Editing Divine command theory (section)

==General form==
Although "divine command" is the standard term in the literature, God addresses people in all sorts of ways.  The [[scholasticism|scholastics]] distinguished between five different forms of God's revealed will, and they can be summarized in a [[Latin]] [[dactylic hexameter]], "''Praecipit et prohibet, permittit, consultit, implet''". ''Praecipit'' means "gives precepts to". Precepts tell people to do something. They can include warning, admonishment or exhortation.  ''Prohibet'' means "prohibits".  A prohibition is a command not to do something.  ''Permittit'' means "permits". A permission is not a command because a person is permitted both to do the thing and not to do it.  ''Consultit'' means "counsels". They can include advice, instruction or invitation.  They are different from commands as the latter generally generate obligation, and there is normally some expectation of condemnation if the command is not carried out.  Finally, ''implet'' means "fulfils", which are directly effective commands. They do not need language-using human recipients. An example is "Let there be light", and there is light. Sometimes "command" is taken to mean the whole family of speech acts, but sometimes it only includes those prescriptions which generate obligation.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Hare |first1=John E. |title=God's Command |date=2015 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford |isbn=978-0-19-960201-8 |pages=32–49}}</ref>

Philosophers including [[William of Ockham]] ({{circa|1287–1347}}), [[St Augustine]] (354–430), [[Duns Scotus]] ({{circa|1265–1308}}), and [[John Calvin]] (1509–1564) have presented various forms of divine command theory. The theory generally teaches that moral truth does not exist independently of [[God]] and that divine commands determine morality. Stronger versions of the theory assert that God's command is the only reason that a good action is moral, while weaker variations cast divine command as a vital component within a greater reason.<ref name="Martin">{{harvnb|Martin|1993|p= 229}}</ref> The theory asserts that good actions are morally good as a result of divine command, and many [[religious belief|religious believers]] subscribe to some form of divine command theory.<ref>{{harvnb|Geirsson|Holmgren|2010|p= 37}}</ref> Because of these premises, adherents believe that moral obligation is obedience to God's commands; what is morally right is what God desires.<ref name=austin/>

Divine command theory features in the [[ethics]] of many contemporary religions – including [[Judaism]], [[Islam]], the [[Bahá'í Faith]], and [[Christianity]] – as well as featuring in numerous [[polytheism|polytheistic religions]].<ref>{{harvnb|Rae|2009|loc=ch. 2}}</ref> In [[ancient Athens]], citizens commonly held that moral truth was tied directly to divine commands, and religious piety was almost equivalent to morality.<ref>{{harvnb|Kowalski|2011|p=98}}</ref><nowiki> Although Christianity does not entail divine command theory, people commonly associate the two. DCT can be a plausible theory to Christians because the traditional conception of God as the </nowiki>[[Creator deity|creator]] of the universe parallels the idea that he created moral truths. The theory is supported by the Christian view that God is [[omnipotent|all-powerful]] because this implies that God creates moral truths, rather than moral truths existing independently of him, which seems inconsistent with his [[omnipotence]].<ref name="Martin" />

===Augustine===
[[File:Gerard Seghers (attr) - The Four Doctors of the Western Church, Saint Augustine of Hippo (354–430).jpg|thumb|The Four Doctors of the Western Church, Saint Augustine of Hippo (354–430), [[Gerard Seghers]]]]

[[Saint Augustine]] offered a version of divine command theory that began by casting ethics as the pursuit of the [[supreme good]], which delivers human [[happiness]]. He argued that to achieve this happiness, humans must love objects that are worthy of human love in the correct manner; this requires humans to love God, which then allows them to correctly love that which is worthy of being loved. Augustine's ethics proposed that the act of loving God enables humans to properly orient their loves, leading to human happiness and [[Self-fulfillment|fulfilment]].<ref name=austin/> Augustine supported [[Plato| Plato's]] view that a well-ordered [[soul]] is a desirable consequence of morality. However, unlike Plato, he believed that achieving a well-ordered soul had a higher purpose: living in accordance with God's commands. His view of morality was thus [[heteronomous (disambiguation)|heteronomous]], as he believed in deference to a higher authority (God), rather than acting [[autonomy#Philosophy|autonomously]].<ref>{{harvnb|Connolly|Keller|Leever|White|2009|p=24}}</ref>

===John Duns Scotus===
[[File:JohnDunsScotus.jpg|thumb|John Duns Scotus, who proposed a variant of divine command theory]]

