Editing First Anglo-Dutch War (section)

==Background==
In the 16th century, [[Kingdom of England|England]] had supported the [[Dutch Republic]] in the [[Eighty Years' War]] against [[Habsburg Spain|Spain]]. They cooperated in fighting the [[Spanish Armada]] and England supported the Dutch in the early part of the [[Eighty Years' War]] by sending money and troops and maintaining garrisons in key ports and a permanent English representative to the Dutch government to ensure coordination of the joint war effort, under the [[Treaty of Nonsuch]]. The [[Treaty of London (1604)|separate peace]] in 1604 between England and Spain strained this relationship, although an Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1625, due to remain in force until 1640 was the basis of officially cordial relations between the two countries, and also formed the basis of [[Charles I of England]]'s Dutch policy.<ref name="Groenveld542">Groenveld (1987), p. 542</ref>

The weakening of Spanish power at the end of the [[Thirty Years' War]] in 1648 also meant that many colonial possessions of the [[Portuguese Empire|Portuguese]] and some of the [[Spanish Empire]] and their mineral resources were effectively open to conquest by a stronger power. The ensuing rush for empire brought the former allies into conflict, and the Dutch, having made peace with Spain, quickly replaced the English as dominant traders with the [[Iberian Peninsula]], adding to an English resentment about Dutch trade that had steadily grown since 1590. Although the Dutch wished to renew the 1625 treaty, their attempt to do so in 1639 was not responded to, so the treaty lapsed.<ref name="Groenveld543">Groenveld (1987), p. 543</ref>

By the middle of the 17th century the Dutch had built by far the largest mercantile fleet in Europe, with more ships than all the other states combined, and their economy, based substantially on maritime commerce, gave them a dominant position in European trade, especially in the [[North Sea]] and [[Baltic region|Baltic]]. Furthermore, they [[Dutch–Portuguese War|had conquered]] most of Portugal's territories and trading posts in the [[East Indies]] and [[Colonial Brazil|Brazil]], giving them control over the enormously profitable trade in [[spice]]s. They were even gaining significant influence over England's trade with her as yet small [[English overseas possessions|North American colonies]].<ref name="Israel715">Israel (1995), p. 715</ref>

The economic disparity between England and the United Provinces increased in part because unlike the English, the Dutch system was based on [[free trade]], making their products more competitive. For example, an English wool trader, who dealt largely with ports in English-speaking America, complained in 1651 that although his English ships would take [[wool]] cloth to America to be sold, they could expect to leave American ports with 4,000 to 5,000 bags of wool cloth unsold. Dutch ships, on the other hand, would leave American ports with barely 1,000 bags of wool cloth unsold. Because of this disparity, English trade with her traditional markets in the Baltic, Germany, Russia and Scandinavia withered.<ref name="Israel714-15">Israel (1995), pp. 714–715</ref> During the [[Wars of the Three Kingdoms]], the States General was officially neutral, a policy that antagonised both [[Roundhead|Parliamentarians]] and [[Cavalier|Royalists]] but which the powerful province of [[Holland]] considered most advantageous.<ref name="Groenveld544">Groenveld (1987), p. 544</ref>

The Dutch also benefitted from the 1648 [[Peace of Münster]] which confirmed their independence from Spain and ended the [[Eighty Years' War]], although the [[Imperial Diet (Holy Roman Empire)|Imperial Diet]] did not formally accept that the Dutch Republic was no longer part of the [[Holy Roman Empire]] until 1728.{{sfnp|Wilson|2009|p=746}} The peace agreement's provisions included a [[monopoly]] over trade conducted through the [[Scheldt]] estuary, confirming the commercial ascendancy of [[Amsterdam]]; [[Antwerp]], part of the [[Spanish Netherlands]] and before 1585 the most important port in [[Northern Europe]], would not recover until the late 19th century.{{sfnp|Israel|1995|pp=197–199}} This translated into cheaper prices for Dutch products due to a steep and sustained drop in freight charges and insurance rates.{{sfnp|Israel|1995|p=714}}

