Editing Fabian strategy (section)

== Rome versus Carthage: The Second Punic War ==
[[File:N26 Fabius Cunctator, Schönbrunn (04).jpg|thumb|Statue of [[Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus|Quintus Fabius Maximus]], the strategy's namesake]]
This strategy derives its name from [[Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus]],<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/fabian-strategy/|title=Fabian Strategy|website=George Washington's Mount Vernon|language=en|access-date=2019-05-03}}</ref> the [[Roman dictator|dictator]] of the [[Roman Republic]] given the task of defeating the great [[Carthage|Carthaginian]] general [[Hannibal]] in southern [[Italy]] during the [[Second Punic War]] (218–201 BC).<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|url=https://www.britannica.com/biography/Quintus-Fabius-Maximus-Verrucosus|title=Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus {{!}} Roman statesman and commander|website=Encyclopedia Britannica|language=en|access-date=2019-05-03}}</ref> At the start of the war, Hannibal boldly [[Hannibal's crossing of the Alps|crossed the Alps]] and invaded Italy.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/apr/03/where-muck-hannibals-elephants-alps-italy-bill-mahaney-york-university-toronto|title=The truth about Hannibal's route across the Alps|last=Ball|first=Philip|date=2016-04-03|work=The Observer|access-date=2019-05-03|language=en-GB|issn=0029-7712}}</ref> Due to his skill as a general, Hannibal repeatedly inflicted devastating losses on the Romans—quickly achieving two crushing victories over Roman armies at [[Battle of the Trebia|Trebia]] in 218 BC and [[Battle of Lake Trasimene|Lake Trasimene]] in 217 BC.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-the-Trebbia-River|title=Battle of the Trebbia River {{!}} Roman-Carthaginian history|website=Encyclopedia Britannica|language=en|access-date=2019-05-03}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/Battle-of-Trasimene|title=Battle of Trasimene {{!}} Roman-Carthaginian history|website=Encyclopedia Britannica|language=en|access-date=2019-05-03}}</ref> After these disasters, the Romans gave full authority to Fabius Maximus as [[Roman dictator|dictator]]. Fabius initiated a war of attrition, fought through constant skirmishes, limiting the ability of the Carthaginians to forage for food and denying them significant victories.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Erdkamp|first=Paul|date=1992|title=Polybius, Livy and the 'Fabian Strategy'|journal=Ancient Society|volume=23|pages=127–147|issn=0066-1619|jstor=44079478|doi=10.2143/AS.23.0.2005877}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oxOCAgAAQBAJ&q=Battle+of+lake+trasimene+Fabius|title=Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War|last=Daly|first=Gregory|date=2005-08-18|publisher=Routledge|isbn=9781134507122|pages=16|language=en}}</ref>

Hannibal was handicapped by being a commander of an invading foreign army (on Italian soil), and was effectively cut off from his home country in North Africa due to the difficulty of seaborne resupply over the [[Mediterranean Sea]].<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IJcT7R0dEe4C&q=hannibal+italy+invasion+cut+off+from+carthage&pg=PA91|title=Hannibal: The Military Biography of Rome's Greatest Enemy|last=Gabriel|first=Richard A.|date=2011-02-28|publisher=Potomac Books, Inc.|isbn=9781597976862|pages=91|language=en}}</ref> As long as Rome's allies remained loyal, there was little he could do to win. Hannibal tried to convince the allies of Rome that it was more beneficial for them to side with Carthage (through a combination of victory and negotiation).<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zF0Wiv7UJ7oC&q=hannibal+italy+invasion+allies+in+italy|title=Between Rome and Carthage: Southern Italy during the Second Punic War|last=Fronda|first=Michael P.|date=2010-06-10|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=9781139488624|pages=37, 39{{en dash}}40|language=en}}</ref> Fabius calculated that, in order to defeat Hannibal, he had to avoid engaging him altogether (so as to deprive him of victories). He determined that Hannibal's largely extended [[Military supply-chain management|supply lines]] (as well as the cost of maintaining the Carthaginian army in the field) meant that Rome had time on its side.{{Citation needed|date=May 2019}}

