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Fear and Trembling
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== Structure == One of the work's core themes is that attempting to understand Abraham through rational ethical thinking (Silentio mentions [[Ancient Greek philosophy|Greek philosophy]] and [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]]) leads to the [[reductio ad absurdum]] conclusion that ''(a)'' there must be something that transcends this type of thinking or ''(b)'' there is no such thing as "faith," which would mean Abraham's characterization as the "father of the faith" is mistaken.<ref>"If this is not faith, then Abraham is lost, then faith has never existed in the world precisely because it has always existed. For if the ethical—that is, social morality—is the highest and if there is in a person no residual incommensurability in some way such that this incommensurability is not evil (i.e., the single individual, who is to be expressed in the universal), then no categories are needed other than what Greek philosophy had or what can be deduced from them by consistent thought." Johannes de Silentio [Søren Kierkegaard], ''Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric'', in Søren Kierkegaard, ''Fear and Trembling / Repetition'', ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Kierkegaard's Writings 6 (Princeton University Press, 1983), 55; "Now if this train of thought is sound, if there is nothing incommensurable in a human life, and if the incommensurable that is present is there only by an accident from which nothing results insofar as existence is viewed from the idea, then Hegel was right. But he was not right in speaking about faith or in permitting Abraham to be regarded as its father, for in the latter case he has pronounced judgment both on Abraham and on faith." Ibid., 68–69.</ref> Silentio also emphasizes that Abraham believes that [[Isaac]] will survive the ordeal and is not simply giving up the latter for dead; this distinction comes out in what Silentio respectively refers to as [[Knight of faith|faith and infinite resignation]]. Silentio first presents four alternate Abrahams—different ways Abraham might have approached and carried out the command to sacrifice Isaac—in the "Exordium" of the text, who, although they are prepared to follow God's command to sacrifice Isaac, are nevertheless considered to be without faith.<ref>Silentio, "Exordium," in ''Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric''.</ref> Silentio then engages in extended praise of Abraham's qualities and recounts much of the latter's life up to and including the [[Binding of Isaac|binding]] in the "Eulogy on Abraham."<ref>Silentio, "Eulogy on Abraham," in ''Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric''.</ref> Finally, the "Preliminary Expectoration" introduces the concepts of [[Knight of faith|faith and infinite resignation]].<ref>Silentio, "Preliminary Expectoration," in ''Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric''.</ref> The three problems Silentio engages are three thought experiments or setups that attempt to demonstrate how Abraham's actions and internal state correspond to the religious category of faith and thereby transcend ethics. They are: * Problema I: Is there a [[Teleology|Teleological]] Suspension of the Ethical?<ref name=":0">Silentio, "Problema I: Is There a Teleological Suspension of the Ethical?," in ''Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric''.</ref> * Problema II: Is there an Absolute Duty to God?<ref name=":1">Silentio, "Problema II: Is There an Absolute Duty to God?," in ''Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric''.</ref> * Problema III: Was It Ethically Defensible for Abraham to Conceal His Undertaking from Sarah, from Eliezer, and from Isaac?<ref name=":2">Silentio, "Problema III: Was It Ethically Defensible for Abraham to Conceal His Undertaking from Sarah, from Eliezer, and from Isaac?," in ''Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric''.</ref> === Is there a [[Teleology|Teleological]] Suspension of the Ethical? === Silentio identifies the ethical with the universal, which he defines as that which is incumbent upon all people at all times. [[Sin]] is when an individual asserts himself as an [[Particular|individual]] over and against the universal. Silentio asserts that faith is a paradox whereby an individual transcends the universal without sinning. Silentio explains that Abraham must occupy the category of faith, because without doing so, he would not be the father of the faith. Silentio explains that Abraham's relationship to God during the [[Binding of Isaac|binding]] cannot be logically understood or mediated away. He contrasts Abraham with three other figures—[[Agamemnon]], [[Jephthah]], and [[Lucius Junius Brutus|Brutus]]—who similarly had to sacrifice or impose capital punishment on their offspring but are nevertheless called "tragic heroes," not knights of faith. Silentio explains that tragic heroes have a [[middle term]] that acts as their [[telos]], or purpose, when transgressing the ethical; that is, in transgressing against the ethical, they do so for a higher, yet understandable ethical purpose. Silentio asserts that Abraham inhabits the paradox of faith because he does not act for any purpose other than his own, and Silentio further identifies Abraham's purpose with God's purpose. === Is there an Absolute Duty to God? === Problem 2 continues in the same vein as problem 1. Silentio asserts that, in faith, the individual determines their relationship with the universal (i.e., the ethical) through their relationship with God instead of the other way around (i.e., determining their relationship with God through the ethical). Silentio asserts that knights of faith exist in pure isolation and cannot explain themselves or their actions to others. If a knight of faith were to express themselves in terms of the universal, this would constitute "temptation" (''Anfechtung''), and the individual would sin since their actions now breach or offend against universal injunctions. Faith is then an incommunicable paradox known only to the individual in question and to God. === Was It Ethically Defensible for Abraham to Conceal His Undertaking from Sarah, from Eliezer, and from Isaac? === Silentio identifies the ethical with the universal and the universal with the disclosed (i.e., that which is spoken about, revealed, or confessed). He explains that Abraham cannot be acting in accordance with the universal because he obeys God's command silently without explaining the purpose of his journey to his wife, his servants, or Isaac. Problem 3 is the longest of the text and introduces the categories of the [[Aesthetics|aesthetic]] and the [[Demon|demonic]]. Silentio claims that aesthetics rewards hiddenness while the ethical demands disclosure. Silentio then postulates that faith mimics aesthetics in its hiddenness but that it is ultimately a distinct category. A series of [[Folklore|folkloric]] myths and tales are analyzed to explain how the dynamics of concealment and disclosure of information in these stories interact with the categories of the aesthetic, ethical, and religious, and how these tensions are resolved through [[serendipity]], [[self-sacrifice]], or the absurd. Ultimately, Silentio persists in portraying Abraham's isolation and incommunicability. He explains that the tragic hero's sacrifice is usually mediated by some kind of cultural background or disclosure that contextualizes his actions but that Abraham possesses no such security.
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