Editing Croatian Spring (section)

==Background==
===Economic crisis===
[[File:SocialistYugoslavia en.svg|thumb|300px|After [[World War II]], [[Socialist Republic of Croatia|Croatia]] was one of six republics within [[Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia|federal Yugoslavia]].|alt=Political map of six republics comprising the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]]
In the early 1960s, the [[Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia]] was a [[federation]] according to [[1946 Yugoslav Constitution|its constitution]] (comprising the people's republics of [[Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnia and Herzegovina]], [[Socialist Republic of Croatia|Croatia]], [[Socialist Republic of Macedonia|Macedonia]], [[Socialist Republic of Montenegro|Montenegro]], [[Socialist Republic of Serbia|Serbia]], and [[Socialist Republic of Slovenia|Slovenia]]), but ''[[de facto]]'' operated as a [[centralised state]]. The Yugoslav economy was in [[recession]], prompting economic reforms, which were hastily implemented and proved ineffective. By 1962, the country's economic difficulties worsened, prompting debate on the foundations of the economic system.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=212–214}} In March 1962, President [[Josip Broz Tito]] convened the extended [[central committee]] of the country's ruling party, the [[League of Communists of Yugoslavia]] (SKJ), to discuss the role of the SKJ and the relationship between the central government and the constituent republics. The meeting exposed a clash between [[Serb]]s, openly supported by a Serb [[Deputy Prime Minister of Yugoslavia|deputy prime minister]] [[Aleksandar Ranković]], and [[Slovenes|Slovene]] members of the body, particularly [[Miha Marinko]] and [[Sergej Kraigher]], cautiously supported by Slovene deputy prime minister [[Edvard Kardelj]]. The Slovene delegation advocated for devolving power and authority to the constituent republics. The Serb delegation sought to preserve the central government's monopoly on decision-making and the distribution of tax revenue to less-developed republics. As it was less developed than [[Socialist Republic of Slovenia|PR Slovenia]] and PR Croatia, PR Serbia would have benefited from such an arrangement.{{sfn|Flere|Rutar|2019|pp=90–95}} In 1963, [[1963 Yugoslav Constitution|a new constitution]] was adopted, granting additional powers to the republics,{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=208}} and the [[8th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia|8th Congress of the SKJ]] expanded the powers of the SKJ branches the following year.{{sfn|Štiks|2015|pp=92–93}}

===Politicisation of reforms===
Further economic reforms were adopted in 1964 and 1965, transferring considerable powers from the federation to the republics and individual companies. Some of the reform measures exacerbated conflict between the banks, insurers, and foreign trade organisations owned by the Yugoslav government versus those owned by the constituent republics, a conflict that became increasingly political and nationalist.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=212–214}} Competing alliances were established. Ranković gained the support of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, in addition to Serbia. Slovenia was supported by Croatia, based on the belief of [[Vladimir Bakarić]]—the [[President of the League of Communists of Croatia|Secretary of the Central Committee]] of the [[League of Communists of Croatia]] (SKH)—that decentralisation would benefit others in Yugoslavia. Bakarić persuaded [[Krste Crvenkovski]], the head of the [[League of Communists of Macedonia]] (SKM), to support the Slovene–Croatian reformist bloc, which managed to enact substantial legislation curbing federal powers in favour of the republics. The conflict was framed as a contest between Serbia's interests against those of Slovenia and Croatia.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=214–217}}

In Croatia, positions adopted by Ranković's allies in the [[League of Communists of Serbia]] (SKS) and the [[League of Communists of Montenegro]] (SKCG) were interpreted as [[wikt:hegemonistic|hegemonistic]], which in turn increased the appeal of [[Croatian nationalism]].{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=242}} By the mid-1960s, the [[List of diplomatic missions of the United States|United States consul in Zagreb]], [[Helene Batjer]], estimated that about half of SKH members and 80 percent of the population of Croatia held nationalist views.{{sfn|Batović|2010|p=547}}

===Peak of the reformist forces===
[[File:Aleksandar Ranković (1).jpg|thumb|left|upright|The fall of [[Aleksandar Ranković]] ushered in a period of reformist dominance in Yugoslavia|alt=Photograph of Aleksandar Ranković facing the camera]]
By early 1966, it was clear that the reforms had not produced the desired results. The SKJ blamed the Serbian leadership for resistance to the reforms.{{sfn|Rusinow|2007|p=137}} In early 1966, Kardelj persuaded Tito to remove Ranković from the SKJ Central Committee and dismiss him as vice president of Yugoslavia. Ranković was accused of plotting to seize power, disregarding the decisions of the [[8th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia|eighth congress of the SKJ]] (December 1964), abuse of the [[State Security Administration (Yugoslavia)|State Security Administration]] directly or through allies,{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=218–219}} and illegally [[wire-tapping]] the SKJ leadership, including Tito himself.{{sfn|Rusinow|2007|p=138}} Tito saw Ranković's removal as an opportunity to implement greater decentralisation.{{sfn|Banac|1992|p=1087}} In devolving power to constituent units of the federation, Tito assumed the role of sole arbiter in inter-republican disputes.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=251}}

In 1967 and 1968, the Yugoslav constitution was amended once again, further reducing federal authority in favour of the constituent republics.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=247}} The peak of the reformist coalition occurred at the [[9th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia|9th congress of the SKJ]] in March 1969, during which decentralisation of all aspects of the country was proposed. A [[World Bank]] loan for the construction of motorways caused a major rift in the reformist coalition after the federal government decided to shelve plans to develop a highway section in Slovenia and build one highway section in Croatia and one in Macedonia instead. For the first time, a constituent republic (Slovenia) protested a decision of the federal government, but Slovene demands were rejected. The situation became heated, prompting the Slovene authorities to publicly state that they had no plan to secede. In the aftermath of the affair, the Slovenian authorities withdrew their support for the reformist coalition. Regardless, the SKH and the SKM pressured the SKJ to adopt the principle of unanimity in decision-making, obtaining veto power for the republican branches of the SKJ in April 1970.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=222–225}}

[[1968 student demonstrations in Yugoslavia|Student demonstrations erupted in Belgrade in June 1968]] against authoritarian aspects of the Yugoslav regime, market reforms, and their impact on Yugoslav society. The students were inspired by the worldwide [[protests of 1968]],{{sfn|Fichter|2016|pp=110–112}} and criticism of the reforms leveled by the [[Marxist humanist]] [[Praxis School]].{{sfn|Trencsényi|Kopeček|Lisjak Gabrijelčič|Falina|2018|p=428}} They opposed decentralisation and criticised nationalism in Yugoslavia through the ''Praxis'' journal.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=249}} In November 1968, [[Petar Stambolić]] and other SKS leaders whose political views were a blend of communist [[dogmatism]] and [[Serbian nationalism]],{{sfn|Miller|2007|pp=188–189}} were removed on Tito's initiative.{{sfn|Lampe|2000|p=309}} Tito specifically blamed Stambolić for not stopping the student demonstrations in a timely fashion.{{sfn|Miller|2007|pp=188–189}} The replacements were [[Marko Nikezić]], as the [[President of the League of Communists of Serbia|president]], and [[Latinka Perović]] as the secretary of the SKS, respectively. Nikezić and Perović supported [[market economy|market-based reforms]] and a policy of non-interference in other republics' affairs except where officials from those republics denounced Serbian nationalism outside of Serbia.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=243–244}}