Editing Great power (section)

==Characteristics==
There are no set or defined characteristics of a great power. Analysts have often regarded any such characteristics as empirical, self-evident to the assessor.<ref>{{cite book |title=Theory of International Politics |url=https://archive.org/details/theoryofinternat00walt |url-access=registration|last=Waltz|first=Kenneth N |publisher=McGraw-Hill |year=1979 |page= [https://archive.org/details/theoryofinternat00walt/page/131 131] |isbn=0-201-08349-3}}</ref> However, this approach has the disadvantage of subjectivity. As a result, theorists have made attempts to derive some common criteria and to treat these as essential elements of great-power status. Danilovic (2002)<ref>{{cite book |last=Danilovic |first=Vesna |title=When the Stakes Are High – Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers |publisher=University of Michigan Press |year=2002 |isbn=978-0-472-11287-6 | url = https://www.press.umich.edu/16953/when_the_stakes_are_high
}}</ref>
highlights three central characteristics: "power, spatial, and status dimensions", that distinguish major powers from other states.<ref>
{{cite book
 |last1                = Danilovic
 |first1               = Vesna
 |date                 = 4 June 2010
 |orig-date            = 2002
 |chapter              = 
 |title                = When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers
 |url                  = https://books.google.com/books?id=OpZFDwAAQBAJ
 |publisher            = University of Michigan Press
 |page                 = 
 |isbn                 = 9780472026821
 |access-date          = 27 April 2025
 |quote                = 
}}
</ref>{{qn|date=April 2025}}
The following discussion on characteristics is extracted from her discussion of these three dimensions, including all{{huh?|date=April 2025}} of the citations.

Early writings on the subject tended to judge states by the [[Realism (international relations)|realist]] criterion, as expressed by the historian [[A. J. P. Taylor]] when he noted that "the test of a great power is the test of strength for war".<ref>{{cite book|title=The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918 |url=https://archive.org/details/struggleformaste00ajpt |url-access=registration |last=Taylor |first=Alan JP |publisher=Clarendon |location=Oxford |year=1954 |page=xxiv |isbn=0-19-881270-1}}</ref> Later writers have expanded this test, attempting to define power in terms of overall military, economic, and political capacity.<ref>Organski, AFK – World Politics, Knopf (1958)</ref> [[Kenneth Waltz]], the founder of the [[Neorealism (international relations)|neorealist]] theory of international relations, uses a set of six criteria to determine great-power status: population and territory, resource endowment, military strength, economic capability, political stability and competence.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Waltz |first=Kenneth N.|date=1993|title=The Emerging Structure of International Politics |url=http://www.ir.rochelleterman.com/sites/default/files/Waltz%201993.pdf|journal=International Security |volume=18 |issue=2 |pages=50 |via=International Relations Exam Database |doi=10.2307/2539097 |jstor=2539097 |s2cid=154473957 |access-date=22 May 2017|archive-date=6 April 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200406093311/http://www.ir.rochelleterman.com/sites/default/files/Waltz%201993.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref>

[[John Mearsheimer]] defines great powers as those that "have sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mearsheimer |first=John |title=The Tragedy of Great Power Politics|publisher=W. W. Norton|year=2001|page =5}}</ref>

===Power dimensions===
As noted above, for many, power capabilities are the sole criterion. Even under more expansive tests, power retains a vital place.

This aspect has received mixed treatment, with some confusion as to the degree of power required. Writers have approached the concept of "great power" with differing conceptualizations of the world situation, from multi-polarity to overwhelming [[hegemony]]. In his essay, "French Diplomacy in the Postwar Period", the French historian [[Jean-Baptiste Duroselle]] spoke of the concept of multi-polarity: "A Great power is one which is capable of preserving its own independence against any other single power."<ref>contained on page 204 in: Kertesz and Fitsomons (eds) – ''Diplomacy in a Changing World'', University of Notre Dame Press (1960)</ref>

This attitude differed from that of earlier writers, notably [[Leopold von Ranke]] (1795-1886), who clearly had a different idea of the world situation in his day. In his essay "The Great Powers" ({{langx | de | Die grossen Mächte}}), written in 1833, von Ranke wrote: "If one could establish as a definition of a Great power that it must be able to maintain itself against all others, even when they are united, then [[Frederick the Great|Frederick]] has raised Prussia to that position."<ref>Iggers and von Moltke "In the Theory and Practice of History", Bobbs-Merrill (1973)</ref> These positions have attracted criticism.<ref name="When the Stakes27">Danilovic, Vesna. "When the Stakes Are High – Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers", University of Michigan Press (2002), pp 27, 225–230 [https://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/0472112872-appb.pdf].</ref>

