Editing Four Days' Battle (section)

==Background==
===Naval tactics===
The introduction of sailing ships with a [[square rig]], of a type later called the ship of the line, which were heavily armed with cannon, brought about a gradual change in naval tactics. Before and during the First Dutch War, fleet encounters were chaotic and consisted of individual ships or squadrons of one side attacking the other, firing from either side as opportunities arose but often relying on capturing enemy ships by boarding. Ships in each squadron were supposed to support those in the same squadron, particularly their flag officer, as their first priority. However, in the melee of battle, ships of the same squadron frequently blocked each other's fields of fire and collisions between them were not uncommon.<ref>Palmer, pp.128-9</ref>

Although Lieutenant-Admiral [[Maarten Tromp]] had formed a line against the Spanish fleet in 1639 in the [[action of 18 September 1639]], this was not a planned formation but a desperate attempt to hold off a greatly superior, but badly organised, enemy. The initial sea battles of the First Dutch War were largely indecisive melees, but later in that war [[Robert Blake (admiral)|Robert Blake]] and [[George Monck, 1st Duke of Albemarle|George Monck]] issued instructions for each squadron to stay in line with its flag officer. At the [[Battle of Portland]] Tromp's attempt to overwhelm the English rear by concentrating his whole fleet against it and using his favourite tactic of boarding was frustrated by the English rear remaining in line ahead<ref>Palmer, pp.131-3</ref> at the [[Battle of the Gabbard]], the English fleet in line ahead forced the Dutch into an artillery duel that defeated their more lightly armed ships with a loss of Dutch 17 ships sunk or captured.<ref>Palmer, pp.134-5</ref>

Between the first and second wars, the Dutch built the "New Navy", some sixty larger ships with heavier armament, about forty cannon, although the shallow waters around the Netherlands prevented them building ships as big as the largest English ones: additionally, English ships of the same size tended to have more and larger guns than their Dutch equivalents.<ref>Fox, pp. 47-8</ref> However, many of those the Dutch built were relatively small convoy escorts, [[frigate]]s by English standards. It was intended to replace these by sixty heavier vessels but not all those planned had been completed or fitted out by the start of the war in 1665.<ref>Bruijn, pp.64-6.</ref> At the time of the Second Dutch War, the English fleet also had a signalling system which, if still rudimentary, was better than the Dutch reliance on standing instructions to fight in line. In the [[Battle of Lowestoft]] and the [[St. James's Day Battle]], the English fighting in line ahead defeated the Dutch who did not.<ref>Palmer, pp.138-9</ref> De Ruyter favoured the tactic of concentrating his attack on a portion of the enemy's line, so achieving a breakthrough, and the capture of ships by boarding.<ref>Bruijn, pp. 64-6</ref> However, in the Four Days' Battle the Dutch generally fought in line, and the English fleet did not do so, at important stages in the fighting.<ref>Palmer, p. 140</ref>

From early in the 17th century, the Dutch navy had used fireships extensively, and in the First Anglo-Dutch War at the [[Battle of Scheveningen]], Dutch fireships burned two English warships and an English fireship burned a Dutch warship. The Dutch in particular increased the number of their fireships after the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Dutch War but, at the [[Battle of Lowestoft]], it was two English fireships that burned six Dutch warships which had collided and become entangled with one another. However, the limitations of fireships when used in open waters was demonstrated during the Four Days' Battle, where many were destroyed while trying to attack well-armed ships able to manoeuvre freely. The surrender of the English {{HMS|Prince Royal|1660|6}} when attacked by several Dutch fireships after it had run aground because of the panic this attack caused only demonstrated that fireships were useful against warships that were stationary or in confined harbours, but not those able to move in the open sea. However, this overall lack of success in this battle did not prevent both sides adding more fireships to their fleets.<ref>Coggeshall, pp. 13-14</ref>