[[Scholasticism|Scholastic]] philosopher [[John Duns Scotus]] argued that the only moral obligations that God could not take away from humans involve loving God, as God is, definitionally, the most loveable thing.<ref>{{cite book | title= Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy | publisher= Oxford University Press | author= Swinburne, Richard | year= 2007 | pages= 358–359 | isbn= 978-0-19-921246-0}}</ref> Scotus argued that the [[natural law]], in the strictest sense, contains only what is self-evidently [[logical truth|analytically true]] and that God could not make these statements false. This means that the commands of natural law do not depend on God's will, and thus form the first three commandments of the [[Ten Commandments]]. The last seven of the Ten Commandments do not belong to the natural law in the strictest sense.<ref>{{cite book|last1= Scotus|first1= John Duns|title= Selected Writings on Ethics|year= 2017|publisher= Oxford University Press|isbn= 978-0-19-967341-4|pages= Ordinatio III, D. 37, "Do all the precepts of the Decalogue belong to the natural law?"}}</ref> Whilst humanity's duties to God are [[Self-evidence|self-evident]], [[Analytic proposition|true by definition]], and unchangeable even by God, mankind's duties to others (found on the second tablet) were arbitrarily willed by God and are within his power to revoke and replace (although, the third commandment, to honour the Sabbath and keep it holy, has a little of both, as humanity is absolutely obliged to render worship to God, but there is no obligation in natural law to do it on this day or that). Scotus does note, however that the last seven commandments:

{{quote|...are highly consonant with [the natural law], though they do not follow necessarily from first practical principles that are known in virtue of their terms and are necessarily known by any intellect that understands their terms. And it is certain that all the precepts of the second table belong to the natural law in this second way, since their rectitude is highly consonant with first practical principles that are known necessarily.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Scotus|first1=John Duns|title=Selected Writings on Ethics|year=2017|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-967341-4|pages=Ordinatio III, D. 37, Q. UN, para. 25, 26}}</ref>{{sfn|Williams|2013|loc=[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/duns-scotus/#NatLaw Ethics and Moral Psychology: The natural law]}}{{sfn|Williams|2002|pp=312–316}}<ref>See {{harvnb|Cross|1999|p=92}} for the view that our duties to others "hold automatically [i.e., without God's commands] unless God commands otherwise."</ref>}}

Scotus justifies this position with the example of a peaceful society, noting that the possession of private property is not necessary to have a peaceful society, but that "those of weak character" would be more easily made peaceful with private property than without. Hence, the last seven commandments do belong to the natural law, but not in the strictest sense, as they belong to the natural law by rectitude rather than by definition.

===Thomas Aquinas===
{{Roman Catholic Church}}
Whilst [[Thomas Aquinas]], as a natural law theorist, is generally seen as holding that morality is not willed by God,<ref>{{Cite book|chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas/#NatLaw|title = The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|chapter = Saint Thomas Aquinas|year = 2018|publisher = Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref> Kelly James Clark and Anne Poortenga have presented a defence of divine command theory based on Aquinas' moral theory. Aquinas proposed a theory of natural law which asserted that something is moral if it works towards the purpose of human existence, and so human nature can determine what is moral. Clark and Poortenga argued that God created human nature and thus commanded a certain morality; hence he cannot arbitrarily change what is right or wrong for humans.<ref name=austin/>

===Immanuel Kant===
The [[deontological ethics]] of [[Immanuel Kant]] has been cast as rejecting divine command theory by several figures, among whom is ethicist [[R. M. Hare]]. Kant's view that morality should be determined by the [[categorical imperative]] – duty to the moral law, rather than acting for a specific end – has been viewed as incompatible with divine command theory. Philosopher and theologian [[John E. Hare]] has noted that some philosophers see divine command theory as an example of Kant's [[heteronomy|heteronomous will]] – motives besides the moral law, which Kant regarded as non-moral.<ref name=PT263>{{harvnb|Phillips|Tessin|2000|p=263}}</ref> American philosopher [[Lewis White Beck]] takes Kant's argument to be a refutation of the theory that morality depends on divine authority.<ref>{{harvnb|Phillips|Tessin|2000|p=264}}</ref> John E. Hare challenges this view, arguing that [[Kantian ethics]] should be seen as compatible with divine command theory.<ref name=PT263/>

===Robert Adams===
[[File:RobertMerrihewAdams20060625.jpg|thumb|Robert Merrihew Adams proposes what he calls a "modified divine command theory".]]

