Editing Glassboro Summit Conference (section)

==Background==
[[File:Whitney Mansion (Hollybush).JPG|thumb|right|[[Whitney Mansion (Glassboro, New Jersey)|Hollybush Mansion]] at then [[Rowan University|Glassboro State College]], site of the summit meetings.]]
With the United States gradually losing ground in the [[Vietnam War]], the administration was looking for other solutions to the conflict.

On 5 June 1967 the [[Six-Day War]] began between [[Israel]] and the [[Arab states]]. The war led to an increase in Soviet-US diplomatic contact and cooperation; there were some who hoped this could continue to help the US solve the [[Vietnam War]] and other pressing international issues.<ref>Gibbons 1995, p. 718.</ref> On 10 June 1967, Premier Alexei Kosygin wrote a letter to contact President Lyndon B. Johnson. The "hot line" message arrived at the White House to seek communication between the United States and the Soviet Union. Alexei Kosygin gives a quick explanation of what the Soviet Union and United States should do in regards to the Middle Eastern Crisis. In the message Alexei Kosygin writes:

{{blockquote|To The White House

To President Lyndon B. Johnson

Dear Mr. President:

The events of the last days have forced me to express to you with all frankness our view. As the situation shows, the resolutions of the Security Council are invalid. Israel has completely ignored them. As you can understand, after the many attempts taken in this direction and the resolutions of the Security Council concerning the termination of aggression on the part of Israel in the Near East - - these attempts have proved ineffective.

A very crucial moment has now arrived which forces us, if military actions are not stopped in the next few hours, to adopt an independent decision. We are ready to do this. However, these actions may bring us into a clash, which will lead to a grave catastrophe. Obviously in the world there are powers to whom this would be advantageous.

We purpose that you demand from Israel that it unconditionally cease military action in the next few hours. On our part, we will do the same. We purpose to warn Israel that, if this is not fulfilled, necessary actions will be taken, including military.

Please give me your views.

A. Kosygin<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.lbjlibrary.org/assets/uploads/education/Constitution_Day_Activity.pdf|title=Translation|date=10 June 1967|website=LBJ Library|access-date=21 November 2016|archive-date=19 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210319111755/http://www.lbjlibrary.org/assets/uploads/education/Constitution_Day_Activity.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref>}}

Several days later the [[Soviet Union]] sent Premier [[Alexei Kosygin]] to [[New York City]] to deliver a speech on the then-ongoing Middle Eastern crisis at the [[United Nations headquarters]]. When the [[United States government]] was informed of this the Americans gladly welcomed Kosygin to a meeting between him and President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]]. On 13 June 1967 Johnson sought out [[J. William Fulbright]], a Senator, at a [[White House]] reception. [[Llewellyn Thompson]], then [[United States ambassador to Russia|US ambassador to the USSR]], believed that a conference could "start the process of moving toward an understanding with the Soviets". Fulbright even believed that Johnson was reconsidering his Vietnam strategy. Later Fulbright wrote two letters to Johnson about the importance of a summit between the two nations. Johnson agreed, and wrote a letter in return, which said they were waiting for a Soviet response for US invitation. [[Walt Rostow]], the [[National Security Advisor (United States)|National Security Advisor]] at the time, said it was a 20 percent chance of the summit having a good effect on Soviet–US relations, and only a 10 percent chance of the summit going awry.<ref>Gibbons 1995, p. 719.</ref>

The Soviet [[List of members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the 1960s|Political Bureau]] (Politburo) were divided over the usefulness of the summit. [[Andrei Gromyko]], the [[Ministry of External Relations (Soviet Union)|Minister of Foreign Affairs]] at the time and still not a member of the Politburo, was able to win support for it. Gromyko noted that Soviet-US dialogue which had been suspended in 1963 should be reactivated, despite the [[Vietnam War]] putting a great deal strain on the two countries' relations.<ref>{{Cite book |author=Dunbabin, J.P.D. |title=The Cold War: The Great Powers and Their Allies |publisher=[[Pearson Education]] |year=2008 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IVriqPvx7iwC |isbn=978-0-582-42398-5}}</ref>

Kosygin had agreed to address the [[United Nations]] and as such, wished to conduct the summit in New York. Johnson, wary of encountering protesters against the war in Vietnam, preferred to meet in [[Washington, D.C.]] Roughly equidistant, [[Whitney Mansion (Glassboro, New Jersey)|Hollybush]], the residence of the President of Glassboro State College (now [[Rowan University]]) in [[Glassboro, New Jersey]] was selected as a compromise.