Editing European Monetary System (section)

== History ==
===Background, 1960 to 1971===
The origins of the EMS can be traced back to the end of 1960 when the Heads of the member states of the EEC, known as the [[European Council]] today, met in [[the Hague]] and agreed to begin moving toward the goal of a single European economy.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Coffey|first=Peter|date=1986|title=The European Monetary System — Past, Present and Future|doi=10.1007/978-94-009-4488-6|isbn=978-94-010-8499-4}}</ref> In 1969, the European Council decided to create an economic and monetary union to be implemented by 1980.<ref name="De Vries-1980" />

===1972: the Werner Report is published and EEC countries peg their currencies===
A group of experts, led by the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Luxembourg, [[Pierre Werner]], met and produced the [[Werner Report]], which was published on 8 October 1970 and outlined the structure and function of the EMS{{Citation needed|date=January 2021}}. On the basis of the Werner Report, the EEC began moving to a single economy in three stages. The final stage economy was to have a fixed exchange rate but no single currency. After the abandonment of the [[Bretton Woods system]] in 1971, the EEC took action. In October 1972, the EEC's Paris summit adopted the recommendations of the Werner Report and, as a result, the EEC currencies were adjustably pegged to one another in a scheme known as the [[snake in the tunnel]].<ref name="Investopedia: the European Monetary System" /><ref name="Artis-1987">{{Cite journal|last=Artis|first=M.J.|date=1987|title=The European monetary system: An evaluation|journal=Journal of Policy Modeling|volume=9|issue=1|pages=175–198|doi=10.1016/0161-8938(87)90008-1|issn=0161-8938}}</ref> The currency snake established a single currency fluctuation band of +/-2.25%, however Italy left the snake already in 1973.<ref>Eichengreen 2008, S. 153</ref>

===The EMS is created===
At a meeting of the EEC in Brussels on 5 December 1978, French President [[Valéry Giscard d'Estaing]] and German Chancellor [[Helmut Schmidt]] successfully championed the EMS, which was implemented via resolution at the meeting.<ref name="van den Bempt-1987" /><ref name=":Alogoskoufis"/> The EMS officially entered into force on 13 March 1979 with the participation of eight Member States ([[France]], [[Denmark]], [[Belgium]], [[Luxembourg]], [[Ireland]], [[Netherlands]], [[Germany]] and [[Italy]]).<ref name="De Vries-1980">{{Cite book|last=De Vries, Tom.|title=On the meaning and future of the european monetary system.|date=1980|publisher=Princeton University Press|oclc=848156047}}</ref>

===Creation of the European Currency Unit===
{{Main|European Currency Unit}}
European currency exchange rate stability has been one of the most important objectives of European policymakers since the [[World War II|Second World War.]]{{Citation needed|date=January 2021}} Between 1982 and 1987, European currencies displayed a range of stable and unstable behavior. For example, the [[Dutch guilder]] remained quite stable with respect to the Mark, the [[Italian lira]] exhibited a sharp downward trend throughout the life of the EMS, and the [[French franc]], the [[Belgian franc]], the [[Danish krone]] and the [[Irish pound]] all escaped trends of successive devaluations to emerge more stable.<ref name="Weber-1991" /> At the same time that the EMS was created, the [[Council of the European Union]] Ministers created a new monetary unit, the European Currency Unit (ECU).<ref name=":Alogoskoufis"/> The ECU was the official monetary unit of the EMS, but it was purely a composite accounting unit, not a real currency. The ECU's value was based on the weighted average of a basket of 12 European currencies; the Austrian schilling, Belgian franc, German mark, Spanish peseta, French franc, Finnish markka, Greek drachma, Irish pound, Italian lira, Luxembourgish franc, Dutch guilder, and Portuguese escudo. The exchange rates for member nations' currencies were based on their value relative to the ECU.<ref name=":Alogoskoufis"/><ref name="Investopedia: The European Currency Unit" /><ref name="Was the ERM Crisis Inevitable? Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review">{{cite journal|last=Higgins|first=Bryon|title=Was the ERM Crisis Inevitable?|journal=Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, Fourth Quarter, 1993|pages=27–40|url=https://www.kansascityfed.org/Publicat/Econrev/EconRevArchive/1993/4q93HIGG.pdf|access-date=25 October 2011}}</ref>