===War in 1665===
[[File:Bol, Michiel de Ruyter.jpg|thumb|right|[[Michiel de Ruyter]], commander of the Dutch navy.]]
The Second Anglo-Dutch War arose from an escalation of existing commercial tensions between England and the Netherlands in 1664, involving English provocations in North America and West Africa.<ref>Rommelse, p.73</ref> Although negotiations to avoid the outbreak of war took place throughout much of 1664, both sides refused to compromise on what they considered were their vital interests in these two areas and in Asia, and hostile acts by each side continued despite diplomatic efforts to avoid war.<ref>Rommelse, pp.95, 98-9</ref> [[Louis XIV of France]] was intent on conquering the [[Spanish Netherlands]] and had signed a defensive treaty with the Dutch in 1662, with the intention of dissuading other countries from intervening if France invaded the Habsburg territories there.<ref>Fox, pp.67-8</ref> The existence of this treaty strengthened the Dutch resolve not to make significant concessions, as [[Johan de Witt]] believed it would prevent England declaring war.<ref>Rommelse, pp.100-1</ref> [[Charles II of England|Charles II]] and his ministers hoped, firstly, to persuade Louis to repudiate the Dutch treaty and to replace it with an Anglo-French alliance, although such an arrangement would not assist Louis' plans for the Spanish Netherlands and, secondly, to strengthen English relations with Sweden and Denmark, both of which had significant fleets.<ref>Rommelse, pp.100, 108-9</ref> Although neither plan succeeded, Louis considered an Anglo-Dutch war unnecessary and likely to obstruct his plans to acquire Habsburg territory.,<ref>Rommelse, p.109</ref> Charles' ambassador in France reported the French opposed such a war and this gave Charles the hope that, if the Dutch could be provoked into declaring war, the French would evade their treaty obligations which only applied if the [[Dutch Republic]] were attacked, and refuse to be drawn into a naval war with England.<ref>Fox, pp.69, 136</ref> The war commenced with a declaration of war by the Dutch on 4 March 1665, following English attacks on two Dutch convoys off Cadiz and in the English Channel.<ref>Fox, pp.67-8</ref>

[[File:George Monck 1st Duke of Albemarle Studio of Lely.jpg|thumb|left|George Monck, commander of the English navy]]
De Witt also achieved the completion of many new warships, with twenty-one ordered during the early stages of the war to augment the existing fleet and sixty-four planned in 1664, including several large flotilla flagships comparable in armament to all but the largest English ones. These had been given greater constructional strength and a wider beam to support heavier guns. Although several of these ships had not been available to the Dutch fleet at the [[Battle of Lowestoft]], they had been completed and fitted out after it.<ref>Bruijn, pp. 64-6</ref> The Dutch fleet had been confident of victory when it sought out and fought the English fleet in the Battle of Lowestoft in June 1665, but it suffered the worst Dutch defeat in any of the three Anglo-Dutch wars, with at least sixteen ships lost, and one-third of its personnel killed or captured. De Witt quickly saw that men were critical, not materiel: he sought to deal with the insubordination, lack of discipline and apparent cowardice among captains by executing three and exiling and dismissing others.<ref>Fox, pp. 126-7</ref><ref>Jones, pp. 28-9</ref> De Witt also turned to de Ruyter, rather than [[Cornelis Tromp]] who had previously been given temporary command, to lead the Dutch fleet because of his seniority and political neutrality: de Ruyter assumed command on 18 August 1665 and he transferred his flag to the newly commissioned ''Zeven Provinciën'' on 6 May 1666.<ref>Van Foreest and Weber, pp. 1-2, 4</ref>

[[File:Peter Lely - Prince Rupert of the Rhine - Google Art Project.jpg|thumb|right|Prince Rupert of the Rhine, commander of the English navy]]
Although the English had defeated the Dutch at Lowestoft, they failed to take full advantage of their victory. Despite the loss of ships and at least 5,000 men killed, wounded or captured, the escape of the bulk of the Dutch fleet frustrated the possibility of England ending the war with a single overwhelming victory.<ref>Fox, pp.99-100</ref> In another reverse to English hopes of an early and successful end to the war, the rich Dutch Spice Fleet managed to return home safely after defeating an English flotilla that attacked it at the [[Battle of Vågen]] in August 1665. The Dutch navy was enormously expanded through the largest building programme in its history.<ref>Fox, pp. 126-7</ref> In August 1665 the English fleet was again challenged, though no large battles resulted. In 1666, the English became anxious to destroy the Dutch navy completely before it could grow too strong and were desperate to end the activity of Dutch raiders which threatened the collapse of English maritime trade.

