Editing Gothic Line (section)

==Background==
After the nearly concurrent breakthroughs at [[Battle of Monte Cassino|Cassino]] and [[Battle of Anzio|Anzio]] in spring 1944, the 11 nations representing the Allies in Italy finally had a chance to trap the Germans in a [[pincer movement]] and to realize some of the [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom|British Prime Minister]] [[Winston Churchill]]'s strategic goals for the long, costly campaign against the [[Axis powers|Axis]] "underbelly". This would have required the [[United States Army North|U.S. Fifth Army]] under [[Lieutenant general (United States)|Lieutenant General]] [[Mark W. Clark]] to commit most of his Anzio forces to the drive east from [[Cisterna di Latina|Cisterna]], and to execute the envelopment envisioned in the original planning for the Anzio landing (i.e., flank the [[10th Army (Wehrmacht)|German 10th Army]], and sever its northbound line of retreat from Cassino). Instead, fearing that the [[Eighth Army (United Kingdom)|British Eighth Army]], under [[Lieutenant-general (United Kingdom)|Lieutenant-General]] [[Oliver Leese|Sir Oliver Leese]], might beat him to the Italian capital of [[Rome]], Clark diverted a large part of his Anzio force in that direction in an attempt to ensure that he and the Fifth Army would have the honour of liberating the city.

As a result, most of ''[[Generalfeldmarschall]]'' [[Albert Kesselring]]'s forces slipped the noose and fell back north fighting delaying actions, notably in late June on the [[Trasimene Line]] (running from just south of [[Ancona]] on the east coast, past the southern shores of [[Lake Trasimeno]] near [[Perugia]] and on to the west coast south of [[Grosseto]]) and in July on the Arno Line (running from the west coast along the line of the [[Arno|Arno River]] and into the [[Apennine Mountains]] north of [[Arezzo]]). This gave time to consolidate the Gothic Line, a {{convert|10|mi|km}} deep belt of fortifications extending from south of [[La Spezia]] (on the west coast) to the [[Foglia River|Foglia Valley]], through the natural defensive wall of the Apennines (which ran unbroken nearly from coast to coast, {{convert|50|mi|km}} deep and with high crests and peaks rising to {{convert|7000|ft|m}}), to the [[Adriatic Sea]] between [[Pesaro]] and [[Ravenna]], on the east coast. The emplacements included numerous concrete-reinforced gun pits and trenches and 2,376 machine-gun nests with interlocking fire, 479 anti-tank, mortar and assault gun positions, {{convert|120000|m|yd}} of barbed wire and many miles of anti-tank ditches.<ref>Orgill, p. 28.</ref> This last redoubt proved the Germans' determination to continue fighting.

Nevertheless, it was fortunate for the Allies that at this stage of the war the [[Italian resistance movement|Italian partisan]] forces had become highly effective in disrupting the German preparations in the high mountains. On 2 April 1944, partisans belonging to the Eighth [[Brigate Garibaldi|Garibaldi Brigade]] managed to occupy [[Sant'Agata Feltria]]; their ambush of a German detachment sent to round up partisans led to the [[Fragheto massacre]] on 7 April.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=6 April 2024 |title=7 aprile 1944 – 80 anni fa la strage di Fragheto |trans-title=7 April 1944 – 80 years ago, the Fragheto massacre |url=https://www.chiamamicitta.it/7-aprile-1944-80-anni-fa-la-strage-di-fragheto/ |access-date=7 April 2024 |website=Chiamami Città |language=it-IT}}</ref><ref name=":7">{{Cite web |title=Strage di Fragheto |trans-title=Fragheto massacre |url=http://www.paesaggidellamemoria.it/calendario-della-memoria/strage-di-fragheto/ |access-date=7 April 2024 |website=Paesaggi della memoria |language=it-IT}}</ref><ref name=":8">{{Cite web |title=Fragheto di Casteldelci |url=https://www.istitutostoriamarche.it/luoghi-di-memoria-nelle-marche/eccidi-e-stragi/fragheto-di-casteldelci/ |access-date=7 April 2024 |website=Istituto Storia Marche |language=it-IT}}</ref> By September 1944, German generals were no longer able to move freely in the area behind their main lines because of partisan activity. ''[[Generalleutnant]]'' [[Frido von Senger und Etterlin]]—commanding [[XIV Panzer Corps|XIV ''Panzer'' Corps]] (''XIV Panzerkorps'')—later wrote that he had taken to travelling in a little Volkswagen "(displaying) no general's insignia of rank—no peaked cap, no gold or red flags...". One of his colleagues who ignored this caution—[[Wilhelm Crisolli]] (commanding the [[20th Luftwaffe Field Division (Germany)|20th ''Luftwaffe'' Field Division]])—was caught and killed by partisans as he returned from a conference at corps headquarters.<ref>Orgill, p. 36.</ref>

