Editing Introspection (section)

==In psychology==

===Wundt===
It has often been claimed that [[Wilhelm Wundt]], the father of experimental psychology, was the first to adopt introspection to [[experimental psychology]]<ref name="Schultz" /> though the methodological idea had been presented long before, as by 18th century German philosopher-psychologists such as [[Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten]] or [[Johann Nicolaus Tetens]].<ref>Cf. Thomas Sturm, ''Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen'' (Paderborn: Mentis, 2009), ch. 2.</ref> Later writers have warned that Wundt's views on introspection must be approached with great care.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Danziger | first1 = Kurt | year = 1980 | title = The History of Introspection Reconsidered | journal = Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences | volume = 16 | issue = 3| pages = 241–262 | doi=10.1002/1520-6696(198007)16:3<241::aid-jhbs2300160306>3.0.co;2-o| pmid = 11610711 }}</ref> Wundt was influenced by notable [[physiology|physiologists]], such as [[Gustav Fechner]], who used a kind of controlled introspection as a means to study human [[sense|sensory]] organs. Building upon that use of introspection in physiology, Wundt believed introspection included the ability to directly observe one's own experiences (not just to logically reflect on them or speculate about them, though some others misinterpreted his views in this way).<ref name="Asthana 244–248">{{Cite journal|last=Asthana|first=Hari Shanker|date=June 2015|title=Wilhelm Wundt|journal=Psychological Studies|volume=60|issue=2|pages=244–248|doi=10.1007/s12646-014-0295-1|s2cid=189774028}}</ref> Wundt imposed exacting control over the study of introspection in his experimental laboratory at the [[University of Leipzig]],<ref name="Schultz" /> making it possible for other scientists to [[reproducibility|replicate]] his experiments elsewhere, a development that proved essential to the development of psychology as a modern, [[peer review|peer-reviewed]] scientific discipline. Such exact purism was typical of Wundt. He prepared a set of instructions to be followed by every observer in his laboratory during studies of introspection: "1) the Observer must, if possible, be in a position to determine beforehand the entrance of the process to be observed. 2) the introspectionist must, as far as possible, grasp the phenomenon in a state of strained attention and follow its course. 3) Every observation must, in order to make certain, be capable of being repeated several times under the same conditions and 4) the conditions under which the phenomenon appears must be found out by the variation of the attendant circumstances and when this was done the various coherent experiments must be varied according to a plan partly by eliminating certain stimuli and partly by grading their strength and quality".<ref name="Asthana 244–248"/>

===Titchener===
[[Edward B. Titchener|Edward Titchener]] was an early pioneer in experimental psychology and a student of Wilhelm Wundt.<ref name="Schultz" /> After earning his doctorate under Wundt at the University of Leipzig, he made his way to [[Cornell University]], where he established his own laboratory and research.<ref name="Schultz" /> When Titchener arrived at Cornell in 1894, psychology was still a fledgling discipline, especially in the United States, and he was a key figure in bringing Wundt's ideas to America. However, Titchener misrepresented some of Wundt's ideas to the American psychological establishment, especially in his account of introspection which, Titchener taught, only served a purpose in the [[Qualitative research|qualitative]] analysis of [[consciousness]] into its various parts,<ref name="Schultz" /> while Wundt saw it as a means to [[Quantitative research|quantitatively]] measure the whole of conscious experience.<ref name="Schultz" /> Titchener was exclusively interested in the individual components that comprise conscious experience, while Wundt, seeing little purpose in the analysis of individual components, focused on synthesis of these components. Titchener's ideas formed the basis of the short-lived psychological theory of [[Structuralism (psychology)|structuralism]].<ref name="Schultz" />

===Historical misconceptions===
American [[historiography]] of introspection, according to some authors,<ref name="Costal 2006 634–654">{{cite journal|last=Costal|first=A|title='Introspectionism' and the mythical origins of scientific psychology|journal=Consciousness and Cognition|year=2006|volume=15|issue=4|pages=634–654|doi=10.1016/j.concog.2006.09.008|pmid=17174788|s2cid=17381488}}</ref><ref name="Clegg 2013">{{Cite book |last=Clegg |first=Joshua W. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DSFWDwAAQBAJ |title=Self-Observation in the Social Sciences |publisher=Routledge |year=2013 |isbn=978-1-351-29678-6 |language=en}}</ref> is dominated by three misconceptions. In particular, historians of psychology tend to argue 1) that introspection once was the dominant method of psychological inquiry, 2) that behaviorism, and in particular [[John B. Watson]], was responsible for discrediting introspection as a valid method, and 3) that scientific [[psychology]] completely abandoned introspection as a result of those critiques.<ref name="Costal 2006 634–654"/> However, introspection may not have been the dominant method. It was widely believed to be dominant because [[Edward B. Titchener|Edward Titchener]]'s student [[Edwin G. Boring]], in his influential historical accounts of experimental psychology, privileged Titchener's views while giving little credit to original sources.<ref name="Costal 2006 634–654"/> Introspection has been critiqued by many other psychologists, including [[Wilhelm Wundt]] and [[Knight Dunlap]], who presented a non-behaviorist argument against self-observation.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Dunlap |first=Knight |date=1912 |title=Discussion: The case against introspection. |url=https://doi.apa.org/doi/10.1037/h0071571 |journal=Psychological Review |language=en |volume=19 |issue=5 |pages=404–413 |doi=10.1037/h0071571 |issn=1939-1471|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Introspection is still widely used in psychology, but now implicitly, as self-report surveys, interviews and some fMRI studies are based on introspection.<ref name="Clegg 2013"/>{{rp|4}} It is not the method but rather its name that has been dropped from the dominant psychological vocabulary.