Fabius avoided battle as a deliberate strategy.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CcHqDQAAQBAJ&q=fabius+shadow+hannibals+army&pg=PT115|title=Hannibal's Oath: The Life and Wars of Rome's Greatest Enemy|last=Prevas|first=John|date=2017-09-26|publisher=Hachette Books|isbn=9780306824258|language=en}}</ref> He sent out small military units to attack Hannibal's foraging parties<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=h-VlDC4Jt6gC&q=fabius+forage+hannibal&pg=PT181|title=Hannibal: The Military Biography of Rome's Greatest Enemy|last=Gabriel|first=Richard A.|date=2011|publisher=Potomac Books, Inc.|isbn=9781597977661|language=en}}</ref> while keeping the Roman army in hilly terrain to nullify Carthaginian [[cavalry]] superiority.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8EgQAAAAYAAJ&q=fabius+maneuvering+in+the+hills&pg=PA923|title=Ancient Greece and Rome|last=Clare|first=Israel Smith|date=1893|publisher=Werner Company|pages=923|language=en}}</ref> Residents of small villages in the path of the Carthaginians were ordered by Fabius to burn their crops creating [[scorched earth]] and take refuge in [[fort]]ified towns.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pMdpAo6BaXkC&q=fabius+village+fortified+towns+%C2%A0hannibal&pg=PA88|title=Masters of Command: Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, and the Genius of Leadership|last=Strauss|first=Barry|date=2013|publisher=Simon and Schuster|isbn=9781439164495|pages=88|language=en}}</ref> Fabius used [[interior lines]] to ensure that Hannibal could not march directly on Rome without having to first abandon his Mediterranean ports (supply lines). At the same time, Fabius began to inflict constant, small, debilitating defeats on the Carthaginians. This, Fabius had concluded, would wear down the invaders' endurance and discourage Rome's allies from switching sides, without challenging the Carthaginians to major battles. Once the Carthaginians were sufficiently weakened and demoralized by lack of food and supplies, Fabius and his well-fed legions would then fight a decisive battle in the hope of crushing the Carthaginians once and for all.

Hannibal's second weakness was that much of his army was made up of [[Mercenaries of the ancient Iberian peninsula|Spanish mercenaries]] and [[Gaul]]ish allies. Their loyalty to Hannibal was shallow; though they disliked Rome, they mainly desired quick battles and raids for plunder. They were unsuited for long [[siege|sieges]], and possessed neither the equipment nor the patience for such tactics. The tedium of countless small-skirmish defeats sapped their morale, causing them to desert.

With no main Roman army to attack, Hannibal's army became virtually no threat to Rome, which was a walled city that required a long siege to take. Fabius's strategy struck at the heart of Hannibal's weakness. Time, not major battles, would cripple Hannibal.

=== Political opposition ===

Fabius's strategy, though a military success and tolerable to wiser minds in the [[Roman Senate]], was unpopular; the Romans had been long accustomed to facing and besting their enemies directly on the field of battle. The Fabian strategy was, in part, ruined because of a lack of unity in the command of the Roman army. The [[Master of the Horse|magister equitum]], [[Marcus Minucius Rufus (consul 221 BC)|Marcus Minucius Rufus]], a political enemy of Fabius, famously exclaiming:
<blockquote>
Are we come here to see our allies butchered, and their property burned, as a spectacle to be enjoyed? And if we are not moved with shame on account of any others, are we not on account of these citizens... which now not the neighboring [[Samnites|Samnite]] wastes with fire, but a Carthaginian foreigner, who has advanced even this far from the remotest limits of the world, through our dilatoriness and inactivity?<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SikNAAAAIAAJ&q=Did+we+come+here+to+see+our+allies+butchered,+and+their+property+burned,+as+a+spectacle+to+be+enjoyed&pg=PA781|title=The History of Rome|last=Livy|date=1872|publisher=Bell|pages=781|language=en}}</ref>
</blockquote>

As the memory of the shock of Hannibal's victories grew dimmer, the Roman populace gradually started to question the wisdom of the Fabian strategy, the very thing which had given them time to recover. It was especially frustrating to the mass of the people, who were eager to see a quick conclusion to the war. Moreover, it was widely believed that if Hannibal continued plundering Italy unopposed, the allies, believing that Rome was incapable of protecting them, might defect to the Carthaginians.

Since Fabius won no large-scale victories, the Senate removed him from command in 216 BC. Their chosen replacement, [[Gaius Terentius Varro]], led the Roman army into a debacle at the [[Battle of Cannae]]. The Romans, after experiencing this catastrophic defeat and losing countless other battles, had by this point learned their lesson. They utilized the strategies that Fabius had taught them, which, they finally realized, were the only feasible means of driving Hannibal from Italy.

This strategy of attrition earned Fabius the [[cognomen]] "Cunctator" (The Delayer).<ref name=":0"/>