Editing Existence (section)

== Definition and related terms ==
Existence is the state of being real or participating in [[reality]].<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|AHD staff|2022}} |2={{harvnb|Merriam-Webster|2024}} |3={{harvnb|CUP staff}} }}</ref> Existence sets real entities apart from imaginary ones,<ref name="auto4">{{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}}</ref> and can refer both to individual entities or to the totality of reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|AHD staff|2022}} | {{harvnb|Merriam-Webster|2024}} | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|p=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 277]}} }}</ref> The word "existence" entered the English language in the late 14th century from [[old French]] and has its roots in the [[medieval Latin]] term {{lang|la|[[:wiktionary:en:exsisto#Latin|ex(s)istere]]}}, which means "to stand forth", "to appear", and "to arise".<ref>{{harvnb|Hoad|1993|p=160}}</ref> Existence is studied by the subdiscipline of [[metaphysics]] known as [[ontology]].<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Lowe|2005|p=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 277]}} |2={{harvnb|Sorensen|2023|loc=Lead Section}} |3={{harvnb|Vallicella|2010|p=xi}} }}</ref>{{efn|Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that investigates the most basic aspects of [[reality]], such as existence, [[Subject and object (philosophy)|objects]] and their [[Property (philosophy)|properties]], possibility and necessity, [[space]] and [[time]], [[Causality|causation]], [[matter]], and [[mind]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=1–3}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ What Is an Introduction?}} }}</ref> As its subdiscipline, ontology examines the nature of existence and the [[categories of being]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=10–14}} | {{harvnb|Van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|loc=§ The Categories Of Being}} }}</ref>}}

The terms "being", "reality", and "actuality" are often used as synonyms of "existence",<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|AHD staff|2022}} |2={{harvnb|Merriam-Webster|2024}} |3={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=0BvTfX-swZ0C&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&printsec=frontcover&pg=PA2&hl=en&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false 2]}} }}</ref> but the exact definition of ''existence'' and its connection to these terms is disputed.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Prior|2006|p=493}} |2={{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2023}} |3={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section, §2. Meinongianism}} }}</ref> According to metaphysician [[Alexius Meinong]] (1853–1920), all entities have being but not all entities have existence. He argues merely possible objects like [[Santa Claus]] have being but lack existence.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2023}} |2={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section, §2. Meinongianism}} |3={{harvnb|Jubien|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA49 49]}} }}</ref> Ontologist Takashi Yagisawa (20th century–present) contrasts existence with reality; he sees "reality" as the more-fundamental term because it equally characterizes all entities and defines existence as a relative term that connects an entity to the world it inhabits.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Divers|2011|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/DIVWAI 570–574]}} |2={{harvnb|Yagisawa|2011|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/YAGPOW 270–272]}} }}</ref> According to philosopher [[Gottlob Frege]] (1848–1925), actuality is narrower than existence because only actual entities can produce and undergo changes, in contrast to non-actual existing entities like [[numbers]] and [[Set (mathematics)|sets]].<ref>{{harvnb|Chakrabarti|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=bLStBgAAQBAJ&pg=PT106 106–107]}}</ref> According to some philosophers, like [[Edmund Husserl]] (1859–1938), existence is an elementary concept, meaning it cannot be defined in other terms without involving circularity. This would imply characterizing existence or talking about its nature in a non-trivial manner may be difficult or impossible.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Vallicella|2010|p=16}} | {{harvnb|Jubien|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA47 47–48]}} }}</ref>

Disputes about the nature of existence are reflected in the distinction between thin and [[thick concept]]s of existence. Thin concepts of existence understand existence as a logical property that every existing thing shares; they do not include any substantial content about the metaphysical implications of having existence. According to one view, existence is the same as the logical property of [[Law of identity|self-identity]]. This view articulates a thin concept of existence because it merely states what exists is identical to itself without discussing any substantial characteristics of the nature of existence.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Robinson|2008|p=139}} |2={{harvnb|Vallicella|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2QBgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA46 46–47]}} |3={{harvnb|Berto|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oMN1Si2wPVIC&pg=PA31 31–32]}} |4={{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=15LIl3X8SnUC&pg=PA126 126]}} }}</ref> Thick concepts of existence encompass a metaphysical analysis of what it means that something exists and what essential features existence implies. According to one proposal, to exist is to be present in space and time, and to have effects on other things. This definition is controversial because it implies abstract objects such as numbers do not exist. Philosopher [[George Berkeley]] (1685–1753) gave a different thick concept of existence; he stated: "to be is to be perceived", meaning all existence is mental.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Robinson|2008|p=139}} | {{harvnb|Vallicella|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2QBgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA46 46–47]}} | {{harvnb|Berto|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oMN1Si2wPVIC&pg=PA31 31–32]}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=96_CBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA9 9]}} }}</ref>

Existence contrasts with nonexistence, a lack of reality. Whether objects can be divided into existent and nonexistent objects is a subject of controversy. This distinction is sometimes used to explain how it is possible to think of fictional objects like dragons and unicorns but the concept of nonexistent objects is not generally accepted; some philosophers say the concept is contradictory.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Reicher|2022|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/ lead section, §1. The Concept of a Nonexistent Object]}} |2={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|p=8}} |3={{harvnb|Yao|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=NZjOAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA140 140]}} }}</ref> Closely related contrasting terms are [[nothingness]] and nonbeing.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Shūzō|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=GVgEEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA830 830]}} | {{harvnb|Leclerc|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_B2KaiGu038C&pg=PA49 49]}} | {{harvnb|Sorensen|2023|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> Existence is commonly associated with mind-independent reality<ref>{{harvnb|Merriam-Webster|2024}}</ref> but this position is not universally accepted because there could also be forms of mind-dependent existence, such as the existence of an idea inside a person's mind. According to some [[idealists]], this may apply to all of reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Waxman|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1UwGAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA211 211]}} | {{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=30, 33–34}} }}</ref>

Another contrast is made between ''existence'' and ''[[essence]]''. Essence refers to the intrinsic nature or defining qualities of an entity. The essence of something determines what kind of entity it is and how it differs from other kinds of entities. Essence corresponds to what an entity is, while existence corresponds to the fact that it is. For instance, it is possible to understand what an [[Object (philosophy)|object]] is and grasp its nature even if one does not know whether this object exists.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|p=2}} |2={{harvnb|Ceylan|1993|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/20840134 329–337]}} |3={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> According to some philosophers, there is a difference between entities and the fundamental characteristics that make them the entities they are.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nicholson|1996|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009875 357–374]}} |2={{harvnb|Wheeler|2020|loc=§2.2.1 The Question}} |3={{harvnb|Vallicella|2010|p=1}} }}</ref> [[Martin Heidegger]] (1889–1976) introduced this concept; he calls it the [[ontological difference]] and contrasts individual beings with being. According to his response to the question of being, being is not an entity but the background context that makes all individual entities intelligible.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Nicholson|1996|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009875 357–358]}} | {{harvnb|Wheeler|2020|loc=§2.2.1 The Question}}  | {{harvnb|Inwood|1999|pp=89–100}} }}</ref>{{efn|In [[Heideggerian terminology|his own terminology]], Heidegger reserves the terms "''Existenz''" and "''Ek-sistenz''" to characterize the mode of being of [[Dasein]], which is the mode of being characteristic of human beings.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Reck|2000|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ZpkdBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA156 155–156]}} | {{harvnb|Aho|2021|pp=[https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-heidegger-lexicon/eksistence-eksistenz/C78548237FFDBE1D518259C7DFA0BC9C 268–270]}} | {{harvnb|Inwood|1999|p=60}} }}</ref>}}