Editing Easter Offensive (section)

==Background==

===Planning===
{{Further|topic=the Laotian incursion|Operation Lam Son 719}}
In the wake of the failed South Vietnamese [[Operation Lam Son 719]], the [[Hanoi]] leadership began discussing a possible offensive during the 19th Plenum of the Central Committee of the [[Vietnam Workers' Party]] in early 1971.{{sfn|Fulghum|Maitland|1984|p=122}} Convinced that they had destroyed South Vietnam's best units during Lam Son 719, by December, the [[Politburo]] had decided to launch a major offensive early in the following year. 1972 would be a U.S. presidential election year, and the possibility of affecting the outcome was enticing and there was increasing anti-war sentiment among the population and government of the U.S.{{sfn|Palmer|1978|pp=310–311}} With American troop withdrawals, South Vietnamese forces were stretched to breaking point along a border of more than {{convert|600|mi|km|0}} and the poor performance of ARVN troops in the offensive into [[Laos]] promised an easy victory.

This decision marked the end of three years of political infighting between two factions within the Politburo: those members grouped around [[Trường Chinh]], who favored following the Chinese model of continued low-intensity [[guerrilla warfare]] and rebuilding the north, and the "southern firsters" around Defense Minister [[Võ Nguyên Giáp]], supported by First Party Secretary [[Lê Duẩn]] (both of whom supported the [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] model of big offensives).{{sfn|Andrade|1995|pp=36–37}} The failure of the [[Tet Offensive]] of 1968 had led to a downgrading of Giáp's influence, but the victory achieved over South Vietnamese forces during the Laotian incursion brought Giáp's strategy back into the ascendant.{{sfn|Andrade|1995|pp=36–37}} Lê Duẩn was given responsibility for planning the operation but Giáp never rose to his former prominence, dealing chiefly with logistical matters and the approval of operational planning.{{sfn|Fulghum|Maitland|1984|p=122}} The officer entrusted with the conduct of the offensive was the PAVN chief of staff, General [[Văn Tiến Dũng]].

The central questions then became where and with what forces the offensive would be launched and what its goals were to be. North Vietnam had used the border regions of Laos and [[Cambodia]] as supply and manpower conduits for a decade and a [[Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone|demilitarized zone]] (DMZ) that separated the two Vietnams. There, the line of communication would be shortest and forces could be concentrated where "the enemy is weakest...violent attacks will disintegrate enemy forces...making it impossible for him to have enough troops to deploy elsewhere."{{sfn|Fulghum|Maitland|1984|p=122}} This was an important consideration, since the northern thrust would serve to divert South Vietnamese attention and resources, while two other attacks were to be launched: one into the [[Central Highlands (Vietnam)|Central Highlands]], to cut the country in two and another eastwards from Cambodia to threaten [[Saigon]].<ref name=Miller>{{cite book|last=Miller|first=Sergio|title=No Wider War: A history of the Vietnam War Volume 2 1965-1975|publisher=Bloomsbury|year=2021|isbn=9781472838520}}</ref>{{rp|324}}

[[File:South Vietnam Map.jpg|thumb|right|200px|Republic of Vietnam: Corps Tactical Zones]]
The offensive was given a title steeped in Vietnamese history. In 1773, the three Tây Sơn brothers (so-called because of the place of their origin) united a Vietnam divided by civil war and social unrest. The youngest brother, Nguyễn Huệ, then defeated an invading Chinese army on the outskirts of Hanoi in 1788.

The campaign eventually employed the equivalent of 14 divisions. There was the distinct possibility of destroying or at least crippling large elements of the ARVN; possibly deposing of South Vietnamese President [[Nguyễn Văn Thiệu]]; convincing the U.S. as to the hopelessness of continued support to the South and demonstrating the failure of [[Vietnamization]]. The prospect of seizing a South Vietnamese provincial capital, which could then be proclaimed as the seat of the [[Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam|Provisional Revolutionary Government]], was also enticing.{{sfn|Andrade|1995|p=43}} The attitude of the North Vietnamese leadership was illustrated in an article in a 1972 party journal: "It doesn't matter whether the war is promptly ended or prolonged...Both are opportunities to sow the seeds; all we have to do is to wait for the time to harvest the crop."{{sfn|Fulghum|Maitland|1984|p=122}}

