Editing Incompatibilism (section)

== Definition ==
On one recent taxonomy, there are now at least three substantively different, non-classical uses of the term ''incompatibilism'', namely: neo-classical incompatibilism, post-classical incompatibilism (a.k.a. incompossibilism), and anti-classical incompatibilism. Correspondingly, there are neo-classical, post-classical (compossibilist), and anti-classical versions of compatibilism as well.<ref>Mickelson, Kristin, Joe Campbell, and V. Alan White, "Introduction," in A Companion to Free Will (Campbell, Joe; Mickelson, Kristin M. & White, V. Alan (eds.) (2023). Wiley-Blackwell:1-19. Open-access version available at: https://philarchive.org/rec/CAMWCT-2</ref> Neo-classical incompatibilism is a two-tenet view: incompossibilism is true (i.e. it is metaphysically impossible for an ordinary human to act freely when determinism is true), and determinism-related causal/nomological factors preclude free will (which explains ''why'' incompossibilism is true).<ref>Pereboom, Derk (2023). "Meaning in Life and Free Will Skepticism", in J. Campbell, K. Mickelson, and V. A. White, eds. A Companion to Free Will. Blackwell (2023): 464-476.</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Free Will and Moral Responsibility |url=https://serious-science.org/free-will-and-moral-responsibility-5667 |access-date=2023-08-22 |website=Serious Science |language=en-US}}</ref> Correspondingly, neo-classical compatibilism is the two-tenet view that: the negative, non-explanatory tenet of neo-classical incompatibilism is false (i.e. compossibilism is true), and that the positive, explanatory tenet of neo-classical incompatibilism is false. Anti-classical incompatibilism is the explanatory thesis of neo-classical incompatibilism; anti-classical incompatibilism is neutral on the truth-value of incompossibilism.<ref name="Levy, Neil 2011">Levy, Neil (2011). Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.</ref> Correspondingly, anti-classical compatibilism is the negation of neo-classical incompatibilism's positive tenet, i.e. anti-classical compatibilism is the contradictory of anti-classical incompatibilism. Post-classical incompatibilism is just the negative, non-explanatory thesis of neo-classical incompatibilism; this view is neutral on whether the positive, explanatory thesis of neo-classical incompatibilism is true. (Put another way, on the post-classical redefinition of ''incompatibilism'', it is just an alternative name for incompossibilism, a view which is completely silent on whether determinism-related causal factors are ''relevant'' to free will or are a total "red herring" in discussions of free will.) Correspondingly, post-classical compatibilism is identical to compossibilism (i.e. on the post-classical redefinition of ''compatibilism'', it denotes mere compossibilism).<ref>Mele, Alfred. "Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet Biting," Journal of Ethics 17 (2013): 167-184.</ref><ref>Mele, Alfred. ''Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility''. Oxford University Press, 2019.</ref><ref>Mele, Alfred (2023). "Free Will: Looking Ahead," in J. Campbell, K. Mickelson, and V. A. White, eds. ''A Companion to Free Will''. Blackwell: 477-490.</ref>

The ambiguity of ''incompatibilism'' can be a source of confusion because arguments with very different (even inconsistent) conclusions are currently lumped together under the umbrella phrase "arguments for incompatibilism". For example, it is easy for the casual reader to overlook that some arguments for ''post-classical'' incompatibilism (a.k.a. incompossibilism) are not arguments for ''neo-classical'' incompatibilism on the grounds that the argument does not aim to support the latter's explanatory tenet (a.k.a. ''anti-classical'' incompatibilism).<ref>Mickelson, Kristin (2015). The Zygote Argument is invalid: Now what? Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2911-2929. Available at https://philpapers.org/rec/MICLFT</ref><ref>De Marco, Gabriel (2016). Rescuing the Zygote Argument. Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1621-1628.</ref><ref>Mickelson, Kristin M. (2020). The Zygote Argument Is Still Invalid: So What? ''Philosophia'' 49 (2):705-722.</ref><ref>Mickelson, Kristin (2016). The Manipulation Argument. In Chapter 14, the Routledge Companion to Free Will (editors: Meghan Griffith, Kevin Timpe & Neil Levy). New York: Routledge.</ref> Other arguments support ''post-classical'' incompatibilism (a.k.a. incompossibilism) but conclude that ''neo-classical'' incompatibilism is false on the grounds that its explanatory tenet (a.k.a. ''anti-classical'' incompatibilism) is false.<ref>Strawson, Galen. "Luck Swallows Everything": https://naturalism.org/philosophy/free-will/luck-swallows-everything</ref><ref name="Levy, Neil 2011"/><ref>Mickelson, Kristin M. (2019). Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):224-256. Available at https://philarchive.org/rec/MICFWS</ref> Arguments in the last category conclude that people lack free will when determinism is true but not at all ''because'' determinism is true (i.e. not at all because certain causal/nomological factors obtain); most propose that the real threat to free will is that people lack adequate control over their own constitutive properties, or what is often called their "constitutive luck" (as opposed to causal luck).<ref>{{Citation |title=The Free Will Show Episode 9: Moral Luck with Dana Nelkin |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AjqQysx45p4 |access-date=2023-08-22 |language=en}}</ref>