Following the outbreak of the [[First English Civil War]] in August 1642, Parliamentarians and Royalists placed an embargo on Dutch ships trading with the opposing side. Since the vast majority of English ports were held by Parliament and the Royalist navy was weak, few Dutch ships were seized although the number steadily rose from 1644 to 1646, causing considerable tension.<ref name="Groenveld547-51">Groenveld (1987), pp. 547–551</ref> Despite these embargoes and their extension to Ireland and English colonies in Royalist hands, as late as 1649 the States General, and particularly the maritime provinces of Holland and Zeeland, wished to maintain their lucrative trade with England.<ref name="Groenveld554-5">Groenveld (1987), pp. 554–555</ref> Until 1648, Dutch naval vessels also inspected convoys of English ships which, as neutrals, were able to trade with the [[Spanish Netherlands]]. They sometimes brought ships into Dutch ports for more thorough examination and, very rarely, confiscated ships and cargoes as [[contraband]].<ref name="Groenveld547">Groenveld (1987), p. 547</ref>

[[File:Oliver Cromwell by Robert Walker.jpg|thumb|left|150px|''[[Portrait of Oliver Cromwell]]'', by [[Robert Walker (painter)|Robert Walker]]]]

The [[Execution of Charles I]] in January 1649 resulted in the formation of the [[Commonwealth of England]], which continued to fight Royalists at home and in [[An Act for prohibiting Trade with the Barbadoes, Virginia, Bermuda and Antego|some of their colonies]], leading to an expansion in the English Navy.<ref name="Israel715"/> At the same time, the war played havoc with English trading and shipping.<ref>Israel (1995), p. 611</ref> To broadly study their commercial condition, the first [[Board of Trade|Commission of Trade]] to be established by an Act of Parliament was erected on 1 August 1650.<ref>[http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/acts-ordinances-interregnum/pp403-406 August 1650: An Act for the Advancing and Regulating of the Trade of this Commonwealth.]</ref> In October 1650, as part of the act to subdue their Royalist colonies and prevent Royalists from fleeing England, Parliament prohibited foreign ships from visiting or trading with any English [[plantations]] in America, without license; the act also allowed the seizure of ships violating the prohibition by both the English navy and merchant ships. The act was a temporary war measure hastily enacted and, while it was enacted in general terms to include all countries, it was aimed primarily at the Dutch, and was superseded the following year by a carefully prepared Navigation Act.<ref>Chapter III – The Commercial Policy of England Toward the American Colonies: the Acts of Trade, in [[Emory R. Johnson]], T. W. Van Metre, G. G. Huebner, D. S. Hanchett, ''History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States'' – Vol. 1, Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1915{{ISBN?}}</ref> Writing a century later, [[Adam Anderson (economist)|Adam Anderson]] relates of the period that "It had been observed with concern, that the merchants of England for several years past had usually freighted the Hollanders shipping for bringing home their own merchandize, because their freight was at a lower rate than that of English ships. The Dutch shipping were thereby made use of even for importing our own American products; whilst our shipping lay rotting in our harbours; our mariners also for want of employment at home, went into the service of the Hollanders."<ref>Adam Anderson, [https://books.google.com/books?id=chpPAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA415 An historical and chronological deduction of the origin of commerce: from the earliest accounts to the present time. ...], V. 2, pp. 415–416  (1764)</ref> The English accused the Dutch of profiting from the turmoil of the English Civil War.

===Opposing fleets===
[[File:De Vlieger, Brederode off Hellevoetsluis.jpg|thumb|right|The ''Brederode'', flagship of Dutch admiral [[Maarten Tromp]]]]

