Editing George Lakoff (section)

==Work==

===Reappraisal of metaphor===
Although some of Lakoff's research involves questions traditionally pursued by linguists - such as the conditions under which a certain linguistic construction is grammatically viable - he has become best known for his reappraisal of the role that [[metaphor]]s play in the socio-political activity of humans. The Western scientific tradition has seen metaphor as a purely linguistic construction.{{citation needed|date=February 2025}} The essential thrust of Lakoff's work has been to argue that metaphors are a primarily conceptual construction and are in fact central to the development of [[thought]].

In his words: "Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature." According to Lakoff, non-metaphorical thought is possible only when we talk about purely physical reality; the greater the level of [[abstraction]], the more layers of metaphor are required to express that abstraction. People do not notice these metaphors for various reasons, including that some metaphors become "dead" in the sense that we no longer recognize their origin. Another reason is that we just do not "see" what is "going on".

In intellectual debate, for instance, the underlying metaphor - according to Lakoff - is usually that argument is war (later revised to "argument is struggle"):
*He ''won'' the argument.
*Your claims are ''indefensible''.
*He ''shot down'' all my arguments.
*His criticisms were ''right on target''.
*If you use that ''strategy'', he'll ''wipe you out''.

According to Lakoff, the development of thought has been the process of developing better metaphors. He also points out that the application of one [[domain of knowledge]] to another offers new perceptions and understandings.

===Linguistics wars===
{{further|Linguistics wars}}
Lakoff began his career as a student and later as a teacher of the theory of [[transformational grammar]] developed by [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology]] professor [[Noam Chomsky]]. In the late 1960s, however, he joined with others to promote [[generative semantics]]<ref>{{Cite web | last1=Lakoff | first1=George | last2=McCawley | first2=Jim | last3=Ross | first3=John Robert | title=Generative Semantics | url=https://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/dbt_derivate_00004550/Government_and_Binding.pdf | access-date=25 April 2024 | website=www.db-thueringen.de}}</ref> as an alternative to Chomsky's [[generative linguistics|generative syntax]]. In an interview he stated:

<blockquote>
During that period, I was attempting to unify Chomsky's transformational grammar with formal [[logic]]. I had helped work out a lot of the early details of Chomsky's theory of grammar. Noam claimed then — and still does, so far as I can tell —  that [[syntax]] is independent of meaning, context, background knowledge, memory, cognitive processing, communicative intent, and every aspect of the body...In working through the details of his early theory, I found quite a few cases where [[semantic]]s, context, and other such factors entered into rules governing the syntactic occurrences of phrases and [[morphemes]]. I came up with the beginnings of an alternative theory in 1963 and, along with wonderful collaborators like [[John R. Ross|"Haj" Ross]] and [[James D. McCawley|Jim McCawley]], developed it through the sixties.<ref>John Brockman (03/09/99), Edge.org,  [http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/lakoff/lakoff_p2.html "Philosophy In The Flesh" A Talk With George Lakoff]</ref>
</blockquote>

Lakoff's claim that Chomsky asserts independence between syntax and semantics has been rejected by Chomsky, who holds the following view: <blockquote>A decision as to the boundary separating syntax and semantics (if there is one) is not a prerequisite for theoretical and descriptive study of syntactic and semantic rules. On the contrary, the problem of delimitation will clearly remain open until these fields are much better understood than they are today. Exactly the same can be said about the boundary separating semantic systems from systems of knowledge and belief. That these seem to interpenetrate in obscure ways has long been noted….<ref>{{cite book | last1=Chomsky | first1=Noam | title=Aspects of the Theory of Syntax |date=May 1965 |publisher=MIT Press |page=159}}</ref></blockquote>

In response to Lakoff's making the above claim about Chomsky's view, Chomsky claimed that Lakoff has "virtually no comprehension of the work he is discussing".<ref>[http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1973/jul/19/chomsky-replies/ "Chomsky Replies"], ''The New York Review of Books'', 1973 20;12</ref> Despite Lakoff's mischaracterization of Chomsky's view on the matter, their linguistic positions diverge significantly; this rift between Generative Grammar and Generative Semantics led to fierce, acrimonious debates among linguists that have come to be known as the "[[linguistics wars]]".

