Editing Covert operation (section)

==US law==
Under US law, the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA) must lead covert operations unless the president finds that another agency should do so and informs Congress.{{sfn|Daugherty|2004|p=25}} The CIA's authority to conduct covert action comes from the [[National Security Act of 1947]].{{sfn|Daugherty|2004}} President [[Ronald Reagan]] issued [[Executive Order 12333]] titled ''United States Intelligence Activities'' in 1984. This order defined covert action as "special activities", both political and military, that the US Government could legally deny. The CIA was also designated as the sole authority under the 1991 [[Intelligence Authorization Act]] and in [[Title 50 of the United States Code]] Section 413(e).{{sfn|Daugherty|2004}}<ref>''All Necessary Means: Employing CIA operatives in a Warfighting Role Alongside Special Operations Forces'', Colonel Kathryn Stone, Professor Anthony R. Williams (Project Advisor), United States Army War College (USAWC), 7 April 2003, page 7</ref> The CIA must have a "Presidential Finding" issued by the President in order to conduct these activities under the [[Hughes-Ryan Amendment|Hughes-Ryan amendment]] to the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act.{{sfn|Daugherty|2004|p=25}} These findings are then monitored by the oversight committees in both the US Senate and House of Representatives.{{sfn|Daugherty|2004|p=28}} As a result of this framework, the CIA "receives more oversight from the Congress than any other agency in the federal government", according to one author.{{sfn|Daugherty|2004|p=29}} The [[Special Activities Division]] (SAD) is a division of the CIA's [[Directorate of Operations (CIA)|Directorate of Operations]], responsible for Covert Action and "Special Activities". These special activities include covert political influence and paramilitary operations.

===Impact===
According to a 2018 study by University of Chicago political scientist Austin Carson, covert operations may have the beneficial effect of preventing escalation of disputes into full-blown wars.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=Carson|first=Austin|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv346p45|title=Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics|date=2018|volume=157 |publisher=Princeton University Press|doi=10.2307/j.ctv346p45 |jstor=j.ctv346p45|isbn=978-0-691-20412-3 }}</ref> He argues that keeping military operations secret can limit escalation dynamics, as well as insulate leaders from domestic pressures while simultaneously allowing them communicating their interest to the adversary in keeping a war contained.<ref name=":0" /> He finds that covert operations are frequently detected by other major powers.<ref name=":0" />

A 2024 study found that state denials of covert actions, even when the covert actions were obvious, could have a de-escalatory effect (compared to making the covert action public).<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Bloch |first1=Chase |last2=McManus |first2=Roseanne W. |date=2024 |title=Denying the Obvious: Why Do Nominally Covert Actions Avoid Escalation? |journal=International Organization |volume=78 |issue=3 |pages=600–624 |language=en |doi=10.1017/S0020818324000183 |issn=0020-8183|doi-access=free }}</ref>