The Dutch fleet in the [[Eighty Years' War]] had three tasks: as a Battle Force against major Spanish fleets, to convoy Dutch merchant ships and protect its fishing fleet and to actively oppose [[privateers]], particularly those of [[Dunkirk]].<ref name="Bruijn79,82">Bruijn (2016), pp. 79, 82</ref> In that war, the two latter tasks were more important than major fleet actions, and they required more numerous but smaller warships than the Battle Force, although these smaller ships could also be used in mêlée battles, where boarding rather than gunfire might decide the result.<ref name="Bruijn77,83-4">Bruijn (2016), pp. 77, 83–84</ref> Following their victory over the Spanish fleet at the [[Battle of the Downs]] on October 21, 1639, and after peace was made with Spain in 1648,<ref>Israel (1995), p. 537</ref> the need for major warships lessened, although smaller ones were still required for convoy service, particularly to the [[Mediterranean]], the East Indies and later to the Caribbean. The financially exhausted [[Dutch Admiralties]] allowed their squadrons, and particularly their major warships, to deteriorate.<ref name="Bruijn84-5">Bruijn (2016), pp. 84–85</ref>

In the period up to the First Anglo-Dutch War, the Dutch Republic had four sources of warships. The first was the ships of five autonomous Admiralties ("colleges"), three in the province of Holland, which were supported by local taxes on commerce and contributions from the inland provinces. Each Admiralty was responsible for the design, construction, armament and manning of its own ships and the appointment of flag officers for its squadron.<ref name="Bruijn5,8-9">Bruijn (2011), pp. 5, 8–9</ref> The second was the so-called "director's ships" (''directieschepen''), convoy escorts provided by the burgomasters and merchants of six cities including [[Amsterdam]] and [[Hoorn]] to protect their Baltic trades.<ref name="Bruijn23-4">Bruijn (2011), pp. 23–24</ref> The cities were responsible for providing what were in effect modified and armed merchant ships, appointing their captains and providing crews.<ref name="Bruijn84">Bruijn (2016), p. 84</ref> The next group were hybrid ships of the [[Dutch East India Company]], which could act as warships or cargo carriers<ref name="Bruijn87">Bruijn (2016), p. 87</ref> and the last were hired merchant vessels, whose owners had little interest in risking their property.<ref name="Bruijn47">Bruijn (2011), p. 47</ref> Although captains of the East India Company were generally competent, they were unused to naval discipline, as were the more variable in quality commanders of director's ships and hired merchant ships.<ref name="Bruijn87" /><ref name="Bruijn84" />

After 1648 the Admiralties sold off many of their larger ships, including Dutch Admiral [[Maarten Tromp]]'s own flagship, the ''[[Dutch ship Aemilia (1632)|Aemilia]]'', of 600 tons and fitted with 57 guns. Admiral Tromp was forced to shift his flag to the 600-ton ''[[Dutch ship Brederode (1644)|Brederode]]'', of 54 guns. By 1652, the Dutch Admiralties had only 79 ships at their disposal.<ref name="Israel715"/> Many of these ships were in bad repair, with fewer than 50 being [[seaworthy]]. All these ships were inferior in firepower to the largest English [[Rating system of the Royal Navy|first and second rate]] ships.<ref name="Bruijn67-8">Bruijn (2011), pp. 67–68</ref><ref name="Bruijn82">Bruijn (2016), p. 82</ref> The numerical deficiency in the Dutch navy was to be made up by arming merchantmen.

[[File:Spotprent op Engeland, 1652 Leeuw en Honden Geveght (titel op object), RP-P-OB-81.746A.jpg|thumb|left|Dutch political cartoon, published in 1652. The Dutch lion is lulled to sleep by the music of the Spanish cello, but is awakened by Cromwell tickling its ear. Two English dogs (mastiffs) bark at the lion, but their tails are being squeezed by the Dutch sailor with a glowing pair of tongs.]]