The northern leadership was taken aback during the summer of 1971, when an announcement was made that U.S. President [[Richard Nixon]] would visit the People's Republic of China, on a diplomatic mission before May 1972. The Chinese placated the suspicions of their ally, by reassuring North Vietnam that even more military and economic aid would be forthcoming in 1972. The Soviet Union, perceiving the growing antagonism between the People's Republic and North Vietnam, sought to widen the rift by also agreeing to "additional aid without reimbursement", for North Vietnam's military forces.{{Refn|At the time, it was assumed that the Soviet Union was supplying the bulk of North Vietnam's military needs but of the $1.5&nbsp;billion in military aid sent to North Vietnam between 1970 and 1972, two-thirds came from China.|group=Note}}{{sfn|Fulghum|Maitland|1984|p=120}}

These agreements led to a flood of equipment and supplies necessary for a modern, conventional army. This included 400 [[T-34]], [[T-54]] and [[Type 59 tank|Type 59]] (a Chinese version of the T-54) medium and 200 [[PT-76]] light amphibious tanks, hundreds of anti-aircraft missiles, including the shoulder-fired, heat-seeking [[Strela 2|SA-7 Strela]] (called the Grail in the West), anti-tank missiles, including the wire-guided [[AT-3 Sagger]] and heavy-caliber, long-range artillery. To man the new equipment, 25,000 North Vietnamese troops received specialized training abroad, 80 percent of them in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe.{{sfn|Fulghum|Maitland|1984|p=120}}{{Refn|More than 3,000 PAVN tank crews received training at the Soviet armor school in [[Odessa]], in the [[USSR]].|group=Note}} A contingent of high-level Soviet military personnel also arrived in Vietnam and stayed until March 1972 in preparation for the offensive.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Garver|first=John W.|jstor=2150555|title=Sino-Vietnamese Conflict and the Sino-American Rapproachment |journal=[[Political Science Quarterly]]|publisher=[[Academy of Political Science]]|volume=96|issue=3|date=Autumn 1981|page=456|doi=10.2307/2150555|quote=Shortly after Podgorny's departure, a high-level Soviet military mission arrived in Hanoi to stay until March 1972. Much of this Soviet activity was in preparation for the large-scale assault by North Vietnam's army across the 17th parallel in March 1972.}}</ref>

===Miscalculation===
During late 1971, U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence estimates of communist intentions were mixed. An offensive was expected, but intelligence as to its timing, location, and size were confusing. The communists had mounted the Tet Offensive in 1968, but it had been conducted mainly by [[Vietcong]] (VC) in the initial phase, which had been destroyed in the process. Without VC support, a large-scale PAVN offensive was considered highly unlikely. A PAVN thrust across the DMZ was also considered unlikely. Past infiltration and offensive operations had been conducted through and from Laotian and Cambodian territory and a DMZ offensive would be a blatant violation of the Geneva Agreement, which North Vietnam was adamant in defending.

In December, intelligence became conclusive that PAVN units supporting [[Khmer Rouge]] operations in Cambodia began returning to the border areas. In Laos and Cambodia, there was also an unusual expansion of infiltration. In North Vietnam, there was a noticeable increase in military recruitment. In January, [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] officers briefed [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] [[Melvin Laird]] to state that PAVN would attack after the [[Tết]] holidays and that the offensive would involve the widespread use of armored forces.{{sfn|Andrade|1995|p=27}} Laird was unconvinced and told the [[U.S. Congress]] in late January that a large communist offensive "was not a serious possibility"{{sfn|Andrade|1995|p=28}}

U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence services had no consensus as to communist intentions, but [[Military Assistance Command, Vietnam]] (MACV), was suspicious and sent several reconnaissance teams into the [[Mụ Giạ Pass|Mụ Giạ]] and [[Ban Karai Pass]] areas and discovered a buildup of PAVN forces and equipment. MACV then decided that the North Vietnamese were preparing for an offensive in the central highlands and the northern provinces of South Vietnam. The brunt of an attack would be borne by South Vietnamese forces since the U.S. strength had been reduced to 69,000 troops, most of whom were in support roles and the number was to be reduced to 27,000 by 30 November.{{sfn|Nalty|2000|p=348}}