===Embodied mind===
{{further|Embodied philosophy}}
When Lakoff claims the mind is "embodied", he is arguing that almost all of human cognition, up through the most [[abstract reasoning]], depends on and makes use of such concrete and "low-level" facilities as the sensorimotor system and the emotions. Therefore, embodiment is a rejection not only of dualism vis-a-vis mind and matter, but also of claims that human reason can be basically understood without reference to the underlying "implementation details". Lakoff offers three complementary but distinct sorts of arguments in favor of embodiment:
* First, using evidence<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.neurohumanitiestudies.eu/archivio/SSRN-id1437794The_Neural_Theory_of_Metaphor.pdf | title=The Neural Theory of Metaphor, George Lakoff, published in R. Gibbs. 2008 ''The Metaphor Handbook'', Cambridge University Press. | website=www.neurohumanitiestudies.eu/ |access-date=2024-03-02}}</ref> from [[neuroscience]] and [[neural network (biology)|neural-network]] simulations, he argues that certain concepts - such as color and [[spatial relation]] concepts (e.g. "red" or "over"; see also ''[[qualia]]'') - can be almost entirely understood through the examination of how processes of perception or motor control work.
* Second, based on [[cognitive linguistics]]' analysis of [[figurative language]], he argues that the reasoning we use for such abstract topics as warfare, economics, or morality is somehow rooted in the reasoning we use for such mundane topics as spatial relationships (see [[conceptual metaphor]]).
* Finally, based on research in [[cognitive psychology]] and some investigations in the [[philosophy of language]], he argues that very few of the categories used by humans are actually of the black-and-white type amenable to analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. On the contrary, most categories are supposed to be much more complicated and messy, just like our bodies. "We are neural beings", Lakoff states, "Our brains take their input from the rest of our bodies. What our bodies are like and how they function in the world thus structures the very concepts we can use to think. We cannot think just anything — only what our embodied brains permit."<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/lakoff/lakoff_p1.html | title=EDGE 3rd Culture: A Talk with George Lakoff | publisher=Edge.org |access-date=2013-09-29}}</ref>

Lakoff envisages consciousness as neurally embodied, however he explicitly states that the mechanism is not just neural computation alone. Using the concept of {{linktext|disembodiment}}, Lakoff supports the [[physicalist]] approach to the afterlife. If the [[soul]] can not have any of the properties of the body, then Lakoff claims it can not feel, perceive, think, be conscious, or have a personality. If this is true, then Lakoff asks what would be the point of the afterlife?{{Citation needed|date=March 2013}} Many scientists share the belief that there are problems with [[falsifiability]] and [[foundation ontology|foundation ontologies]] purporting to describe "what exists", to a sufficient degree of rigor to establish a reasonable method of [[empirical validation]]. But Lakoff takes this further to explain why hypotheses built with complex metaphors cannot be directly falsified. Instead, they can only be rejected based on interpretations of empirical observations guided by other complex metaphors. This is what he means when he says<ref>Lakoff, G., and M. Johnson, 1999, ''Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought'', New York: Basic Books</ref> that falsifiability itself can never be established by any reasonable method that would not rely ultimately on a shared human bias. The bias he's referring to is the set of conceptual metaphors governing how people interpret observations.