Construction of the defences was also hampered by the deliberately poor quality concrete provided by local Italian mills whilst captured partisans forced into the construction gangs supplemented the natural lethargy of forced labour with clever sabotage. Nevertheless, prior to the Allies' attack, Kesselring had declared himself satisfied with the work done, especially on the Adriatic side where he "...contemplated an assault on the left wing....with a certain confidence".<ref>Orgill, p. 29.</ref>

===Allied strategy===
{{Further|Gothic Line order of battle}}

The Italian Front was seen by the Allies to be of secondary importance to the [[Operation Overlord|offensives through France]], and this was underlined by the withdrawal during the summer of 1944 of seven divisions from the U.S. Fifth Army to take part in the landings in southern France, [[Operation Dragoon]]. By 5 August, the strength of the Fifth Army had fallen from 249,000 to 153,000,<ref>Orgill, p. 20.</ref> and they had only 18 divisions to confront the combined German 10th and [[14th Army (Wehrmacht)|14th Armies]]′ strength of 14 divisions plus four to seven reserve divisions.

Nevertheless, Winston Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff were keen to break through the German defences to open up the route to the northeast through the "Ljubljana Gap" into [[National Socialist Austria|Austria]] and [[Hungary during World War II|Hungary]]. Whilst this would threaten Germany from the rear, Churchill was more concerned to forestall the [[Red Army|Russians]] advancing into central Europe. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff had strongly opposed this strategy as diluting the Allied focus in France. However, following the Allied successes in France during the summer, the U.S. Chiefs relented, and there was complete agreement amongst the [[Combined Chiefs of Staff]] at the [[Second Quebec Conference]] on 12 September.<ref>Orgill, pp. 114–115.</ref>

===Allied plan of attack===
<!-- Operation Olive redirects here, please change the redirect if the section name is altered -->
The original plan of [[General (United Kingdom)|General]] [[Harold Alexander, 1st Earl Alexander of Tunis|Sir Harold Alexander]], the [[Commander-in-chief|Commander-in-Chief]] (C-in-C) of the [[Allied Armies in Italy]] (AAI)—as formulated by his [[Chief of staff|Chief of Staff]], [[Lieutenant-general (United Kingdom)|Lieutenant-General]] [[John Harding, 1st Baron Harding of Petherton|Sir John Harding]]—was to storm the Gothic Line in the centre, where most of [[Gothic Line order of battle|his forces]] were already concentrated. It was the shortest route to his objective, the plains of [[Lombardy]], and could be mounted quickly. He mounted a deception operation to convince the Germans that the main blow would come on the Adriatic front.

[[File:Gothic Line - Concept of OperationOlive 1944.png|thumb|380px|The Gothic Line, August 1944 and the concept of Operation Olive. The dark blue arrows represent major Allied attacks.]]

On 4 August, Alexander met Lieutenant-General Leese, the British Eighth Army commander, to find that Leese did not favour the plan.<ref>Jackson, p. 119.</ref> He argued that the Allies had lost their specialist [[French Expeditionary Corps (1943–44)|French mountain troops]] to [[Operation Dragoon]] and that the Eighth Army's strength lay in tactics combining infantry, armour and guns which could not be employed in the high mountains of the central Apennines.

It has also been suggested that Leese disliked working in league with Clark after the Fifth Army's controversial move on Rome at the end of May and early June and wished for the Eighth Army to win the battle on its own.<ref>Blaxland, p. 163.</ref> He suggested a surprise attack along the Adriatic coast. Although Harding did not share Leese's view and Eighth Army planning staff had already rejected the idea of an Adriatic offensive (because it would be difficult to bring the necessary concentration of forces to bear), General Alexander was not prepared to force Leese to adopt a plan which was against his inclination and judgement<ref>Orgill, p. 33.</ref> and Harding was persuaded to change his mind.

Operation Olive—as the new offensive was christened—called for Leese's Eighth Army to attack up the Adriatic coast toward [[Pesaro]] and [[Rimini]] and draw in the German reserves from the centre of the country. Clark's Fifth Army would then attack in the weakened central Apennines north of [[Florence]] toward [[Bologna]] with [[XIII Corps (United Kingdom)|British XIII Corps]] on the right wing of the attack fanning toward the coast to create a pincer with the Eighth Army advance. This meant that as a preparatory move, the bulk of the Eighth Army had to be transferred from the centre of Italy to the Adriatic coast, taking two valuable weeks, while a new intelligence deception plan (Operation Ulster)<ref>Jackson, p. 126.</ref> was commenced to convince Kesselring that the main attack would be in the centre.