Editing Dieppe Raid (section)

==Background==

===Dunkirk to Dieppe===
In the aftermath of the [[Dunkirk evacuation]] of the [[British Expeditionary Force (World War II)|British Expeditionary Force]] in May 1940, the British started on the development of a substantial raiding force under the umbrella of [[Combined Operations Headquarters]]. This was accompanied by the development of techniques and equipment for [[amphibious warfare]]. In late 1941, a scheme was put forward for the landing of 12 [[Division (military)|divisions]] around [[Le Havre]], assuming a withdrawal of German troops to counter Soviet success in the east. From this came [[Operation Rutter]] to test the feasibility of capturing a port by an opposed landing, the investigation of the problems of operating the invasion fleet and testing equipment and techniques of the assault.<ref>Buckingham 2004, p. 15.</ref>

After its victory in the [[Battle of Britain]] in 1940 and the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} having switched to night bombing in the autumn of 1940, the day fighters of [[Royal Air Force]] [[RAF Fighter Command|Fighter Command]] were "a force without an immediate mission".<ref name="Copp pages 6-9">Copp, Terry. "The Air over Dieppe." ''Legion'', June 1996, p. 6.</ref> Without anything else to do, the day fighters of RAF Fighter Command were in the spring of 1941 deployed on a series of search-and-destroy missions of flying over France to engage the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} in combat. In the second half of 1941, the aerial offensive over France was greatly stepped up, leading to the loss of 411 British and Canadian aircraft.<ref name="Copp pages 6-9"/> In the spring of 1942, the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} deployed the new [[Focke-Wulf Fw 190]] fighter to its airfields in France.<ref name="ReferenceA">Copp, Terry. "The Air over Dieppe." ''Legion'', June 1996, p. 7.</ref>

The Fw 190 was superior to the [[Supermarine Spitfire]] Mk V and [[Hawker Hurricane]] Mk IIs used by the British and Canadian pilots and losses over France increased.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> The RAF was convinced it was winning the air war, believing that the loss of 259 Spitfires over France in the first six months of 1942 were justified by the reported destruction of 197 German aircraft in the same period. A major problem for the RAF was that the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} German fighter pilots declined to engage in combat over the French coast and instead operated inland, forcing the British Spitfires to fly deeper into France, using up their fuel, placing them at a disadvantage when the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} engaged, and, critically, if RAF pilots had to bail out they would be in enemy occupied territory, i.e. RAF Fighter command was now operating with all the disadvantages the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} had to contend with in the Battle of Britain. Thanks to intelligence provided by [[Ultra (cryptography)|Ultra]], the British knew that if any Allied force attempted to seize a port in France, the Germans would assume it to be the beginning of an invasion and thus the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} was to mount a maximum effort. Fighter Command lobbied in early 1942, for a raid to seize a French port to provoke the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} into action with the RAF at an advantage.<ref name="ReferenceA"/>

===Dieppe===
Dieppe, a coastal town in the [[Seine-Inférieure]] [[Departments of France|department]] of France, is built along a long cliff that overlooks the [[English Channel]]. The river [[Scie (river)|Scie]] is on the western end of the town and the [[Arques (river)|Arques]] flows through the town and into a medium-sized harbour. In 1942, the Germans had demolished some seafront buildings to aid in coastal defence and had set up two large artillery batteries at [[Berneval-le-Grand]] and [[Varengeville-sur-Mer]]. One important consideration for the planners was that Dieppe was within range of the RAF's fighter aircraft.<ref name=juno>[http://www.junobeach.org/canada-in-wwii/articles/the-dieppe-raid/ "Dieppe raid."] ''Juno Beach Centre''. Retrieved: 23 March 2016.</ref>

There was also intense pressure from the Soviet government to open a second front in [[Western Europe]]. By early 1942, the Wehrmacht's [[Operation Barbarossa]] had clearly failed to destroy the Soviet Union. However, the Germans in a much less ambitious [[Case Blue|summer offensive]] launched in June, were deep into southern Soviet territory, pushing toward [[Battle of Stalingrad|Stalingrad]]. [[Joseph Stalin]] himself repeatedly demanded that the Allies create a second front in France to force the Germans to move at least 40 divisions away from the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] to remove some of the pressure put on the [[Red Army]] in the Soviet Union.<ref>Whitaker 1992, p. 29.</ref>