After Lowestoft, English warships and privateers blockading the three main entry and exit points where Dutch merchant shipping concentrated, namely the [[Marsdiep|Texel]], the [[Meuse|Maas river]] and off [[Zeeland]] temporarily paralysed Dutch overseas trade and weakened Dutch business confidence.<ref>Jones, p.19</ref> The existence of five admiralty colleges, each with its own policies on ship construction and armaments, each favouring its local commanders and with variable levels of efficiency, and the reluctance of [[Grand Pensionary]] [[Johan de Witt]] to appoint Orangist officers, all led to difficulty in creating a unified navy.<ref>Jones, pp. 20-1</ref>

At Lowestoft, the English Fleet was commanded by [[James II of England|James, Duke of York]], who was [[heir presumptive]] to his brother Charles II as well as [[Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom|Lord High Admiral of England]]. In view of the significant number of casualties among senior English officers and noble volunteers, including three killed next to the Duke, Charles insisted that his brother should no longer command at sea.<ref>Fox, pp.100-2</ref> The command of the English fleet was therefore entrusted jointly to [[Prince Rupert]], a cousin of Charles and James, and [[George Monck, 1st Duke of Albemarle|the Duke of Albemarle]].<ref>Fox, pp.116-7</ref>

===French intervention===
Louis had tried to act as mediator in July and August 1664 to prevent war being declared, but England did not accept his offer.<ref>Rommelse, p.110</ref> After Battle of Lowestoft, and concerned that the complete destruction of the Dutch fleet would leave the English fleet in a position to interfere with his plans in the Spanish Netherlands, Louis again offered mediation, but as he had already sent French troops into the Netherlands to assist the Dutch, and had also attempted to bring Denmark into an alliance with the [[Dutch Republic]] and France that was designed to put pressure on England, his credibility as mediator was undermined. In response to its rejection of his mediation, Louis XIV declared war on England on 16 January 1666.<ref>Fox, pp.136</ref> The greater part of the French fleet was in the Mediterranean under the  [[François de Vendôme, duc de Beaufort|duc de Beaufort]], and Louis intended that much of this would be brought into the Atlantic to join up with the Atlantic squadron commanded by [[Abraham Duquesne]]. The combined French fleet would then, it was intended, link up with the Dutch in the [[English Channel]] and the two would outnumber the English fleet.<ref>Fox, pp.123-7</ref>

Louis' plans were based on the assumption that the Dutch fleet would be at sea in time to be able to prevent the English fleet attacking the weaker French fleet in the western English Channel. However, the Dutch could not undertake to be at sea to provide cover for Beaufort until 21 May. As a result, Beaufort, who left Toulon in April 1666 with 32 fighting ships, delayed at Lisbon for six weeks while the Four Days' Battle was fought.<ref>Fox, pp.173-5, 180</ref> Duquesne, who initially had 8 and later 12 ships, was ordered to join Beaufort at Lisbon so that the combined French fleet would be less vulnerable to a possible English attack before it could join the Dutch, although the two failed to meet and Duquesne returned to Brest while Beaufort stopped at [[Rochfort]].<ref>Fox, pp.176-7</ref>