In 2011, the United States of America had 10 major strengths according to Chinese scholar Peng Yuan, the director of the Institute of American Studies of the China Institutes for Contemporary International Studies.<ref>Quoted in Josef Joffe, ''The Myth of America's Decline: Politics, Economics, and a Half Century of False Prophecies'' (2014) ch. 7.</ref>  
:1. Population, geographic position, and natural resources
:2. Military muscle
:3. High technology and education
:4. Cultural/soft power
:5. Cyber power
:6. Allies, the United States having more than any other state
:7. Geopolitical strength, as embodied in global projection forces
:8. Intelligence capabilities, as demonstrated by the 2011 [[killing of Osama bin Laden]]
:9. Intellectual power, fed by a plethora of US think-tanks and the "revolving door" between research institutions and government
:10. Strategic power, the United States being the world's only country with a truly global strategy
However he also noted where the US had recently slipped: 
:1. Political power, as manifested by the breakdown of bipartisanship
:2. Economic power, as illustrated by the post-2007 slowdown
:3. Financial power, given intractable deficits and rising debt
:4. Social power, as weakened by societal polarization
:5. Institutional power, since the United States can no longer dominate global institutions

===Spatial dimension===
All states have a geographic scope of interests, actions, or [[power projection | projected power]]. This is a crucial factor in distinguishing a great power from a regional power; by definition, the scope of a [[regional power]] is restricted to its region. It has been suggested that a great power should be possessed of actual influence throughout the scope of the prevailing international system. [[Arnold J. Toynbee]], for example, observes that "Great power may be defined as a political force exerting an effect co-extensive with the widest range of the society in which it operates. The Great powers of 1914 were 'world-powers' because Western society had recently become 'world-wide'."<ref>{{cite book |title=The World After the Peace Conference |last=Toynbee |first=Arnold J |publisher=Humphrey Milford and Oxford University Press |year=1926 |page=[https://archive.org/details/TheWorldAfterThePeaceConference/page/n8 4] |url=https://archive.org/details/TheWorldAfterThePeaceConference |access-date=24 February 2016}}</ref>

Other suggestions have been made that a great power should have the capacity to engage in extra-regional affairs and that a great power ought to be possessed of extra-regional interests, two often closely-connected propositions.<ref>Stoll, Richard J – State Power, World Views, and the Major Powers, Contained in: Stoll and Ward (eds) – ''Power in World Politics'', Lynne Rienner Publications (1989)</ref>

===Status dimension===
Formal or informal acknowledgment of a nation's great-power status has also been a criterion for identifying a great power. As political scientist [[George Modelski]] notes, "The status of Great power is sometimes confused with the condition of being powerful. The office, as it is known, did in fact evolve from the role played by the great military states in earlier periods... But the Great power system institutionalizes the position of the powerful state in a web of rights and obligations."<ref>{{cite book |title=Principles of World Politics |last=Modelski |first=George |publisher=Free Press |year=1972 |page=141 |isbn=978-0-02-921440-4}}</ref>

Modelski's approach restricts analysis to the epoch following the 1814-1815 [[Congress of Vienna]] at which great powers were first formally recognized.<ref name="When the Stakes27"/> In the absence of such a formal act of recognition it has been suggested that great-power status can arise by implication by judging the nature of a state's relations with other great powers.<ref name="Power in World Politics">Domke, William K – "Power, Political Capacity, and Security in the Global System", Contained in: Stoll and Ward (eds) – ''Power in World Politics'', Lynn Rienner Publications (1989)</ref>

A further option is to examine a state's willingness to act as a great power.<ref name="Power in World Politics"/> As a country will seldom declare that it is acting as such, this usually entails a retrospective examination of state conduct. As a result, this is of limited use in establishing the nature of contemporary powers, at least not without the exercise of subjective observation.

Other important criteria throughout history are that great powers should have enough influence to be included in discussions of contemporary political and diplomatic questions, and exercise influence on the outcome and resolution. Historically, when major political questions were addressed, several powers met to discuss them. Before the era of groups like the United Nations, participants of such meetings were not officially named but rather were decided based on their implied great-power status. These were conferences that settled important questions based on major historical events.{{efn|The 1648 [[Peace of Westphalia]] would qualify. The 325 [[First Council of Nicaea]] might also fit the definition.}}

==="Full-spectrum" dimension===
Historian [[Phillips P. O'Brien]], Head of the School of International Relations and Professor of Strategic Studies at the [[University of St Andrews|University of St. Andrews]], criticizes the concept of a great power, arguing that it is dated, vaguely defined, and inconsistently applied.<ref name=":0">{{Cite news |last =O'Brien |first =Phillips P. |date =2023-06-29 |title =There's No Such Thing as a Great Power |language=en-US |work=Foreign Affairs |url =https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/theres-no-such-thing-great-power |access-date =2023-06-29 |issn =0015-7120}}</ref> He states that the term is used to "describe everything from true superpowers such as the United States and China, which wield the full spectrum of economic, technological, and military might, to better-than-average military powers such as Russia, which have nuclear weapons but little else that would be considered indicators of great power. "<ref name=":0" /> O'Brien advocates for the concept of a "full-spectrum power", which takes into account "all the fundamentals on which superior military power is built", including economic resources, domestic politics and political systems (which can restrain or expand dimensions of power), technological capabilities, and social and cultural factors (such as a society's willingness to go to war or to invest in military development).<ref name=":0" />{{efn | Both [[monoculturalism | monocultural]] and [[multiculturalism | multicultural]] societies may have advantages - note the changing fortunes of the great-power blocs in the course of World War II.}}