Editing Enforcement (section)

==Theories of enforcement==
Enforcement serves a number of functions; the enforcement of social norms can ensure conformity within insular communities,<ref>Amalia D. Kessler, ''Enforcing Virtue: Social Norms and Self-Interest in an Eighteenth-Century Merchant Court'', 22 {{smallcaps|L. & Hist. Rev.}} 71 (2011).</ref> the enforcements of laws can maximize social benefits and protect the public interest,<ref>John T. Scholz, ''Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement'', 6 {{small
|L. & Pol'y}} 385-88 (1984); see also Margaret H. Lemos, ''[http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5183&context=faculty_scholarship State Enforcement of Federal Law]'', 86 {{smallcaps|N.Y.U. L. Rev.}} 698, 701 (2011) ("The public interest promoted by state enforcement is the interest of the state and its citizens, while federal enforcement purports to serve the broader national interest.").</ref> and enforcement may also serve the self-interest of the institutions that oversee enforcement.<ref>Margaret H. Lemos and Max Minzner, ''[http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/vol127_lemos_minzner_online.pdf For-Profit Public Enforcement]'', 127 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 886 (2014).</ref> Enforcement can be effectuated by both public institutions and private, non-governmental actors.<ref>Zachary D. Clopton, ''[https://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2016/03/Redundant-Public-Private-Enforcement.pdf Redundant Public-Private Enforcement]'', 69 {{smallcaps|Vand. L. Rev.}} 285, 288 (2016); Michael Selmi, ''Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment'', 45 {{smallcaps|UCLA L. Rev.}} 1401, 1456 (1998).</ref> Enforcement is often accomplished through coercive means or by utilizing power disparities to constrain action.<ref>See Scott A. Anderson, ''[http://www.jesp.org/PDF/TheEnforcementApproachFinal.pdf The Enforcement Approach to Coercion]'', 5 J. of Ethics &Soc. Phil. 1 (2010).</ref> Some scholars, such as [[Kate Andrias]], have also argued that institutions enforce rules when deciding "when and how to apply" laws and regulations.<ref>Kate Andrias, ''[http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-88-4-Andrias.pdf The President's Enforcement Power] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161104021200/http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-88-4-Andrias.pdf |date=2016-11-04 }}'', 88 {{smallcaps|N.Y.U. L. Rev.}} 1031, 1040 (2013) (comparing "enforcement" with "rulemaking").</ref> 

===Delegation of enforcement powers===
Some governments will [[delegation|delegate]] enforcement powers to subordinate governmental entities or private parties.<ref>Kurt T. Lash, [http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/LashPDF_dkt69ak6.pdf ''The Sum of All Delegated Power: A Response to Richard Primus'', The Limits of Enumeration], 124 {{smallcaps|Yale L. J. F.}} 180, 184 (2014) (discussing enforcement powers in federalist systems of government); John F. Manning, ''[http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/vol128_manning_foreword.pdf The Means of Constitutional Power]'', 128 {{smallcaps|Harv. L. Rev.}} 1, 44 (2014) (citing specific examples of delegation of enforcement powers to agencies in the United States); Kate Andrias, ''[http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-88-4-Andrias.pdf The President's Enforcement Power] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161104021200/http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-88-4-Andrias.pdf |date=2016-11-04 }}'', 88 {{smallcaps|N.Y.U. L. Rev.}} 1031, 1040 (2013) (noting that enforcement powers can be delegated to "private parties").</ref> In the [[United States]], for example, the federal government and state governments often delegate a range of enforcement powers to [[government agency|administrative agencies]].<ref>Robert F. Durant, {{smallcaps|The Oxford Handbook of American Bureaucracy}} 379 (2010) (discussing agencies' "compliance and enforcement" powers).</ref> There has been considerable debate in legal scholarship about the degree to which governments should oversee and supervise institutions to which enforcement powers have been delegated.<ref>Compare, e.g., Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen O. Robinson, ''[http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4292&context=clr Theory of Legislative Delegation]'', 68 {{smallcaps|Cornell L. Rev.}} 1 (1982) with Gillian E. Metzger, ''[http://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/the-constitutional-duty-to-supervise The Constitutional Duty To Supervise]'', 124 Yale L. J. 124 (2015).</ref>