The proposed Allied invasion of continental Europe in 1943, [[Operation Roundup (1942)|Operation Roundup]], was considered impractical by military planners, and the alternative of landing in 1942, [[Operation Sledgehammer]], even more difficult. The British had been engaged with the Italians and the Germans in the [[Western Desert campaign]] since June 1940. At the [[Second Washington Conference]] in June 1942, U.S. President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] and British Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] decided to postpone the cross-English Channel invasion and schedule [[Operation Torch]], the Anglo-American invasion of [[French North Africa]], for later that year. In the interim, a large-scale Canadian-led raid on the French coast was intended to take some of the pressure off the Soviet Union.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Normandy Landings, Operations Overlord and Neptune|url=http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsNormandy.htm|access-date=2020-11-27|website=www.naval-history.net}}</ref>

The objective of the raid was discussed by Winston Churchill in his war memoirs:<ref name="Churchill 1950, pp. 509-510">Churchill 1950, pp.&nbsp;509–510.</ref>

{{blockquote|I thought it most important that a large-scale operation should take place this summer, and military opinion seemed unanimous that until an operation on that scale was undertaken, no responsible general would take the responsibility of planning the main invasion&nbsp;...In discussion with [[Louis Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma|Admiral Mountbatten]] it became clear that time did not permit a new large-scale operation to be mounted during the summer ''(after Rutter had been cancelled)'', but that Dieppe could be remounted (with the new code-name "Jubilee") within a month, provided extraordinary steps were taken to ensure secrecy.  For this reason, no records were kept but, after the Canadian authorities and the Chiefs of Staff had given their approval, I personally went through the plans with the [[Chief of the Imperial General Staff|C.I.G.S.]], Admiral Mountbatten, and the Naval Force Commander, Captain J. Hughes-Hallett.}}

=== Role of Louis Mountbatten ===
On the directive of Winston Churchill, [[Lord Mountbatten|Louis Mountbatten]] was recalled from captaincy of the aircraft carrier {{HMS|Illustrious|87|6}} while it was under repair in the US in 1941{{efn|Mountbatten had been posted early to the ship, which was not expected to be back in service until November, so he could tour the United States meeting influential members of press, military and the administration{{sfn|Ziegler|1985 |pp=148–150 }}  }} and instated as adviser on combined operations of the British Army (replacing Admiral [[Roger Keyes]]{{efn|Keyes was a veteran of First World War amphibious raids including the Gallipoli campaign and [[Zeebrugge raid]]}} who as director of combined operations had fallen out with the chiefs of staff and Churchill{{sfn|Ziegler|1985 |p=155}}), later to be promoted to the post of chief of combined operations on 4 March 1942. Churchill personally briefed Mountbatten that he wanted raids of increasing intensity, developing equipment and training with a view to the invasion of France; the chiefs of staff directive limited Mountbatten's authority to approving only small raids, through using special service troops. He held a dual role as adviser to the chiefs of staff and commodore combined operations, handling the administration of both small raids and larger operations.{{sfn|Ziegler|1985 |pp=156, 160}} In 1942 Mountbatten was raised by Churchill as a full member of meetings of the chiefs of staff with acting rank of vice-admiral, air marshal and lieutenant general.{{sfn|Ziegler|1985 |pp=168–169}} In May 1942 it was agreed that Combined Operations HQ would handle detailed planning of the Dieppe raid.{{citation needed|date=August 2022}}

COHQ proposed flanking landings that would take Dieppe in a pincer movement, but Home Forces argued for a frontal attack as, within the 15-hour window of the raid, the flank attacks would not have enough time to achieve success. At meetings Mountbatten argued that it was sufficient for the raid to show that the tactics would have worked, Montgomery countered that if the raid did not take Dieppe it would be seen as a failure.{{sfn|Ziegler|1985 |pp=187–188}} An initial heavy bombardment from the air was approved (despite concerns about civilian casualties) then rescinded due to army opinion that wreckage would block streets for the tanks and RAF belief that most of the bombs would end up in the sea or inland. Mountbatten pressed for the firepower of a battleship for bombardment in lieu of bombing but neither this nor cruisers was permitted. Equally, Combined Operations' proposed assault force of marines and commandos was passed over in favour of untried Canadian troops.{{sfn|Ziegler|1985 |pp=199–189}}