===Division of the fleet===
[[File:The Dutch Fleet Assembling Before the Four Days’ Battle of 11-14 June 1666 by Willem van de Velde (II).jpg|thumb|The Dutch Fleet assembling before the Four Days' Battle, 1666]]
The French intention to bring the bulk of their Mediterranean fleet to join the Dutch fleet at [[Dunkirk]] was known to Prince Rupert by 10 May and discussed by Charles and his [[Privy Council of the United Kingdom|Privy Council]] on 13 May. The next day, two privy councillors were delegated to discuss the matter with Albemarle. The delegates recorded that Albemarle would not object to detaching a squadron under Prince Rupert to block the [[Strait of Dover]], provided he were left with at least 70 ships to fight the Dutch.<ref>Fox, p. 143</ref> Rupert selected 20 generally fast or well-armed ships from the fleet and was instructed to collect any extra ships that might be available at [[Portsmouth]] or [[Plymouth]].<ref>Fox, pp. 144, 313-5</ref> Rupert's initial instructions were to attack Beaufort's fleet, whose original 32 ships included several weakly armed, poorly manned or slow vessels. However, once it was known that Duquesne's squadron was intended to join Beaufort, Rupert was instructed only to attack the French fleet if it was at anchor or was attempting an invasion, but otherwise to rejoin the main fleet as soon as he had encountered Beaufort or had credible information that the French fleet was not close enough to be a danger.<ref>Fox, pp. 139, 148, 152</ref> In the event the French fleet did not appear.

Although Albemarle has been accused either of the responsibility for dividing the fleet or complacency for accepting the loss of Rupert's squadron,<ref>Allen, pp. 115-16</ref> it is clear that he counted on having at least 70 ships to face the Dutch fleet, even after Rupert's squadron of 20 ships had been detached.  When he spoke to the privy councillors on 14 May, the nominal strength of the fleet assigned to the joint commanders was over ninety, although at least a dozen of these had not joined the fleet at the mouth of the [[River Thames|Thames]] and three ships then with the fleet later returned to port.<ref>Fox, p. 143</ref> Four of the missing vessels had been refitted but could not be fully manned in time to join the fleet, three were being repaired and five newly constructed ships which had been expected to join in May were delayed by difficulties in manning and victualing them.<ref>Fox, pp. 155-6</ref> Much of the problem was that Charles II and his ministers had planned for a short war, but keeping a large fleet in being for a year after the partial victory of Lowestoft put demands on English public finances in 1666 that were almost impossible for it to meet.<ref>Fox, p. 157</ref>

Albemarle became increasingly concerned about the small numbers of ships under his command at the mouth of the Thames as May progressed, particularly after he received intelligence that the Dutch fleet was preparing to leave its harbours.<ref>Fox, p. 116</ref> He wrote three times between 26 and 28 May to the [[Navy Board]] and to Lord [[Henry Bennet, 1st Earl of Arlington|Arlington]], one of Charles II's [[Secretary of State for the Southern Department|Secretaries of State]]. In each case, he reiterated his commitment to fight the Dutch fleet with 70 ships but, as he had only 54 ships on 27 May and 56 ships on 28 May, he requested a decision on whether he had to fight a much superior Dutch fleet or could retreat. His final letter, to Arlington, amounted to him asking for specific instructions to decline battle if this disparity in numbers persisted.<ref>Fox, p. 159</ref>

The response from the Duke of York contained no instruction for Albemarle to decline battle if he had less than 70 ships, but left him discretion to make the decision. In part, this was because Charles and his ministers believed that the Dutch intended sail around the north of Scotland to join the French fleet before attacking the British fleet, so that Albemarle had time to increase the size of his fleet.<ref>Fox, pp. 157-8, 160</ref> However, the intelligence relied on was faulty and, at the start of the battle the English fleet of 56 ships commanded by  Albemarle was outnumbered by the 85 warships in the Dutch fleet commanded by Lieutenant-Admiral [[Michiel de Ruyter]]. Five ships joined Albemarle on 3 and 4 June, before the return of Rupert's squadron.<ref>Fox, p. 333</ref>

On the day before the battle, the Dutch fleet comprised 72 large warships, 13 smaller warships classed as [[frigates]], 9 fireships and an auxiliary force of 8 despatch [[yachts]] and twenty [[galleys]], disposing of 4,200 guns and manned by 22,000 crewmen, constituting the largest and most powerful Dutch fleet up to that time.<ref>Van Foreest and Weber, pp. 1-2, 4</ref> De Ruyter had been informed that day by a Swedish merchant ship that it had seen the English fleet, which it estimated at 80 ships, off the Kentish coast two days before.<ref>Van Foreest and Weber, p. 6</ref>