American philosopher [[Robert Merrihew Adams]] proposes what he calls a "modified divine command theory".<ref name=P&R2008>{{harvnb|Pojman|Rea|2008|p=558}}</ref> Adams presents the basic form of his theory by asserting that two statements are equivalent:

#It is wrong to do X.
#It is contrary to God's commands to do X.<ref name=P&R2008/>

He proposes that God's commands precede moral truths and must be explained in terms of moral truths, not the other way around. Adams writes that his theory is an attempt to define what being ethically 'wrong' consists of and accepts that it is only useful to those within a [[Judeo-Christian]] context. In dealing with the criticism that a seemingly immoral act would be obligatory if God commanded it, he proposes that God does not command cruelty for its own sake. Adams does not propose that it would be logically impossible for God to command cruelty, rather that it would be unthinkable for him to do so because of his nature. Adams emphasises the importance of [[faith]] in God, specifically faith in God's goodness, as well as his existence.<ref>{{harvnb|Pojman|Rea|2008|pp=558–559}}</ref>

Adams proposes that an action is morally wrong [[if and only if]] it defies the commands of a loving God. If cruelty was commanded, he would not be loving; Adams argued that, in this instance, God's commands would not have to be obeyed and also that his theory of ethical wrongness would break down. He proposed that divine command morality assumes that human concepts of right and wrong are met by God's commands and that the theory can only be applied if this is the case.<ref>{{harvnb|Harris|2003|pp=32–33}}</ref> Adams' theory attempts to counter the challenge that morality might be arbitrary, as moral commands are not based solely on the commands of God, but are founded on his [[omnibenevolence]]. It attempts to challenge the claim that an external standard of morality prevents God from being sovereign by making him the source of morality and his character the moral law.<ref name=austin/>

Adams proposes that in many Judeo-Christian contexts, the term 'wrong' is used to mean being contrary to God's commands. In ethical contexts, he believes that 'wrong' entails an [[emotivism|emotional]] attitude against an action and that these two uses of wrongness usually correlate.<ref>{{harvnb|Pojman|Rea|2008|pp=561–562}}</ref> Adams suggests that a believer's concept of morality is founded in their religious belief and that right and wrong are tied to their belief in God; this works because God always commands what believers accept to be right. If God commanded what a believer perceived as wrong, the believer would not say it is right or wrong to disobey him; rather their concept of morality would break down.<ref>{{harvnb|Pojman|Rea|2008|p=559}}</ref>

Michael Austin writes that an implication of this modified divine command theory is that God cannot command cruelty for its own sake; this could be argued to be inconsistent with God's omnipotence. Aquinas argued that God's omnipotence should be understood as the ability to do all things that are possible: he attempted to refute the idea that God's inability to perform illogical actions challenges his omnipotence. Austin contends that commanding cruelty for its own sake is not illogical, so is not covered by Aquinas' defence, although Aquinas had argued that sin is the falling short of a perfect action and thus not compatible with omnipotence.<ref name=austin/>

===Alternative theories===
[[Paul Copan]] argues from a Christian viewpoint that man, made in God's image, conforms to God's sense of morality. The description of actions as right or wrong are therefore relevant to God; a person's sense of what is right or wrong corresponds to God's.<ref name=Copan>Copan, Paul, and William Lane Craig. ''Passionate Conviction: Contemporary Discourses on Christian Apologetics.'' Nashville, Tennessee: B&H Publishing Group, 2007. p. 91.</ref>
{{Quote|We would not know goodness without God's endowing us with a moral constitution. We have rights, dignity, freedom, and responsibility because God has designed us this way. In this, we reflect God's moral goodness as His image-bearers.|Paul Copan|Passionate Conviction: Contemporary Discourses on Christian Apologetics<ref name="Copan" />}}

As an alternative to divine command theory, Linda Zagzebski has proposed divine motivation theory, which still fits into a monotheistic framework. According to this theory, goodness is determined by God's motives, rather than by what he commands. Divine motivation theory is similar to [[virtue ethics]] because it considers the character of an agent, and whether they are in accordance with God's, as the standard for moral value.<ref>{{harvnb|Baggett|Walls|2011|p=258}}</ref> Zagzebski argues that things in the world have objective moral properties, such as being lovable, which are given to them through God's perception of them. God's attitude towards something is cast as a morally good attitude.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-238093747.html | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130518175300/http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-238093747.html | url-status=dead | archive-date=18 May 2013 | title=Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. Divine Motivation Theory.(Book review) | publisher=The Review of Metaphysics | date=1 September 2010 | access-date=25 August 2012 | author=Toner, Christopher |via=[[HighBeam Research]]|url-access=subscription }}</ref> The theory casts God as a good example for morality, and humans should imitate his virtues as much as is possible for finite, imperfect beings.<ref>
{{harvnb|Langermann|2011|p= 54}}
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