Editing Diplomatic recognition (section)

==Recognition of states and governments==
Diplomatic recognition must be distinguished from formal recognition of states or their governments.<ref>See Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) pages 1–4</ref> The fact that states do not maintain bilateral diplomatic relations does not mean that they do not recognize or treat one another as states. A state is not required to accord formal bilateral recognition to any other state, and some have a general policy of not doing so, considering that a vote for its membership of an international organisation restricted to states, such as the [[United Nations]], is an act of recognition.

===History===
Some consider that a state has a responsibility not to recognize as a state any entity that has attained the qualifications for statehood by a violation of basic principles of the [[UN Charter]]: the [[UN Security Council]] has in several instances ([[United Nations Security Council Resolution 216|Resolution 216]] (1965) and [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 217|Resolution 217]] (1965), concerning [[Rhodesia]]; [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 541|Resolution 541]] (1983), concerning [[Northern Cyprus]]; and [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 787|Resolution 787]] (1992), concerning the [[Republika Srpska]]) issued Chapter VII resolutions (binding in international law) that denied their statehood and precluded recognition.  In the 2010 [[International Court of Justice advisory opinion on Kosovo's declaration of independence]], the [[International Court of Justice|ICJ]] ruled that "general international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence."<ref>[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100821055950/http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf |date=2010-08-21 }}, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 403, para. 84.</ref> The Court carefully noted "that in all of those instances the Security Council was making a determination as regards the concrete situation existing at the time that those declarations of independence were made; the illegality attached to the declarations of independence thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful [[Use of force in international law|use of force]] or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular, those of a peremptory character (jus cogens). In the context of Kosovo, the Security Council has never taken this position.  The exceptional character of the resolutions enumerated above appears to the Court to confirm that no general prohibition against unilateral declarations of independence may be inferred from the practice of the Security Council."<ref>ICJ Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, para. 81.</ref>

States can exercise their recognition powers either explicitly or implicitly.<ref>See, e.g., Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States, American Law Institute Publishers, 1990, {{ISBN|0-314-30138-0}}, § 202 (Recognition or Acceptance of States), § 203 (Recognition or Acceptance of Governments); and § 204 (Recognition and Maintaining Diplomatic Relations).</ref> The recognition of a government implies recognition of the state it governs, but even countries which have a policy of formally recognising states may not have a policy of doing the same regarding governments.

[[File:Israel-Palestine Diplomacy.svg|thumb|right|270px|
{{legend|#cdcd9c|Recognition of both [[Israel]] and [[Palestine]]}}
{{legend|#0052ff|Recognition of Israel only}}
{{legend|#5fadff|Recognition of Israel, with some relations to Palestine}}
{{legend|#FF4500|Recognition of Palestine only}}
{{legend|#E5A238|Recognition of Palestine, with some relations to Israel}}]]

''De facto'' recognition of states, rather than ''de jure'', is rare. ''De jure'' recognition is stronger, while ''de facto'' recognition is more tentative and recognizes only that a government exercises control over a territory. An example of the difference is when the [[United Kingdom]] recognized the [[History of Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union (1917–27)|Soviet state]] ''de facto'' in 1921, but ''de jure'' only in 1924. Another example is the state of [[Israel]] in 1948, whose government was immediately recognized ''de facto'' by the [[United States]] and three days later ''de jure'' by the [[Soviet Union]]. Another example is the [[Republic]] [[Indonesia|of Indonesia]] which was whose government was recognized ''de facto'' by the [[Netherlands]] in 1946 and ''de jure'' by the international community in 1949. Also, the [[Republic of China]], commonly known as "[[Taiwan]]", is generally recognized as ''de facto'' independent and sovereign, but is not universally recognized as ''de jure'' independent due to the complex [[political status of Taiwan]] related to the United Nations' withdrawal of recognition in favor of the [[People's Republic of China]] in 1971.

Renewing recognition of a government is not necessary when it changes in a normal, constitutional way (such as an [[election]] or [[referendum]]), but may be necessary in the case of a [[coup d'etat]] or [[revolution]]. Recognition of a new government by other states can be important for its long-term survival. For instance, the [[Taliban]] government of the [[Islamic State of Afghanistan]], which lasted from 1996 to 2001, was recognized only by [[Pakistan]], the [[United Arab Emirates]], and [[Saudi Arabia]], while far more had recognized the government of ousted President [[Burhanuddin Rabbani]]. The [[disputed territory]] of [[Jammu and Kashmir (state)|Jammu and Kashmir]] under the control of [[India]] is not recognized by either [[Pakistan]] or the [[People's Republic of China]], and the [[Republic of Turkey]].

Recognition can be implied by other acts, such as a visit of the [[head of state]], or the signing of a bilateral treaty. If implicit recognition is possible, a state may feel the need to explicitly proclaim that its acts do not constitute diplomatic recognition, like when the United States commenced its dialogue with the [[Palestine Liberation Organization]] in 1988.

Formal diplomatic recognition can be used as a tool of political influence with examples including [[European Community]]'s conditional recognition of independence of former republics of [[SFR Yugoslavia]] in early 1990s dependent on new states commitment to protection of [[Human rights|human]] and [[national minorities]] rights.<ref name="Caplan">{{cite journal |last=Caplan |first=Richard |date=2002 |title=Conditional recognition as an instrument of ethnic conflict regulation: the European Community and Yugoslavia |journal=[[Nations and Nationalism (journal)|Nations and Nationalism]] |volume=8 |issue=2 |pages=157–177 |doi=10.1111/1469-8219.00044 }}</ref>