of evidence, is needed to establish knowledge of it in particular empirical circumstances. According to [[David Hume]], the human mind is unable to perceive causal relations directly. On this ground, the scholar distinguished between the regularity view of causality and the counterfactual notion.<ref name=Hume>{{Cite book|last=Hume|first=David|title=A Treatise on Human Nature|url=https://archive.org/details/atreatiseofhuman00humeuoft|publisher=Clarendon Press|year=1888|location=Oxford}}</ref> According to the [[Counterfactual conditional|counterfactual view]], ''X'' causes ''Y'' if and only if, without ''X, Y'' would not exist. Hume interpreted the latter as an ontological view, i.e., as a description of the nature of causality but, given the limitations of the human mind, advised using the former (stating, roughly, that ''X'' causes ''Y'' if and only if the two events are spatiotemporally conjoined, and ''X'' precedes ''Y'') as an epistemic definition of causality. We need an epistemic concept of causality in order to distinguish between causal and noncausal relations. The contemporary philosophical literature on causality can be divided into five big approaches to causality. These include the (mentioned above) regularity, [[Probabilistic causation|probabilistic]], counterfactual, [[Mechanism (philosophy)|mechanistic]], and manipulationist views. The five approaches can be shown to be reductive, i.e., define causality in terms of relations of other types.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Maziarz|first=Mariusz|title=The Philosophy of Causality in Economics: Causal Inferences and Policy Proposals.|publisher=Routledge.|year=2020|location=New York & London}}</ref> According to this reading, they define causality in terms of, respectively, empirical regularities (constant conjunctions of events), changes in [[conditional probability|conditional probabilities]], counterfactual conditions, mechanisms underlying causal relations, and invariance under intervention.

==== Geometrical significance ====
Causality has the properties of antecedence and contiguity.<ref name="Born"/><ref name="Sklar"/> These are topological, and are ingredients for space-time geometry. As developed by [[Alfred Robb]], these properties allow the derivation of the notions of time and space.<ref>[[Alfred Robb|Robb, A.A.]] (1936). [https://archive.org/details/geometryoftimean032218mbp ''Geometry of Time and Space''], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK.</ref> [[Max Jammer]] writes "the Einstein postulate ... opens the way to a straightforward construction of the causal topology ... of Minkowski space."<ref>[[Max Jammer|Jammer, M.]] (1982). 'Einstein and quantum physics', pp. 59–76 in ''Albert Einstein: Historical and Cultural Perspectives; the Centennial Symposium in Jerusalem'', edited by G. Holton, Y. Elkana, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, {{ISBN|0-691-08299-5}}, p. 61.</ref> Causal efficacy propagates no faster than light.<ref>Naber, G.L. (1992). ''The Geometry of Minkowski Spacetime: An Introduction to the Mathematics of the Special Theory of Relativity'', Springer, New York, {{ISBN|978-1-4419-7837-0}}, pp. 4–5.</ref>

Thus, the notion of causality is metaphysically prior to the notions of time and space. In practical terms, this is because use of the relation of causality is necessary for the interpretation of empirical experiments. Interpretation of experiments is needed to establish the physical and geometrical notions of time and space.

==== Volition ====
The [[determinism|deterministic]] world-view holds that the history of the [[universe]] can be exhaustively represented as a [[chain of events|progression of events]] following one after the other as cause and effect.<ref name="Sklar">Sklar, L. (1995). Determinism, pp. 117–119 in ''A Companion to Metaphysics'', edited by Kim, J. Sosa, E., Blackwell, Oxford UK, pp. 177–181.</ref> [[Incompatibilism]] holds that determinism is incompatible with free will, so if determinism is true, "[[free will]]" does not exist. [[Compatibilism]], on the other hand, holds that determinism is compatible with, or even necessary for, free will.<ref>Watson, G. (1995). Free will, pp. 175–182 in ''A Companion to Metaphysics'', edited by Kim, J. Sosa, E., Blackwell, Oxford UK, pp. 177–181.</ref>

=== Necessary and sufficient causes ===<!-- This section is linked from [[Causes of schizophrenia]] -->
{{hatnote|A similar concept occurs in logic, for this see [[Necessary and sufficient conditions]]}}

Causes may sometimes be distinguished into two types: necessary and sufficient.<ref>Epp, Susanna S.: "Discrete Mathematics with Applications, Third Edition", pp. 25–26. Brooks/Cole – Thomson Learning, 2004. {{ISBN|0-534-35945-0}}</ref> A third type of causation, which requires neither necessity nor sufficiency, but which contributes to the effect, is called a "contributory cause".

