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Classical liberalism
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== Evolution of core beliefs == Core beliefs of classical liberals included new ideas{{snd}}which departed from both the older [[Conservatism|conservative]] idea of [[Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft|society as a family]] and from the later [[Sociology|sociological]] concept of society as a [[Gesellschaft#Gesellschaft|complex set]] of [[social network]]s. Classical liberals agreed with [[Thomas Hobbes]] that individuals created government to protect themselves from each other and to minimize conflict between individuals that would otherwise arise in a [[state of nature]]. These beliefs were complemented by a belief that financial incentive could best motivate labourers. This belief led to the passage of the [[Poor Law Amendment Act 1834]], which limited the provision of social assistance, based on the idea that [[Market (economics)|markets]] are the mechanism that most efficiently leads to wealth. Drawing on ideas of [[Adam Smith]], classical liberals believed that it was in the common interest that all individuals be able to secure their own economic self-interest.{{sfn|Dickerson|Flanagan|O'Neill|p=132}} They were critical of what would come to be the idea of the [[welfare state]] as interfering in a [[free market]].<ref name="Ryan">Alan Ryan, "Liberalism", in ''A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy'', ed. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1995), p. 293.</ref> Despite Smith's resolute recognition of the importance and value of labour and of labourers, classical liberals criticized labour's [[group rights]] being pursued at the expense of [[individual rights]]<ref>Evans, M. ed. (2001): ''Edinburgh Companion to Contemporary Liberalism: Evidence and Experience'', London: [[Routledge]], 55 ({{ISBN|1579583393}}).</ref> while accepting [[Economic liberalism|corporations' rights]], which led to [[inequality of bargaining power]].{{sfn|Dickerson|Flanagan|O'Neill|p=132}}<ref name=smith>{{cite book|last=Smith|first=A.|date=1778|title=An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations|volume=I|chapter=8|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KpWg1DYxRTwC&q=%22public+good%22&pg=PA81|publisher=W. Strahan; and T. Cadell}}</ref> Classical liberals argued that individuals should be free to obtain work from the highest-paying employers, while the [[profit motive]] would ensure that products that people desired were produced at prices they would pay. In a free market, both labour and capital would receive the greatest possible reward, while production would be organized efficiently to meet consumer demand.{{sfn|Hunt|pp=46–47}} Classical liberals argued for what they called a minimal [[State (polity)|state]] and [[government]], limited to the following functions: * Laws to protect citizens from wrongs committed against them by other citizens, which included protection of individual rights, private property, enforcement of contracts and common law. * A common national defence to provide protection against foreign invaders.{{sfn|Hunt|pp=51–53}} * Public works and services that cannot be provided in a free market such as a stable currency, standard weights and measures and building and upkeep of roads, canals, harbours, railways, communications and postal services.{{sfn|Hunt|pp=51–53}} Classical liberals asserted that rights are of a [[Negative and positive rights|negative]] nature and therefore stipulate that other individuals and governments are to refrain from interfering with the free market, opposing social liberals who assert that individuals have [[positive rights]], such as the right to vote, the right to an education, the [[right to healthcare]], and the right to a minimum wage. For society to guarantee positive rights, it requires taxation over and above the minimum needed to enforce negative rights.<ref name=Cato_Institut_Kelley>[[David Kelley|Kelly, D.]] (1998): ''A Life of One's Own: Individual Rights and the Welfare State'', Washington, DC: [[Cato Institute]].</ref>{{sfn|Richardson|pp=36–38}} Core beliefs of classical liberals did not necessarily include [[democracy]] nor government by a majority vote by citizens because "there is nothing in the bare idea of majority rule to show that majorities will always respect the rights of property or maintain rule of law".<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ellerman |first1=David |title=Does classical liberalism imply democracy? |journal=Ethics & Global Politics |date=2015 |volume=8 |issue=1 |pages=29310 |doi=10.3402/egp.v8.29310 |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name="RyanA_1995">Ryan, A. (1995): "Liberalism", In: Goodin, R. E. and Pettit, P., eds.: ''A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy'', Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, p. 293.