The strongest restraint on the number of sailing warships was the large crews required, so fleets were limited by the number of seaman that could be induced or compelled to serve. England had a greater population and employed [[impressment]] to make up crew numbers, so could generally maintain more fully crewed ships than the Dutch could.<ref name="Fox67-8">Fox (2009), pp. 67–68</ref> The Dutch partly compensated by hiring foreign sailors from Scandinavia and the Baltic. The English navy of the Commonwealth period was in better condition and was still improving. The Commonwealth had won the English Civil War in 1652 with a strong and effective navy that had supported and supplied Cromwell's army in the [[Wars of the Three Kingdoms|wars in Scotland and Ireland]]; blockaded the Royalist fleet of [[Prince Rupert of the Rhine|Prince Rupert]] in [[Lisbon]]; and organised a system of convoys to protect the commerce of the Commonwealth against the numerous [[privateers]] based in European ports.<ref name="Coward123-4">Coward (2002), pp. 123–124</ref>

Compared to the Dutch fleet, the English fleet had larger ships of the first and second rates, but proportionately fewer [[frigates]], as the English fleet was principally designed to fight in major actions, whilst providing convoy escorts or fighting privateers was a secondary task.<ref name="Fox42-4">Fox (2009), pp. 42–44</ref> The first and second rate ships included the ageing [[English ship Resolution (1650)|''Resolution'']] and {{ship|English ship|Victory|1620|2}} which dated from James&nbsp;I's reign, along with the [[English ship Sovereign|''Sovereign'']] and others from Charles&nbsp;I's navy. However, the [[English ship Naseby (1655)|''Naseby'']], [[English ship Richard (1658)|''Richard'']], [[English ship Dunbar (1656)|''Dunbar'']], and several others were built during the Commonwealth.<ref name="Fox38,46">Fox (2009), pp. 38, 46</ref> These were part of a naval expansion financed by an [[Act of Parliament]] on 10 November 1650 which imposed a 15% tax on merchant shipping. Between 1649 and 1651 the English fleet included 18 ships that were each superior in firepower to Dutch Admiral Tromp's new flagship ''Brederode'', the largest Dutch ship.<ref>Israel (1995), pp. 715–716</ref> All the English ships intended to fight in the [[line of battle|battle line]] were more heavily armed than their equivalents in other European navies, sacrificing [[Freeboard (nautical)|freeboard]] and the ability to use their lower guns in adverse weather in exchange for more powerful [[Artillery|ordnance]].<ref name="Fox48">Fox (2009), p. 48</ref> English ships could fire and hit the enemy at a greater range, and favoured the use of [[round shot]] over the [[chain shot]] which was popular in other navies.

===Political tensions===
[[File:FirstAngloDutchwar.png|thumb|300px|Sites of the major battles of the First Anglo-Dutch War]]

The commercial tensions between England and the Netherlands were intensified when the English Parliament passed the [[Navigation Act 1651]].<ref name="Coward125">Coward (2002), p. 125</ref> This limited Dutch trade with any of the English colonies in America unless the shipping was done in "English bottoms" i.e. English ships. Indeed, any cargo to English ports or the ports of English colonies from anywhere in the world was required to be carried in English ships.<ref name="Israel715"/> Furthermore, the Navigation Act forbade all trade with those [[English overseas possessions in the Wars of the Three Kingdoms|English colonies that retained connections and sympathy for the royalist cause of Charles I]]. To have accepted the terms of the Navigation Act was seen by the Dutch as agreeing to subordinate Dutch trade to the English trading system.<ref name="Coward125"/><ref name="Israel714">Israel (1995), p. 714</ref> This insulted Dutch pride and damaged their economy, but the more immediate cause of the war was the actions of the English navy and privateers against Dutch shipping. In 1651, 140 Dutch merchantmen were seized on the open seas. During January 1652 alone, another 30 Dutch ships were captured at sea and taken to English ports. Protests to England by the [[States General of the Netherlands|States General]] of the United Provinces were of no avail: the English Parliament showed no inclination toward curbing these seizures of Dutch shipping.<ref name="Israel715"/>

During the English Civil War, the Dutch [[Stadtholder]] [[Frederick Henry, Prince of Orange|Frederick Henry]] had given significant financial support to [[Charles I of England]], to whom he had close family ties. The [[States General of the Netherlands|States General]] had been generally neutral and refused to become involved with representatives of either king or parliament; it also attempted to mediate between the two sides, an attitude that offended both English Royalists and its parliament.<ref name="Groenveld544-5">Groenveld (1987), pp. 544–545</ref><ref name="Rowen73">Rowen (1990), p. 73</ref> Frederick Henry's influence was lessening with the growth of strongly republican sentiment among the ruling class, and he could not involve the Netherlands in direct support for Charles I, particularly as his country was still at war with Spain.<ref name="Rowen74">Rowen (1990), p. 74</ref><ref name="Godwin371">Godwin (1827), p. 371</ref>

