Editing Defence of property (section)

==English law==
Generally, see [[self-defence in English law]]. In addition to the right of self-defence at [[common law]], section 3 of the [[Criminal Law Act 1967]] states that
:A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime or in arresting offenders or suspects.

Insofar as an attack on property is a crime, reasonable force may be used to prevent the crime or to arrest the offender, whether it be [[theft]] of a sum of money or the [[Criminal Damage Act 1971|damage]] of an object. In many cases of [[robbery]] and [[burglary]], the threat will be to both a person and property, and this combination can be a powerful defence. In ''AG's Reference (No 2 of 1983)'' (1984) 1 AER 988<ref>{{cite BAILII | litigants =Attorney-General's Reference No 2 of 1983 | link = | country = | court = EWCA | division = Crim | year = 1984 | num = 1 | para = | eucase = | parallelcite = [1984] QB 456  | date = 3 February 1984 | courtname = [[Court of Appeal of England and Wales|Court of Appeal]] | juris = }}</ref> Lane CJ. held that a defendant who manufactured ten petrol bombs to defend his shop during the [[Toxteth Riots]] could set up the defence of showing that he possessed an explosive substance "for a lawful purpose" if he could show he acted to protect himself or his family or property by means he believed reasonably necessary to meet the attack. In theory, the defence of property by itself cannot reasonably provide a justification for inflicting serious injury, but there are a number of cases approving considerable violence to arrest criminals threatening property.

Although ''R v Scully'' (1824) 171 ER 1213 held that it was not justifiable to shoot an intruder merely to arrest him, on the facts, "the life of the prisoner was threatened, and if he considered his life in actual danger, he was justified in shooting the deceased as he had done; but if, not considering his own life in danger, he rashly shot this man, who was only a trespasser, he would be guilty of manslaughter." See [[self-defence (Australia)]] for a comparative view on whether the use of excessive force causing death should give rise to a mitigatory defence and "Reform" below. In ''Mead and Belt's Case'' (1823) 68 ER 1006. Holroyd J. instructed a jury that violence could not be used against a civil trespasser, adding: "But, the making an attack upon a dwelling, and especially at night, the law regards as equivalent to an assault on a man's person; for a man's house is his castle and therefore, in the eye of the law, it is equivalent to an assault."

One recent case on using force against a burglar is ''[[Tony Martin (farmer)|Anthony Martin]] v R'' (2001) EWCA 2245,<ref>{{cite BAILII | litigants = Martin v R | link = Tony Martin (farmer) | country = | court = EWCA | division = Crim | year = 2001 | num = 2245 | para = | eucase = | parallelcite = [2002] 2 WLR 1, [2002] 1 Cr App R 27, [2003] QB 1 | date = 30 October 2001 | courtname = [[Court of Appeal of England and Wales|Court of Appeal]] | juris = }}</ref> which resulted in the householder being convicted. As the law currently stands, a person in possession can use no more force than they reasonably believe necessary to remove a trespasser from the premises. Further, where the threat to the land or its possession is not immediate, and other measures could be taken that would make force unnecessary (e.g., calling the police or seeking remedies through the courts) the defence will normally be lost. 

But in ''Chamberlain v Lindon'' (1998) 1 WLR 1252,<ref>{{cite BAILII | litigants = Chamberlain v Lindon | link = | country = | court = EWHC | division = Admin | year = 1998 | num = 329| para = | eucase = | parallelcite = | date = 18 March 1998 | courtname = [[High Court of Justice|High Court]] | juris = }}</ref> Lindon demolished a wall to protect a [[right of way (transit)|right-of-way]], honestly believing that it was a reasonable means of protecting his property (and, incidentally, avoiding litigation). It was held that it was not necessary to decide whether Lindon's action was justified as a matter of civil law. For the purpose of the criminal law, what mattered was whether Lindon believed that his actions were reasonable. Although this case is on the specific interpretation of the statutory defence under §5 [[Criminal Damage Act 1971]], the fact that the defendant was not "out of time" after nine months of inaction is interesting.{{according to whom|date=July 2024}} On a similar statutory defence, ''DPP v Bayer and Others'' (2004) 1 Cr. App. R. 493<ref>{{cite BAILII | litigants = Director of Public Prosecutions v Bayer & Ors | link = | country = | court = EWHC | division = Admin | year = 2003 | num = 2567 | para = | eucase = | parallelcite = [2004] 1 WLR 2856  | date = 4 November  | courtname = [[High Court of Justice|High Court]] | juris = }}</ref> dealt with defence of private property as a defence to aggravated trespass under section 68 of the [[Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994]].

The court held that if defendants argued they had used reasonable force to defend property from actual or imminent damage that would constitute a criminal act, then the court had to consider whether, on the facts as the defendants honestly believed them to be, the force used was reasonable in all the circumstances.