The U.S. commander, General [[Creighton W. Abrams]], was convinced an offensive was likely but was also convinced that the attack would begin during or near the Tết holidays, at the beginning of the year. He notified Admiral [[Thomas Moorer]], the chairman of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], that the North Vietnamese might attempt to "duplicate the effects of the 1968 offensive, perhaps by a limited operation aimed less at inflicting defeat on the battlefield than in influencing American public opinion."{{sfn|Nalty|2000|p=326}} The consensus at MACV was that such an offensive would be launched against II Corps, in the Central Highlands. When the offensive did not occur, he and his headquarters were ridiculed in the American press for [[The Boy Who Cried Wolf|crying wolf]].{{sfn|Andrade|1995|p=238}}<ref>''Life'' magazine, 24 March 1972.</ref> The moment of crisis seemed to have passed, and by the end of March, allied forces that had been standing by had returned to pacification efforts.{{sfn|Palmer|1978|p=316}} U.S. Ambassador [[Ellsworth Bunker]] left for [[Nepal]], and General Abrams went to [[Thailand]] to spend the Easter holiday with his family.{{sfn|Palmer|1978|p=316}}

[[File:Map of Vietnam and neighboring nations, during the Easter Offensive.jpg|thumb|right|200px|The ''Nguyen Hue Offensive'' of 1972]]
The ARVN units upon which the initial North Vietnamese attack was to fall included the [[1st Division (South Vietnam)|1st]] and [[3rd Division (South Vietnam)|3rd Division]]s in Quảng Trị and Thừa Thiên Provinces and the [[2nd Division (South Vietnam)|2nd Division]], further south. The force was supplemented by two brigades of [[Republic of Vietnam Marine Division|Marines]] (the 147th and 258th), the 51st Infantry Regiment, the [[Vietnamese Rangers|1st Ranger Group]] and [[South Vietnamese Regional Force|Regional]] and [[South Vietnamese Regional Force|Popular Force]]s, approximately 30,000 men.{{sfn|Andrade|1995|p=46}} The units were in static defensive positions and lacked adequate mobile reserves.{{sfn|Andrade|1995|p=47}}

Bearing the initial brunt of the attack would be the 3rd Division, which had been created in October 1971 and was located in an arc of outposts near the DMZ, to replace departing American troops. To create the new unit, the 1st Division (arguably ARVN's best unit) was stripped of its 2nd Regiment and the 11th Armored Cavalry was brought up from the I Corps reserve. Both units were experienced, well-trained, well-equipped, and well-led. The 3rd Division's other two regiments, the 56th and 57th were made up of recaptured deserters, men released from jail, and regional and provincial forces.{{sfn|Turley|1985|p=56}}{{Refn|That contention was challenged by General Ngô Quang Trưởng as false.{{sfn|Andrade|1995|p=49}}{{sfn|Trưởng|1980|p=18}}|group=Note}} It was led by cast-off officers and sergeants from other units. Like other ARVN units at this stage of the conflict, the division suffered from a dearth of American advisors, who then served only at regimental, brigade, and divisional headquarters.

Because of the general belief that the North Vietnamese would not violate the sacrosanct boundary, the unit was stationed in the relatively "safe" area directly below the DMZ. The division was commanded by newly promoted Brigadier General [[Vũ Văn Giai]], the former deputy commander of the 1st Division. The I Corps commander, Lieutenant General [[Hoàng Xuân Lãm]], was an officer who epitomized the indecision and the ineffectiveness of Saigon's command structure, as had been discovered all too blatantly during [[Operation Lam Son 719]].{{sfn|Andrade|1995|p=46}} Lãm concentrated on administrative matters and left tactical decisions to his subordinate commanders. Considering the circumstances, that was a workable solution only as long as his division commanders encountered no major difficulties.

U.S. intelligence had been squabbling over a possible PAVN attack across the DMZ attack during the months preceding the offensive. DIA analysts "cautiously" predicted such a contingency, but the CIA downplayed the possibility. General Lãm's American advisors agreed with his assessment that a blatant North Vietnamese violation of the [[Geneva Accord (1954)|Geneva Accord]] was unlikely.{{sfn|Andrade|1995|pp=67–68}}

When the weekend of Easter 1972 arrived, General Giai had planned to rotate the operational areas of his 56th Regiment (along the central DMZ) with the 2nd Regiment (around the artillery base at [[Camp Carroll]] in the west). Because of a truck shortage, the units were moved simultaneously and became hopelessly intermixed and disorganized. At 11:30 on 30 March, both unit headquarters shut down their radios, for the exchange of operational areas.{{sfn|Andrade|1995|p=52}} With communications fragmented, its units entangled, and the weather bad enough to prevent aerial operations, the 3rd Division offered the massed PAVN forces to the north an irresistible target.{{sfn|Fulghum|Maitland|1984|p=129}}