After the death of Frederick Henry in March 1647, his son, stadtholder [[William II of Orange]], attempted to extend the power of the stadtholderate particularly through maintaining the size of the army, which he commanded and using his supporters in six provinces to outvote Holland, the most prosperous province, in the States General.<ref name="Coward125-6">Coward (2002), pp. 125–126</ref><ref name="Godwin371"/> Following the end of the Eighty Years' War and the execution of his father-in-law, Charles I, William attempted to support the English Royalist cause to an extent that gave concern to even his own followers, and which involved him in disputes with the more committed republicans, particularly those in Holland.<ref name="Rowen81">Rowen (1990), p. 81</ref> The execution of Charles outraged the Orangists, and the Dutch republicans that had attempted to save Charles' life,<ref name="Rowen82">Rowen (1990), p. 82</ref> but the execution did not prevent the States General from continuing a policy of broad neutrality, dealing unofficially with the English parliament while allowing Royalist envoys into the country.<ref name="Groenveld552-3">Groenveld (1987), pp. 552–553</ref> The Commonwealth and the Dutch Republic had many things in common: they were both republican and [[Protestant]] and many members of States General sympathised with the aims of the English parliamentarians and, while strongly against its [[regicide]], supported a pragmatic policy of neutrality, in opposition to the Royalist-supporting stadtholder.<ref name="Rowen81-2">Rowen (1990), pp. 81–82</ref> The impasse between the two sides ended with the sudden death of William II in November 1650. His attempts to involve the Netherlands in action against the English Commonwealth in support of the exiled Charles II could have led at least to limited hostilities and possibly outright war and lead to a republican reaction.<ref name="Rowen91-2">Rowen (1990), pp. 91–92{{page needed|date=June 2023}}</ref> Shortly before his death, William attempted to gain control of Amsterdam by a coup, and then imprisoned six leading members of the States of Holland, but they were released when he died.<ref name="Godwin371-2">Godwin (1827), pp. 371–372</ref> These six led the province of Holland to assume the leadership of the republican movement, the [[Loevestein faction]], which saw the Netherlands as a free republic without a stadholder. The resulting [[First Stadtholderless period]] began when William II died in 1650, although it was not until January 1651 that the last of the seven provinces agreed to it.<ref name="Groenveld555">Groenveld (1987), p. 555</ref>

===English delegation to The Hague===
As early as 1643, [[Oliver St John]] had urged fellow Protestants in the Netherlands to sign the [[Solemn League and Covenant]] that the Scots had already signed, but had been rebuffed.<ref name="Groenveld545">Groenveld (1997), p. 545</ref> After the execution of Charles I in 1649, parliament sent an envoy to the Hague to discuss an alliance with the United Provinces, but he was murdered shortly after his arrival in reprisal for the king's death, after which the proposal was left in abeyance until more favourable times.<ref name="Godwin353-4,373">Godwin (1827), pp. 353–354, 373</ref> The sudden death on 6 November 1650 of [[William II of Orange|William II]], the Stadholder of the United Provinces, whose popularity had declined since his election in 1647 in the face of growing discontent from the States Party in the United Provinces, changed matters. The States party was the political faction identified most closely with the idea of rule solely by the States General, and was especially powerful in the large commercially oriented province of Holland. To obtain support against William II, it had sought the assistance of Oliver Cromwell. After William II's death, the States Party was in a much stronger position politically, and no longer valued or needed Cromwell's support against the stadholderate.<ref name="Coward126">Coward (2002), p. 126</ref>

