Editing German spring offensive (section)

==German preparations==

===Strategy===
[[File:Riflemen-1918-Western-Front.jpg|thumb|upright=1.6|Comparative numbers of German and Allied front-line infantry from April to November 1918.<ref>Leonard P. Ayers, ''The war with Germany: a statistical summary'' (1919) p 104 [https://archive.org/stream/warwithgermanyst00ayreuoft#page/n1/mode/1up online]</ref>]]

The German High Command—in particular General [[Erich Ludendorff]], the Chief Quartermaster General at [[Oberste Heeresleitung]], the supreme army headquarters—has been criticised by military historians{{who|date=November 2010}} for the failure to formulate sound and clear strategy. Ludendorff privately conceded that Germany could no longer win a [[Attrition warfare|war of attrition]], yet he was not ready to give up the German gains in the west and east and was one of the main obstacles to the German government's attempts to reach a settlement with the Western Allies.<ref>Martin Kitchen, ''The German Offensive of 1918'' (2001)</ref>{{page needed|date=June 2021}}

Although Ludendorff was unsure whether the Americans would enter the war in strength, at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the German armies on the Western Front on 11 November 1917, he decided to launch an offensive.<ref>Blaxland, p.25</ref> The German government and Field Marshal [[Paul von Hindenburg]], nominally the Chief of the General Staff, were not party to the planning process. Eventually it was decided to launch [[Operation Michael]] near [[Saint-Quentin, Aisne|Saint-Quentin]], at the hinge between the French and British armies, and strike north to Arras. The main reason for the choice was tactical expediency. The ground on this sector of the front would dry out much sooner after the winter and spring rains and would therefore be easier to advance across. It was also a line of least resistance as the British and French armies were weak in the sector.{{Citation needed|date=June 2024}}

The intention was not to reach the [[English Channel]] coast, but to break through the Allied lines and roll up the flank of the British army from the south, pushing it back toward the Channel ports or destroying it if the British chose to stand and fight. Further operations such as [[Operation Georgette]] and Operation Mars were designed to strike further north to seize the remaining Allied ports in Belgium and France while diverting Allied forces from ''Michael''. However, these remained only secondary and weaker operations, subordinate to ''Michael''.<ref>Middlebrook 1983, pp. 30–34.</ref>

The constant changing of operational targets once the offensive was underway gave the impression the German command had no coherent strategic goal. Any capture of an important strategic objective, such as the Channel ports, or the vital railway junction of [[Amiens]], would have occurred more by chance than by design.<ref>Brown 1998, p. 184.</ref><ref>Robson 2007, p. 93.</ref>{{incomplete short citation|date=June 2021}}

===Changes in tactics===
The German army had concentrated many of its best troops into stormtrooper units, trained in [[infiltration tactics]] to infiltrate and bypass enemy front line units, leaving these strong points to be "mopped-up" by follow-up troops. The stormtrooper tactic was to attack and disrupt enemy headquarters, [[artillery]] units and supply depots in the rear areas, as well as to occupy territory rapidly.<ref>Simpson 1995, pp. 117–118.</ref>{{incomplete short citation|date=June 2021}}<!--All of the Western front armies had evolved like this since early 1915 by obtaining the theory, equipment and training.--> Each major formation "creamed off" its best and fittest soldiers into storm units; several complete divisions were formed from these elite units. This process gave the German army an initial advantage in the attack, but meant that the best formations would suffer disproportionately heavy casualties, while the quality of the remaining formations declined as they were stripped of their best personnel to provide the stormtroops. The Germans also failed to arm their forces with a mobile exploitation force, such as cavalry, to exploit gains quickly. This tactical error meant the infantry had to keep up an exhausting tempo of advance.<ref>Simpson 1995, p. 124.</ref>{{incomplete short citation|date=June 2021}} Notwithstanding the effectiveness of the stormtroopers, the following German infantry often made attacks in large traditional waves and suffered heavy casualties.<ref>Simpson 1995, p. 123.</ref>{{incomplete short citation|date=June 2021}}

To enable the initial breakthrough, Lieutenant Colonel [[Georg Bruchmüller]],<ref name="Bruchmüller">[http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/bruchmuller.htm Bruchmüller] biography.</ref> a German artillery officer, developed the ''{{ill|Feuerwalze|de|Feuerwalze (Militär)}}'', (literally: rolling fire, rolling barrage)<ref>(Anon.) (1918) [https://books.google.com/books?id=0nEmAQAAIAAJ&pg=PA417 "Organization of a rolling barrage in the German Army"], ''The Field Artillery Journal'' (U.S. Army), '''8''' :  417–421.</ref> an effective and economical [[creeping barrage]] scheme.<ref>Zabecki, 2006, p 56</ref> There were three phases: first, a brief bombardment on the enemy's command and communications (headquarters, telephone exchanges, etc.); then, destruction of their artillery; lastly an attack upon the enemy front-line infantry defences. Bombardment would always be brief so as to retain surprise. Bruchmüller's tactics were made possible by the vast numbers of heavy guns—with correspondingly plentiful amounts of ammunition for them—which Germany possessed by 1918{{citation needed|date=February 2024}}.