Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
Fact–value distinction
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
==David Hume's skepticism== {{Main|Is–ought problem}} In ''[[A Treatise of Human Nature]]'' (1739), [[David Hume]] discusses the problems in grounding normative statements in positive statements; that is, in deriving [[is–ought problem|''ought'' from ''is'']]. It is generally regarded that Hume considered such derivations untenable, and his 'is–ought' problem is considered a principal question of [[moral philosophy]].<ref>{{Cite book |first=Stephen |last=Priest |title=The British Empiricists |url=https://archive.org/details/britishempiricis00prie |url-access=limited |pages=[https://archive.org/details/britishempiricis00prie/page/n193 177]–178 |publisher=Routledge |year=2007 |isbn=978-0415357234}}</ref> Hume shared a political viewpoint with early Enlightenment [[philosophers]] such as [[Thomas Hobbes]] (1588–1679) and [[John Locke]] (1632–1704). Specifically, Hume, at least to some extent, argued that religious and national hostilities that divided European society were based on unfounded beliefs. In effect, Hume contended that such hostilities are not found in [[nature]], but are a human creation, depending on a particular time and place, and thus unworthy of mortal conflict. Prior to Hume, [[Aristotelianism|Aristotelian]] philosophy maintained that all actions and [[Four Causes#End|causes]] were to be interpreted [[teleology|teleologically]]. This rendered all facts about human action examinable under a [[normative]] framework defined by [[cardinal virtues]] and [[capital vices]]. "Fact" in this sense was not value-free, and the fact-value distinction was an alien concept. The decline of Aristotelianism in the 16th century set the framework in which those theories of knowledge could be revised.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=MacIntyre |first1=Alasdair |authorlink=Alasdair MacIntyre |title=After Virtue |url=https://archive.org/details/aftervirtuestudy00alas |url-access=limited |date=2007 |publisher=[[University of Notre Dame Press]] |location=Notre Dame |page=[https://archive.org/details/aftervirtuestudy00alas/page/81 81–84] |isbn=978-0268035044 |edition=3rd}}</ref>
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)