===Recent developments===
{{See also|Introspection illusion}}
Partly as a result of Titchener's misrepresentation, the use of introspection diminished after his death and the subsequent decline of structuralism.<ref name="Schultz" /> Later psychological movements, such as [[functional psychology|functionalism]] and [[behaviorism]], rejected introspection for its lack of scientific [[Reliability (statistics)|reliability]] among other factors.<ref name="Schultz" /> Functionalism originally arose in direct opposition to structuralism, opposing its narrow focus on the elements of consciousness<ref name="Schultz" /> and emphasizing the purpose of consciousness and other psychological behavior. Behaviorism's objection to introspection focused much more on its unreliability and [[objectivity (science)|subjectivity]] which conflicted with behaviorism's focus on measurable behavior.<ref name="Schultz" /><ref>{{cite book |title = The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences |editor-first=Robert Andrew |editor-last=Wilson |editor2=Keil, Frank C. | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=-wt1aZrGXLYC | location = Cambridge, Massachusetts|isbn=9780262731447 |year=2001 }}</ref>

The more recently established [[cognitive psychology]] movement has to some extent accepted introspection's usefulness in the study of psychological phenomena, though generally only in experiments pertaining to internal thought conducted under experimental conditions. For example, in the "[[think aloud protocol]]", investigators cue participants to speak their thoughts aloud in order to study an active thought process without forcing an individual to comment on the process itself.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Hayes | first1 = S. C. | year = 1986 | title = The case of the silent dog—Verbal reports and the analysis of rules: A review of Ericsson and Simon's Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data | journal = Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior | volume = 45 | issue = 3| pages = 351–363 | doi = 10.1901/jeab.1986.45-351 | pmc = 1348244 }}</ref>

Already in the 18th century authors had criticized the use of introspection, both for knowing one's own mind and as a method for psychology. [[David Hume]] pointed out that introspecting a mental state tends to alter the very state itself; a German author, [[Christian Gottfried Schütz]], noted that introspection is often described as mere "inner sensation", but actually requires also attention, that introspection does not get at unconscious mental states, and that it cannot be used naively — one needs to know what to look for. [[Immanuel Kant]] added that, if they are understood too narrowly, introspective experiments are impossible. Introspection delivers, at best, hints about what goes on in the mind; it does not suffice to justify knowledge claims about the mind.<ref>Cf. Thomas Sturm, ''Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen'' (Paderborn: Mentis, 2009), chapters 2 and 4.</ref> Similarly, the idea continued to be discussed between [[John Stuart Mill]] and [[Auguste Comte]]. Recent psychological research on [[cognition]] and [[Attribution (psychology)|attribution]] has asked people to report on their mental processes, for instance to say why they made a particular choice or how they arrived at a judgment. In some situations, these reports are clearly [[confabulation|confabulated]].<ref name="telling">{{cite journal|last=Nisbett|first=Richard E.|author2=Timothy D. Wilson|year=1977|title=Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes|journal=Psychological Review|volume=84|issue=3|pages=231–259|doi=10.1037/0033-295x.84.3.231 |hdl=2027.42/92167|s2cid=7742203 |url=https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/92167/1/TellingMoreThanWeCanKnow.pdf|hdl-access=free}}, reprinted in {{cite book|title=Social cognition: key readings|editor=David Lewis Hamilton|publisher=Psychology Press|year=2005|isbn=978-0-86377-591-8}}</ref> For example, people justify choices they have not in fact made.<ref name="something">{{cite journal|first=Petter|last=Johansson|author2=Lars Hall |author3=Sverker Sikström |author4=Betty Tärning |author5=Andreas Lind |title=How something can be said about telling more than we can know: On choice blindness and introspection |year=2006 |journal= Consciousness and Cognition |volume=15 |issue=4 |pages=673–692 |doi=10.1016/j.concog.2006.09.004|pmid=17049881 |s2cid=14863202}}</ref> Such results undermine the idea that those verbal reports are based on direct introspective access to mental content. Instead, judgements about one's own mind seem to be [[inference]]s from overt behavior, similar to judgements made about another person.<ref name="telling" /> However, it is hard to assess whether these results only apply to unusual experimental situations, or if they reveal something about everyday introspection.<ref name="knowing_more">{{cite journal|last=White |first=Peter A.|year=1988 |journal=British Journal of Psychology |volume=79| title=Knowing more about what we can tell: 'Introspective access' and causal report accuracy 10 years later|issue=1|pages=13–45|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8295.1988.tb02271.x}}</ref> The theory of the [[adaptive unconscious]] suggests that a very large proportion of mental processes, even "high-level" processes like goal-setting and decision-making, are inaccessible to introspection.<ref name="annreview">{{cite journal|last=Wilson|first=Timothy D.|author2=Elizabeth W. Dunn|year=2004|title=Self-Knowledge: Its Limits, Value, and Potential for Improvement|journal=[[Annual Review of Psychology]]|volume=55|pages=493–518|doi=10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.141954|pmid=14744224}}</ref>
Indeed, it is questionable how confident researchers can be in their own introspections.