</ref> For example, [[James Madison]] argued for a constitutional republic with protections for individual liberty over a [[pure democracy]], reasoning that in a pure democracy a "common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole ... and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party".<ref>James Madison, [[Federalist No. 10]] (22 November 1787), in Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, ''The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States'', ed. Henry Cabot Lodge (New York, 1888), [https://books.google.com/books?id=XcllKruLvi4C&q=%22common+passion+or+interest%22&pg=PA56 p. 56].</ref> In the late 19th century, classical liberalism developed into [[Right-libertarianism#Neo-classical liberalism|neoclassical liberalism]], which argued for government to be as small as possible to allow the exercise of [[individual freedom]]. In its most extreme form, neoclassical liberalism advocated [[social Darwinism]].{{sfn|Mayne|1999|p=124}} [[Right-libertarianism]] is a modern form of neoclassical liberalism.{{sfn|Mayne|1999|p=124}} However, Edwin Van de Haar states although classical liberal thought influenced libertarianism, there are significant differences between them.{{sfn|Van de Haar|2015|p=71}} Classical liberalism refuses to give priority to liberty over order and therefore does not exhibit the hostility to the state which is the defining feature of libertarianism.{{sfn|Heywood|2004|p=337}} As such, right-libertarians believe classical liberals do not have enough respect for individual property rights and lack sufficient trust in the [[free market]]'s workings and [[spontaneous order]] leading to their support of a much larger state.{{sfn|Van de Haar|2015|p=42}} Right-libertarians also disagree with classical liberals as being too supportive of [[central bank]]s and [[monetarist]] policies.{{sfn|Van de Haar|2015|p=43}} === Typology of beliefs === [[Friedrich Hayek]] identified two different traditions within classical liberalism, namely the British tradition and the French tradition: * The British philosophers [[Bernard Mandeville]], [[David Hume]], [[Edmund Burke]], [[Adam Smith]], [[Adam Ferguson]], [[Josiah Tucker]] and [[William Paley]] held beliefs in [[empiricism]], the [[common law]] and in traditions and institutions which had spontaneously evolved but were imperfectly understood. *The French philosophers [[Voltaire]], [[Jean-Jacques Rousseau]], [[Denis Diderot]], [[Maximilien Robespierre]], [[Louis Antoine de Saint-Just]], [[Marquis de Condorcet]], the [[Encyclopédistes|Encyclopedists]] and the [[Physiocrats]] believed in rationalism and sometimes showed hostility to tradition and religion. Hayek conceded that the national labels did not exactly correspond to those belonging to each tradition since he saw the Frenchmen [[Montesquieu]], [[Benjamin Constant]], [[Joseph De Maistre]] and [[Alexis de Tocqueville]] as belonging to the British tradition and the British [[Thomas Hobbes]], [[Joseph Priestley]], [[Richard Price]], [[Edward Gibbon]], [[Benjamin Franklin]], [[Thomas Jefferson]] and [[Thomas Paine]] as belonging to the French tradition.<ref name="autogenerated1">{{cite book|first=F. A.|last=Hayek|title=The Constitution of Liberty|location=London|publisher=Routledge|date=1976|pages=55–56|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0otEBAAAQBAJ&q=The+Constitution+of+Liberty|isbn=978-1317857808}}</ref><ref>F. A. Hayek, "Individualism: True and False", in ''Individualism and Economic Order'' (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 1–32.</ref> Hayek also rejected the label ''[[laissez-faire]]'' as originating from the French tradition and alien to the beliefs of Hume and Smith. [[Guido De Ruggiero]] also identified differences between "Montesquieu and Rousseau, the English and the democratic types of liberalism"{{sfn|De Ruggiero|p=71}} and argued that there was a "profound contrast between the two Liberal systems".{{sfn|De Ruggiero|p=81}} He claimed that the spirit of "authentic English Liberalism" had "built up its work piece by piece without ever destroying what had once been built, but basing upon it every new departure". This liberalism had "insensibly adapted ancient institutions to modern needs" and "instinctively recoiled from all abstract proclamations of principles and rights".{{sfn|De Ruggiero|p=81}} Ruggiero claimed that this liberalism was challenged by what he called the "new Liberalism of France" that was characterised by egalitarianism and a "rationalistic consciousness".{{sfn|De Ruggiero|pp=81–82}} In 1848, [[Francis Lieber]] distinguished between what he called "Anglican and Gallican Liberty". Lieber asserted that "independence in the highest degree, compatible with safety and broad national guarantees of liberty, is the great aim of Anglican liberty, and self-reliance is the chief source from which it draws its strength".{{sfn|Lieber|p=377}} On the other hand, Gallican liberty "is sought in government ... . [T]he French look for the highest degree of political civilisation in organisation, that is, in the highest degree of interference by public power".{{sfn|Lieber|pp=382–383}}
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