Mountbatten was well known for his chivalry and charming abilities; however, he lacked experience in terms of actual warfare.{{efn|Mountbatten had served in the Royal Navy since 1916}} Even before taking up this role, Mountbatten had faced a rough patch at sea captaining the British Navy's {{HMS|Kelly|F01|6}} as commander of the [[5th Destroyer Flotilla]], where his performance was so below par that [[Denis Healey]]{{snd}} who was secretary of state for defence when Mountbatten was [[Chief of the Defence Staff (United Kingdom)|chief of the defence staff]] in the 1960s{{snd}} remarked, "but his birth saved him from the court martial any other officer would have faced".<ref>{{Cite book|first=Denis |last=Healy|title=The Time of My Life|page=259}}</ref>

Despite his shortcomings, Mountbatten played an important role in the planning of the whole operation. The Dieppe raid was intended as an experiment and was initially planned to take place at the end of June 1942. Preparations were in full swing with two rehearsals taking place in [[Bridport]] on 13 and 23 June; the second due to the debacle that the first rehearsal had turned into.{{sfn|Ziegler|1985 |p=190}} However, bad weather delayed the operation by three weeks and two vessels that were to be used had been put out of action by bombs.{{sfn|Ziegler|1985 |p=190}} This made the chiefs of staff uneasy thinking that the Germans would have found out about the attack by then as the plan was no longer a secret to the more than 10,000 Allied troops who had been informed of it. On 8 July, General [[Bernard Montgomery]] recommended calling off the attack altogether, and the idea would probably have been shelved had it not been for Mountbatten's proposal to relaunch the operation six weeks later, still aiming at Dieppe. His argument was that although the enemy must have found out that Dieppe had been the original target, "the very last thing they'd (Germans) ever imagine is that we would be so stupid as to lay on the same operation again".{{sfn|Ziegler|1985 |p=190}}

Mountbatten's hubristic approach convinced the generals to go ahead with the plan, which ultimately turned out to be catastrophic. Although Churchill, [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] and Mountbatten collectively staved off any blame for the outcome, Mountbatten bore the brunt of it. Mountbatten was reluctant to accept the blame and shifted it to peripheral reasons by passing apologetic and sometimes insensitive remarks.{{citation needed|date=August 2022}}

===Operation Rutter===
Operation Rutter was devised to satisfy several objectives, as a show of support for the [[Soviet Union]], to provide an opportunity for the Canadian forces in Britain to engage the [[Wehrmacht|German Army]] and as a morale booster for the British public, among whom were vociferous supporters of a second front to give tangible support to the Red Army.

At the time, the military thought that when the real invasion of Europe began, it would be important to quickly capture a port before the Germans could demolish the facilities or re-capture it by a counter-attack. The extent of the [[Atlantic Wall|German fortification of French ports]] was uncertain and how organised an [[amphibious attack]] could be after a Channel crossing and how a surprise element could be achieved was also in doubt. Rutter was devised to provide the experience that would be needed later in the war.

Rutter was a combined operation, involving heavy bombers of [[RAF Bomber Command]] and the heavy ships of the [[Royal Navy]] to bombard German defences overlooking the beaches; parachute and glider troops would silence German heavy artillery commanding the approaches to the port. The main force of infantry and tanks would land and advance through the port to the outskirts and dig in to resist counter-attacks until it was time to withdraw and re-embark in their landing craft.

The [[2nd Canadian Infantry Division]] was chosen for the operation and given three months' specialist training in amphibious operations up to July. The Canadians assembled at embarkation ports and went aboard their ships, where the target was revealed. German aircraft spotting and bombing the assembled ships<ref name="leasor1"/>{{page needed|date=August 2022}} and inclement weather forced a delay in sailing and on 7 July, Rutter was cancelled and the troops disembarked.{{sfn|Christie|2000|pp=6–7}}<ref name=bbcdieppe>Julian Thompson: [https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/dieppe_raid_01.shtml ''The Dieppe Raid.''] ''[[BBC]] (World Wars in Depth series),'' 6 June 2010.</ref><ref name=comb>[http://www.combinedops.com/Dieppe.htm "Operation Jubilee."] ''Combined Operations'', 7 June 2010.</ref>