Editing Irrelevant conclusion (section)

==Overview==
''Ignoratio elenchi'' is one of the fallacies identified by [[Aristotle]] in his ''[[Organon]]''. In a broader sense he asserted that all fallacies are a form of ''ignoratio elenchi''.<ref name="Owen 1878">{{cite book |title=The Organon, or Logical treatises, of Aristotle |author=Aristotle |author-link=Aristotle |translator=Octavius Freire Owen |year=1878 |url=https://www.jdavidstark.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/aristotle-organon-v-1.pdf |publisher=George Bell and Sons |location=Covent Garden |volume=2 |pages=548–553 |access-date=12 December 2020 |archive-date=30 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220330012254/https://www.jdavidstark.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/aristotle-organon-v-1.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/ignoratio.html |title=Ignoratio Elenchi |work=Introduction to Logic |date=24 September 2009}}</ref>

{{Blockquote|''Ignoratio Elenchi'', according to Aristotle, is a fallacy that arises from "ignorance of the nature of refutation". To refute an assertion, Aristotle says we must prove its contradictory; the proof, consequently, of a proposition which stood in any other relation than that to the original, would be an ''ignoratio elenchi''.  Since Aristotle, the scope of the fallacy has been extended to include all cases of proving the wrong point&nbsp;... "I am required to prove a certain conclusion; I prove, not that, but one which is likely to be mistaken for it; in that lies the fallacy&nbsp;... For instance, instead of proving that 'this person has committed an atrocious fraud', you prove that 'this fraud he is accused of is atrocious{{'"}};&nbsp;... The nature of the fallacy, then, consists in substituting for a certain issue another which is more or less closely related to it and arguing the substituted issue. The fallacy does not take into account whether the arguments do or do not really support the substituted issue, it only calls attention to the fact that they do not constitute proof of the original one… It is a particularly prevalent and subtle fallacy and it assumes a great variety of forms. But whenever it occurs and whatever form it takes, it is brought about by an assumption that leads the person guilty of it to substitute for a definite subject of inquiry another which is in close relation with it.<ref name="Davies1915">{{cite book |first=Arthur Ernest |last=Davies |year=1915 |title=A Text-Book of Logic |publisher=R. G. Adams and company |lccn=15027713 |url=https://archive.org/details/afx7162.0001.001.umich.edu |pages=[https://archive.org/details/afx7162.0001.001.umich.edu/page/569 569]–576}}</ref>|Arthur Ernest Davies|"Fallacies" in ''A Text-Book of Logic''}}

● '''Example 1''': A and B are debating as to whether criticizing indirectly has any merit in general.
{{block indent|''A'': There is no point in people ranting on social media about politics; the president is not going to read it anyway.}}
{{block indent|''B'': But it is their social media. People can agree on making a petition or convey notice from many others that they will be signing one based on their concerns.}}
{{block indent|''A'': Well, I do not keep up with it anyway.}}

{{Not a typo|A}} attempts to support their position with an argument that politics ought not to be criticized on social media because the message is not directly being heard by the head of state; this would make them guilty of ''ignoratio elenchi'', as people such as B may be criticizing politics because they have a strong message for their peers, or because they wish to bring attention to political matters, rather than ever intending that their views would be directly read by the president.

● '''Example 2''': A and B are debating about the law.
{{block indent|''A'': Does the law allow me to do that?}}
{{block indent|''B'': My neighbor John believes that the law ''should'' allow you to do that because of this and that.}}

B missed the point. The question was not if B's neighbor believes that law should allow, but rather if the law does allow it or not.

[[Samuel Johnson]]'s unique "refutation" of [[George Berkeley|Bishop Berkeley's]] [[immaterialism]], his claim that matter did not actually exist but only seemed to exist,<ref>{{Harvnb|Bate|1977|p=316}}</ref> has been described as ''ignoratio elenchi'':<ref>Bagnall, Nicholas. ''Books: Paperbacks'', [[The Sunday Telegraph]] 3 March 1996</ref> during a conversation with [[James Boswell|Boswell]], Johnson powerfully kicked a nearby stone and proclaimed of Berkeley's theory, "I refute it ''thus''!"<ref name="Boswell p. 122">{{Harvnb|Boswell|1986|p=122}}</ref> (See also ''[[argumentum ad lapidem]]''.)

A related concept is that of the [[red herring]], which is a deliberate attempt to divert a process of enquiry by changing the subject.<ref name="Hurley2011">{{cite book|author=Patrick J. Hurley|title=A Concise Introduction to Logic|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Ikp2dGWT5O4C&pg=PT155|year=2011|publisher=Cengage Learning|isbn=978-0-8400-3417-5|pages=131–133}}</ref> ''Ignoratio elenchi'' is sometimes confused with [[straw man]] argument.<ref name="Hurley2011"/>