;Necessary causes: If ''x'' is a necessary cause of ''y'', then the presence of ''y'' necessarily implies the prior occurrence of ''x''. The presence of ''x'', however, does not imply that ''y'' will occur.<ref name="CR">{{Cite web
 | url = http://www.istarassessment.org/srdims/causal-reasoning-2/
 | title = Causal Reasoning
 | website = www.istarassessment.org
 | access-date = 2 March 2016
}}</ref>
;Sufficient causes: If ''x'' is a sufficient cause of ''y'', then the presence of ''x'' necessarily implies the subsequent occurrence of ''y''. However, another cause ''z'' may alternatively cause ''y''. Thus the presence of ''y'' does not imply the prior occurrence of ''x''.<ref name="CR"/>
;Contributory causes: For some specific effect, in a singular case, a factor that is a contributory cause is one among several co-occurrent causes. It is implicit that all of them are contributory. For the specific effect, in general, there is no implication that a contributory cause is necessary, though it may be so. In general, a factor that is a contributory cause is not sufficient, because it is by definition accompanied by other causes, which would not count as causes if it were sufficient. For the specific effect, a factor that is on some occasions a contributory cause might on some other occasions be sufficient, but on those other occasions it would not be merely contributory.<ref name="Riegelman">{{Cite journal
 | last1 = Riegelman | first1 = R.
 | title = Contributory cause: Unnecessary and insufficient
 | journal = Postgraduate Medicine
 | volume = 66
 | issue = 2
 | pages = 177–179
 | year = 1979
 | pmid = 450828
 | doi = 10.1080/00325481.1979.11715231
}}</ref>

[[J. L. Mackie]] argues that usual talk of "cause" in fact refers to '''INUS''' conditions ('''i'''nsufficient but '''n'''on-redundant parts of a condition which is itself '''u'''nnecessary but '''s'''ufficient for the occurrence of the effect).<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=h38IAQAAIAAJ|title=The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation|last=Mackie|first=John Leslie|date=1974|publisher=Clarendon Press|isbn=9780198244059|language=en}}</ref> An example is a short circuit as a cause for a house burning down. Consider the collection of events: the short circuit, the proximity of flammable material, and the absence of firefighters. Together these are unnecessary but sufficient to the house's burning down (since many other collections of events certainly could have led to the house burning down, for example shooting the house with a flamethrower in the presence of oxygen and so forth). Within this collection, the short circuit is an insufficient (since the short circuit by itself would not have caused the fire) but non-redundant (because the fire would not have happened without it, everything else being equal) part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the occurrence of the effect. So, the short circuit is an INUS condition for the occurrence of the house burning down.

=== Contrasted with conditionals ===
{{more citations needed|section|reason=Want to read more, want to examine source|date=January 2017}}
[[Indicative conditional|Conditional]] statements are ''not'' statements of causality. An important distinction is that statements of causality require the antecedent to precede or coincide with the consequent in time, whereas conditional statements do not require this temporal order. Confusion commonly arises since many different statements in English may be presented using "If ..., then ..." form (and, arguably, because this form is far more commonly used to make a statement of causality). The two types of statements are distinct, however.

For example, all of the following statements are true when interpreting "If ..., then ..." as the material conditional:

# ''If Barack Obama is president of the United States in 2011, then Germany is in Europe.''
# ''If George Washington is president of the United States in 2011, then {{angbr|arbitrary statement}}.''

The first is true since both the [[Antecedent (logic)|antecedent]] and the [[consequent]] are true. The second is true in [[sentential logic]] and indeterminate in natural language, regardless of the consequent statement that follows, because the antecedent is false.

The ordinary [[indicative conditional]] has somewhat more structure than the material conditional. For instance, although the first is the closest, neither of the preceding two statements seems true as an ordinary indicative reading. But the sentence:
* ''If Shakespeare of Stratford-on-Avon did not write Macbeth, then someone else did.''
intuitively seems to be true, even though there is no straightforward causal relation in this hypothetical situation between Shakespeare's not writing Macbeth and someone else's actually writing it.

Another sort of conditional, the [[counterfactual conditional]], has a stronger connection with causality, yet even counterfactual statements are not all examples of causality. Consider the following two statements:

# ''If A were a triangle, then A would have three sides.''
# ''If switch S were thrown, then bulb B would light.''

In the first case, it would be incorrect to say that A's being a triangle ''caused'' it to have three sides, since the relationship between triangularity and three-sidedness is that of definition. The property of having three sides actually determines A's state as a triangle. Nonetheless, even when interpreted counterfactually, the first statement is true. An early version of Aristotle's "four cause" theory is described as recognizing "essential cause". In this version of the theory, that the closed polygon has three sides is said to be the "essential cause" of its being a triangle.<ref name="Graham 1987"/> This use of the word 'cause' is of course now far obsolete. Nevertheless, it is within the scope of ordinary language to say that it is essential to a triangle that it has three sides.

A full grasp of the concept of conditionals is important to [[understanding]] the literature on causality. In everyday language, loose conditional statements are often enough made, and need to be interpreted carefully.

=== Questionable cause ===
{{Main|Questionable cause}}

Fallacies of questionable cause, also known as causal fallacies, ''non-causa pro causa'' (Latin for "non-cause for cause"), or false cause, are [[informal fallacy|informal fallacies]] where a cause is incorrectly identified.