One of the central implications of dissociations between [[consciousness]] and [[Metacognition|meta-consciousness]] is that individuals, presumably including researchers, can misrepresent their experiences to themselves. Jack and Roepstorff assert, '...there is also a sense in which subjects simply cannot be wrong about their own experiential states.' Presumably they arrived at this conclusion by drawing on the seemingly self-evident quality of their own introspections, and assumed that it must equally apply to others. However, when we consider research on the topic, this conclusion seems less self-evident. If, for example, extensive introspection can cause people to make decisions that they later regret, then one very reasonable possibility is that the introspection caused them to 'lose touch with their feelings'. In short, empirical studies suggest that people can fail to appraise adequately (i.e. are wrong about) their own experiential states.

Another question in regards to the veracious accountability of introspection is if researchers lack the confidence in their own introspections and those of their participants, then how can it gain legitimacy? Three strategies are accountable: identifying behaviors that establish credibility, finding common ground that enables mutual understanding, and developing a trust that allows one to know when to give the benefit of the doubt.
That is to say, that words are only meaningful if validated by one's actions; When people report strategies, feelings or beliefs, their  behaviors must correspond with these statements if they are to be believed.<ref>{{cite journal | doi = 10.1016/S1364-6613(02)01970-8 | volume=6 | issue=9 | title=Establishing a legitimate relationship with introspection | journal=Trends in Cognitive Sciences | pages=371–372| year=2002 | last1=Schooler | first1=Jonathan W. | pmid=12200175 | s2cid=45055944 }}</ref>

Even when their introspections are uninformative, people still give confident descriptions of their mental processes, being "unaware of their unawareness".<ref>{{cite journal|last=Wilson|first=Timothy D.|author2=Yoav Bar-Anan|date=August 22, 2008|title=The Unseen Mind|journal=Science|volume=321|pages=1046–1047|doi=10.1126/science.1163029|pmid=18719269|issue=5892 |s2cid=11434647}}</ref> This phenomenon has been termed the ''introspection illusion'' and has been used to explain some [[cognitive bias]]es<ref>{{cite journal|last=Pronin|first=Emily|date=January 2007|title=Perception and misperception of bias in human judgment|journal=Trends in Cognitive Sciences|volume=11|issue=1|pages=37–43|issn=1364-6613|doi=10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.001|pmid=17129749|s2cid=2754235}}</ref> and belief in some [[paranormal]] phenomena.<ref name="selfismagic">{{cite book|last=Wegner|first=Daniel M.|title=Are we free?: psychology and free will|editor=John Baer|editor2=James C. Kaufman|editor2-link=James C. Kaufman|editor3=Roy F. Baumeister|editor3-link=Roy F. Baumeister|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=New York|year=2008|chapter=Self is Magic|isbn=978-0-19-518963-6|chapter-url=http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic67047.files/2_13_07_Wegner.pdf|access-date=2008-07-02|archive-date=2017-01-20|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170120195419/http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic67047.files/2_13_07_Wegner.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> When making judgements about themselves, subjects treat their own introspections as reliable, whereas they judge other people based on their behavior.<ref name="blindspot" /> This can lead to [[Illusory superiority|illusions of superiority]]. For example, people generally see themselves as less [[conformity|conformist]] than others, and this seems to be because they do not introspect any urge to conform.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Pronin|first=Emily|author2=Jonah Berger |author3=Sarah Molouki |year=2007|title=Alone in a Crowd of Sheep: Asymmetric Perceptions of Conformity and Their Roots in an Introspection Illusion|journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology|volume=92|issue=4|pages=585–595|issn=0022-3514|doi=10.1037/0022-3514.92.4.585|pmid=17469946 |url=https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1400&context=marketing_papers}}</ref> Another reliable finding is that people generally see themselves as [[bias blind spot|less biased than everyone else]], because they are not likely to introspect any biased thought processes.<ref name="blindspot">{{cite journal|last=Pronin|first=Emily|author2=Matthew B. Kugler|date=July 2007|title=Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection illusion as a source of the bias blind spot|journal=Journal of Experimental Social Psychology|volume=43|issue=4|pages=565–578|issn=0022-1031|doi=10.1016/j.jesp.2006.05.011}}</ref>

One experiment tried to give their subjects access to others' introspections. They made audio recordings of subjects who had been told to say whatever came into their heads as they answered a question about their own bias.<ref name="blindspot" /> Although subjects persuaded themselves they were unlikely to be biased, their introspective reports did not sway the assessments of observers. When subjects were explicitly told to avoid relying on introspection, their assessments of their own bias became more realistic.<ref name="blindspot" />