===German monetary policy dominates===
The EMS was similar to the [[Bretton Woods system]], in that it pegged member currencies within a fluctuation band. Furthermore, the EMS came to be 'de facto' centered on the Deutschmark similarly to how the Bretton Woods system had been based on the US Dollar.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Kaufmann, Hugo M.|title=Germany's international monetary policy and the European monetary system|date=1985|publisher=Social Science Monographs|isbn=0-88033-063-5|location=New York|oclc=11957859}}</ref><ref name="De Vries-1980" /> Although no currency was designated as an anchor, the Deutsche Mark and [[Deutsche Bundesbank|German central bank]] emerged as the anchor of the EMS. Germany emerged as the dominant player within the EMS, setting its monetary policy largely autonomously while other ERM members attempted to converge on the German standard of the Deutsche Mark, causing a power imbalance within the EMS.<ref name="MacDonald-1991" /> German monetary policy dictated the policy of the European Monetary System, because of its strong growth rate and the low-inflation policies of the German central bank.<ref name="MacDonald-1991" /><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Artus|first1=P.|last2=Avouyi-Dovi|first2=S.|last3=Bleuze|first3=E.|last4=Lecointe|first4=F.|date=1991|title=Transmission of U.S. monetary policy to Europe and asymmetry in the European monetary system|journal=European Economic Review|volume=35|issue=7|pages=1369–1384|doi=10.1016/0014-2921(91)90024-d|issn=0014-2921}}</ref> The influence of the US dollar also entailed strong disturbances within the EMS.<ref>Reichart Alexandre [2024], '[https://www.jeeh.it/articolo?urn=urn:abi:abi:RIV.JOU:2024;1.47 Managing Monetary Policy facing US External Constraint and Internal Macroeconomic Divergences: the Case of the Western European Central Banks in the 1980s]', ''The'' ''Journal of European Economic History'', 53(1), pp. 47-96.</ref> Eventually, this situation led to dissatisfaction in most countries and was one of the primary forces behind the drive to a monetary union.{{Citation needed|date=January 2021}}

===Changing operating principles and preparing for the Euro===
The EMS went through two distinct phases.<ref name="Preda-2017">{{Cite book |url=https://www.peterlang.com/document/1113190 |title=The History of the European Monetary Union |date=2017| publisher=[[Peter Lang (publisher)|Peter Lang]] |isbn=978-2-8076-0100-0 |editor-last=Preda |editor-first=Daniela}}</ref>{{page needed|date=May 2025}} During the first period, from 1979 to 1986, the EMS allowed member countries a certain degree of autonomy in monetary policy by restricting the movement of capital. The second period, from 1987 to 1992, the EMS was more rigid.{{Citation needed|date=January 2021}} In 1988, a committee was set up under EEC President [[Jacques Delors]] to begin changing the EMS to provide favorable starting conditions for the transition to [[Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union|Economic and Monetary Union]] (EMU).<ref name="Weber-1991">{{Cite journal|last1=Weber|first1=Axel A.|last2=Baldwin|first2=Richard|last3=Obstfeld|first3=Maurice|date=1991|title=Reputation and Credibility in the European Monetary System|journal=Economic Policy|volume=6|issue=12|pages=57|doi=10.2307/1344449|jstor=1344449|issn=0266-4658}}</ref> The Delors plan was a three-stage process that lead to a single European currency under the control of a [[European Central Bank]].<ref>{{Cite news|last=Jeffery|first=Simon|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jun/06/euro.eu|title=The euro: a timeline|date=2003-06-06|work=The Guardian|access-date=2020-03-27|language=en-GB|issn=0261-3077}}</ref>

===1992 crisis===
{{Further|Black Wednesday}}
The year 1990 saw a crisis in the EMS. The [[European single market]] had been created in 1986 with the main goal of removing control on capital movements. Periodic adjustments raised the value of strong currencies and lowered those of weaker ones, and national interest rates were changed to keep the currencies within a narrow range. In early 1990, the European Monetary System was strained by the differing economic policies and conditions of its members, especially the newly reunified Germany, and Britain, which had initially declined to join, subsequently joining in 1990. The opt-out of Denmark from the EMU in 1992 and exchange rate adjustments of the currencies from weaker countries by the EMS also contributed to the crisis.<ref name="Preda-2017" />{{page needed|date=May 2025}}

Speculative attacks on the French franc during the following year led to the Brussels compromise in August 1993 which broadened the fluctuation band from +/-2.25% to +/-15% for all the participating currencies.<ref name="Höpner-2017" /> The German central bank reduced interest rates and the UK and Italy were affected by large capital outflows. In the aftermath of the crisis, Italy and the UK both withdrew from the ERM in September 1992.<ref name="Preda-2017" />{{page needed|date=May 2025}}

According to [[Barry Eichengreen]], there were three primary reasons for the crisis:  Italy, Spain and the UK had not brought their inflation rates down to the levels of other EMS members, which contributed to competitive imbalances; rising unemployment (stemming in part from German unification) reduced the credibility of the governments with high unemployment rates and weak public support, which led markets to attack the currencies of those countries; and that  The Maastricht Treaty provided the conditions for self-fulfilling speculative attacks.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Eichengreen|first=Barry|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvd58rxg|title=Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System|date=2019|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-0-691-19390-8|edition=3rd|pages=163–169|doi=10.2307/j.ctvd58rxg|jstor=j.ctvd58rxg|s2cid=240840930}}</ref>