Lakoff is, with coauthors [[Mark Johnson (professor)|Mark Johnson]] and [[Rafael E. Núñez]], one of the primary proponents of the [[embodied mind]] thesis. Lakoff discussed these themes in his 2001 [[Gifford Lectures]] at the [[University of Glasgow]], published as ''The Nature and Limits of Human Understanding''.<ref>ed. Anthony Sanford, T & T Clark, 2003. [http://www.giffordlectures.org/Browse.asp?PubID=TPNLHU&Volume=0&Issue=0&Summary=True Summary] at giffordlectures.org {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110614093320/http://www.giffordlectures.org/Browse.asp?PubID=TPNLHU&Volume=0&Issue=0&Summary=True | date=2011-06-14 }} by Brannon Hancock.</ref> Others who have written about the embodied mind include philosopher [[Andy Clark]] (See his ''Being There''), philosophers and neurobiologists [[Humberto Maturana]] and [[Francisco Varela]] and Varela's student [[Evan Thompson]],<ref>Varela, Thompson & [[Eleanor Rosch|Rosch]]: ''The Embodied Mind''</ref> roboticists such as [[Rodney Brooks]], [[Rolf Pfeifer]] and [[Tom Ziemke]], the physicist [[David Bohm]] (see his ''Thought As A System''), [[Ray Gibbs]] (see his ''Embodiment and Cognitive Science''), [[John Grinder]] and [[Richard Bandler]] in their [[neuro-linguistic programming]], and [[Julian Jaynes]]. The work of these writers can be traced back to earlier philosophical writings, most notably in the [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenological]] tradition, such as [[Maurice Merleau-Ponty]] (1908–1961) and [[Martin Heidegger|Heidegger]] (1889–1976). The basic thesis of "embodied mind" is also traceable to the American contextualist or pragmatist tradition, notably to [[John Dewey]] in such works as ''[[Art as Experience]]'' (1934).

===Mathematics===
According to Lakoff, even mathematics is subjective to the human species and its cultures: thus "any question of math's being inherent in physical reality is moot, since there is no way to know whether or not it is". By this, he is saying that there is nothing outside of the thought structures we derive from our embodied minds that we can use to "prove" that mathematics is somehow beyond biology. Lakoff and [[Rafael E. Núñez]] (2000) argue at length that [[mathematics|mathematical]] and [[philosophy|philosophical]] ideas are best understood in light of the embodied mind.<ref>
Lakoff & R. Núñez. (2000). ''[[Where Mathematics Comes From]]: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being''. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 0-465-03771-2.
</ref>
The [[philosophy of mathematics]] ought therefore to look to the current scientific understanding of the human body as a [[foundation ontology]], and should abandon self-referential attempts to ground the operational components of mathematics in anything other than "meat".

Mathematical reviewers have generally been critical of Lakoff and Núñez, pointing to mathematical errors.{{Citation needed|date=November 2014}} Lakoff claims that these errors have been corrected in subsequent printings.{{Citation needed|date=November 2014}} Although Lakoff and Núñez's book attempts a refutation of some of the most widely accepted viewpoints in the philosophy of mathematics and advice for how the field might proceed, its authors have yet to elicit much of a reaction from philosophers of mathematics themselves.{{Citation needed|date=July 2013}} The small community specializing in the psychology of mathematical learning, to which Núñez belongs, is paying attention.<ref>G. Lakoff & R. Núñez. (2000). ''Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being''. New York: Basic Books.</ref>{{page needed|date=February 2025}}

Lakoff has also claimed that we should remain agnostic about whether math is somehow wrapped up with the very nature of the universe. Early in 2001 Lakoff told the [[American Association for the Advancement of Science]] (AAAS): "Mathematics may or may not be out there in the world, but there's no way that we scientifically could possibly tell." This is because the structures of scientific knowledge are not "out there" but rather in our brains, based on the details of our anatomy. Therefore, we cannot "tell" that mathematics is "out there" without relying on conceptual metaphors rooted in our biology. This claim bothers those who believe that there really is a way we could "tell". The falsifiability of this claim is perhaps the central problem in the [[cognitive science of mathematics]], a field that attempts to establish a [[foundation ontology]] based on the human cognitive and scientific process.<ref>
Dehaene, S. (1997) ''The number sense: How the mind creates mathematics''. New York: Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|0-19-513240-8}}</ref>