Editing Idea–expression distinction (section)

==Legal origins and status==
Philosophically, there is disagreement about the distinction between thought and language.
In the past it was often thought that the two could not be separated, and so a paraphrase could never exactly reproduce a thought expressed in different words.
At the opposite extreme is the view that concepts and language are completely independent, so there is always a range of ways in which a concept can be expressed.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Bently|first1=Lionel|last2=Davis|first2=Jennifer|last3=Ginsburg|first3=Jane C. |title=Copyright and Piracy: An Interdisciplinary Critique |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IqWoTkiveVEC&pg=PA190|access-date=2012-06-19|date=2010-10-28 |publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-19343-6|page=190}}</ref>

In the United States, the doctrine originated from the 1879 [[Supreme Court of the United States|Supreme Court]] case of ''[[Baker v. Selden]]''.<ref>{{ussc|101|99|1879}}</ref> The Supreme Court held in ''Selden'' that, while exclusive rights to the "[[useful arts]]" (in this case [[bookkeeping]]) described in a book might be available by patent, only the description itself was protectable by copyright. In later cases, the Supreme Court has stated that "unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea—not the idea itself,"<ref>''[[Mazer v. Stein]]'' {{ussc|347|201|pin=217|1954}}</ref> and that "copyright's idea/expression dichotomy 'strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression.'"<ref>''[[Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises]]'' {{ussc|471|539|pin=556|1985}}</ref>

In the English decision of ''[[Donoghue v. Allied Newspapers Ltd.]]'' (1938) Ch 106, the court illustrated the concept by stating that "the person who has clothed the idea in form, whether by means of a picture, a play or a book" owns the copyright. In the Australian decision of ''[[Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co. Ltd v. Taylor]]'' (1937) 58 CLR 479 at 498, Latham CJ used the analogy of reporting a person's fall from a bus: the first person to do so could not use the law of copyright to stop other people from announcing this fact.

Today, Article 1.2 of the [[Computer Programs Directive|European Union Software Directive]] expressly excludes from copyright ideas and principles that underlie any element of a computer program, including those that underlie its interfaces.<ref>quoted in {{Cite web|author=Mylly, Ulla=Maija|title=Harmonizing Copyright Rules for Computer Program Interface Protection|publisher=University of Louisville Louis D. Brandeis School of Law|location=Louisville, Kentucky|page=14|url=http://www.law.louisville.edu/sites/www.law.louisville.edu/files/cicl2-mylly.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100605051113/http://www.law.louisville.edu/sites/www.law.louisville.edu/files/cicl2-mylly.pdf|archive-date=5 June 2010|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs|publisher=Official Journal of the European Union|url=http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:111:0016:0022:EN:PDF}}</ref> As stated by the European Court of Justice in SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd., "to accept that the functionality of a computer program can be protected by copyright would amount to making it possible to monopolize ideas, to the detriment of technological progress and industrial development."<ref>{{cite web |title=EUR-Lex - 62010CJ0406 - EN - EUR-Lex |url=http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1446134154470&uri=CELEX:62010CJ0406 |website=eur-lex.europa.eu |access-date=2 February 2019}}</ref>