[[File:Toegeschreven aan Bartholomeus van Bassen - Interieur van de Grote Zaal op het Binnenhof te Den Haag, tijdens de Grote Vergadering van de Staten-Generaal in 1651 - 26 - Rijksmuseum.jpg|thumb|left|The Great Assembly of the States General, in the Great Hall of the [[Binnenhof]] (painting by [[Dirck van Delen]], 1651, formerly attributed to [[Bartholomeus van Bassen]])]]

In January 1651, the [[English Council of State]], aware that the Netherlands States General was about to recognise the Commonwealth as the legitimate English government, which it did on 28 January, prepared an embassy to the republic headed by Oliver St John, with two envoys extraordinary. When it arrived in [[The Hague]] on 7 March 1651, the English delegation made it clear that their aim was to "enter into a more strict and intimate alliance and union' with the republic" to be effected by "a Confederation of the two Commonwealths".<ref name="Groenveld555-6">Groenveld (1997), pp. 555–556</ref> and based on proposal put in 1648 by a parliamentary envoy that the Dutch had declined to consider.<ref name="Groenveld553-4,556">Groenveld (1997), pp. 553–554, 556</ref> Any Dutch expectation that recognising the Commonwealth would end dissent between the two countries<ref name="Israel714"/> was disabused and, based on the earlier proposal, the States General drew up a draft of 36 articles, the first eleven of which were the subject of intensive discussion. By June the Dutch believed that agreement had been reached on those points, and the English delegation announced their imminent departure, leaving on 2 July.<ref name="Groenveld556">Groenveld (1997), p. 556</ref>

During their three-month stay, other events had convinced the English delegation of Dutch animosity. The Hague was the residence of the young widow of William II, Charles I's daughter [[Mary, Princess Royal and Princess of Orange|Mary Henrietta Stuart]], the [[Princess Royal]]. Her presence attracted exiled English noblemen not fighting with her brother [[Charles II of England|Charles]] to The Hague, which had for many years been an [[Orangism (Netherlands)|Orangist]] stronghold. The delegation appointed by the Commonwealth, could only leave their lodgings under armed escort, for fear of being assaulted by Royalists or large Orangist mobs in their pay. When the English delegates left in the last week of June, they reported that the Dutch were untrustworthy and that the United Provinces were under the control of the Orangist party and thus a threat to the security of the Commonwealth. Although the [[States of Holland and West Friesland]] were unwilling, if not unable, to suppress the activities of English Royalists, Orangists that deplored the execution of Charles I, and certain strict Calvinist ministers opposing Cromwell's religious innovations, it would have been more logical for him to ally with the ruling republican regents to overcome the pro-Stuart Orangists than go to war, were economic issues not more pressing.<ref name="Israel1118">Israel (1997), p. 1118</ref>

Following the departure of St John, the States General sent a delegation to London to continue discussions. However, after the [[Battle of Worcester]] in September 1651, the radical element in the English parliament became stronger and the group including Cromwell that genuinely favoured an alliance with the Netherlands was outnumbered by those wanting either to cripple Dutch trade without going to war or to provoke a war with the Dutch republic for political reasons.<ref name="Groenveld556"/> The Dutch considered that the economic provisions of the 36 articles they had drafted could form the basis of a trade agreement without compromising the independence of the United Provinces or their becoming involved in a war with Spain,<ref name="Israel1117-8">Israel (1997), pp. 1117–1118</ref> but it soon became apparent that the English negotiators were most concerned to ensure Dutch action against English Royalists and restrictions on the Dutch carrying trade between third countries. The armed confrontation between Tromp and Blake off Dover took place before these issues were settled, and the English immediately halted negotiations and refused to reopen them when the Dutch offered concessions, preferring war.<ref name="Groenveld556"/>

===Path to war===
In England, after 1648 and more particularly after Charles' execution and the proclamation of the Commonwealth, the army assumed a more prominent political role compared with parliament.

The neutralisation of Rupert's fleet and its bases, the defeat of the Irish Royalists at [[Battle of Rathmines|Rathmines]] and [[Siege of Drogheda|Drogheda]] in 1649 and of the Scots at the [[Battle of Dunbar (1650)|Battle of Dunbar]] in 1650 made the Commonwealth more assertive in its relations with the Dutch, both on trade and on William II's support for the Stuart cause.<ref name="Groenveld552-3"/> French support for the English Royalists had led the Commonwealth to commence the issuing of [[letters of marque]] against French ships and against French goods in neutral ships in December 1649.<ref name="Godwin360">Godwin (1827), p. 360</ref> Dozens of neutral Dutch ships were detained near French ports by English ships operating under letters of marque, and some of these were seized. Dutch concerns were further raised by an English embargo on Dutch trade with Scotland declared soon after.<ref name="Groenveld563-4">Groenveld (1997), pp. 563–564</ref>

In 1649 and 1650, General-at-Sea [[Robert Blake (admiral)|Robert Blake]] drove the Royalist fleet under Prince Rupert from its bases in Ireland and pursued it to the port of [[Lisbon]], where it was protected by the harbour's forts and the Portuguese king's refusal to let Blake enter the port.<ref name="Godwin357-9">Godwin (1827), pp. 357–359</ref> The Council of State decided to reinforce Blake and authorised him to seize ships from Brazil in reprisal, and to withdraw the English envoy to Portugal, whose departure in July 1650 created a state of war.<ref name="Godwin360-1">Godwin (1827), pp. 360–361</ref> In response to the Portuguese failure to expel Rupert, Blake continued to seize merchant ships entering the [[River Tagus]] from Brazil. On 24 September 1650 Blake attacked a fleet of 23 merchant vessels from Brazil and their naval escort, sinking the Portuguese Admiral and capturing the Vice-Admiral and ten of the larger merchant ships. The Portuguese court were compelled to insist that Rupert leave Lisbon harbour in September 1650,<ref name="Groenveld558">Groenveld (1987), p. 558</ref> but after finding Blake waiting for him, Rupert placed his ships under the protection of Portuguese coastal forts, where he remained until December, when he escaped to the West Indies.<ref name="Godwin360,366-7">Godwin (1827), pp. 360, 366–367</ref> The threat of the Royalist fleet had been neutralised by forcing it into retreat. Its strongholds in the [[Isles of Scilly]], the [[Isle of Man]] and the [[Channel Islands]] were captured in 1651. This was followed in 1652 by the recovery of England's colonial possessions in the [[West Indies]] and North America by General [[George Ayscue]].<ref name="Low35">Low (1872), p. 35</ref>

Infuriated by the treatment of the English delegation in the Hague and emboldened by their victory against [[Charles II of England|Charles II]] and his forces at the [[Battle of Worcester]] on September 3, 1651, the [[Rump Parliament|English Parliament]], as noted above, passed the first of the [[Navigation Acts]] in October 1651.<ref name="Israel714-15"/> It ordered that only English ships and ships from the originating country could import goods to England. This measure, as also noted above, was particularly aimed at hampering the shipping of the highly trade-dependent Dutch and often used as a pretext simply to take their ships; as [[George Monck, 1st Duke of Albemarle|General Monck]] put it: "The Dutch have too much trade, and the English are resolved to take it from them."<ref>Kennedy (1976), p. 48</ref> Agitation among the Dutch merchants was further increased by [[George Ayscue]]'s capture in early 1652 of 27 Dutch ships trading with the Royalist colony of [[Barbados]] in contravention of the trade prohibition imposed by the Commonwealth. Over a hundred other Dutch ships were captured by English privateers between October 1651 and July 1652. Moreover, the death of Dutch Stadtholder William II, who had favoured an expansion of the army at the expense of the navy, had led to a change in Dutch defence policy towards protecting the great trading concerns of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Accordingly, the States General decided on 3 March 1652 to expand the fleet by hiring and equipping 150 merchant ships as ships of war to allow effective convoying against hostile English actions. Although the States of Holland stressed that this measure was intended defensive and it carefully selected its captains and issued prudent instructions about saluting English warships, when news of this decision reached London on 12 March 1652, it was seen as a provocative move.<ref name="Groenveld565">Groenveld (1987), p. 565</ref>