Editing Lin Biao (section)

==Revolutionary==
===Youth===
[[File:Lin Biao Blue Sky White Sun.jpg|thumb|Lin Biao in [[Kuomintang]] uniform|200px]]
Lin Biao was the son of a prosperous merchant family in [[Huanggang]], [[Hubei]].<ref name="L69">Leung 69</ref> His name at birth was "'''Lin Yurong'''".<ref name="L&D" /> Lin's father opened a small handicrafts factory in the mid-late 1910s, but was forced to close the factory due to "heavy taxes imposed by local militarists". After closing the factory, Lin's father worked as a [[purser]] aboard a river steamship. Lin entered primary school in 1917,<ref name="Lin164">Lin 164</ref> and moved to Shanghai in 1919 to continue his education.<ref name="L&D">Lazitch and Drachkovitch 265–267</ref> As a child, Lin was much more interested in participating in student movements than in pursuing his formal education.<ref name="Lee170">Lee 170</ref> Lin transferred to Wuchang Gongjin High School ({{zh|labels=no|s=武昌共进中学}}) at 15.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/126778/126780/7490123.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180307013953/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/126778/126780/7490123.html |archive-date=7 March 2018 |script-title=zh:林 彪--资料中心--中国共产党新闻网 |website=People.com.cn |language=zh-cn |quote="{{lang|zh-Hans|15岁转入武昌共进中学}}"}}</ref> Lin joined a satellite organization of the [[Communist Youth League]] before he graduated high school in 1925. Later in 1925 he participated in the [[May Thirtieth Movement]] and enrolled in the newly established [[Whampoa Military Academy|Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy]] in [[Guangzhou]].<ref name="L69" />

As a young cadet, Lin admired the personality of [[Chiang Kai-shek]] (Jiang Jieshi), who was then the principal of the academy.<ref name="Lee170" /> At Whampoa, Lin also studied under [[Zhou Enlai]], who was eight years older than Lin. Lin had no contact with Zhou after their time in Whampoa, until they met again in [[Yan'an]] in the late 1930s.<ref>Barnonin and Yu 240</ref> Lin's relationship with Zhou was never especially close, but they rarely opposed each other directly.<ref name="MMW140" />

After graduating from Whampoa in 1926, Lin was assigned to a regiment commanded by [[Ye Ting]]. Less than a year after graduating from Whampoa, he was assigned to the [[Northern Expedition (1926–1927)|Northern Expedition]], where he rose from deputy platoon leader to battalion commander within a few months. During this time Lin joined the [[Chinese Communist Party|Communist Party]].<ref name="L69" /> By 1927 Lin was a colonel.

When he was twenty, Lin married a girl{{Clarify|reason=presumably a woman?|date=September 2021}} from the countryside with the family name "Ong". This marriage was arranged by Lin's parents, and the couple never became close. When Lin left the Kuomintang to become a communist revolutionary, Ong did not accompany Lin, and their marriage effectively ended.<ref name="Lee170" />

===Chinese Civil War===
After the [[Shanghai massacre of 1927|Kuomintang-Communist split]], Lin's commander, Ye Ting, joined forces with [[He Long]] and participated in the [[Nanchang Uprising]] on 1 August 1927.<ref name="L&D" /><ref>Leung 70</ref> During the campaign Lin worked as a company commander under a regiment led by [[Chen Yi (communist)|Chen Yi]].<ref>Barnouin and Yu 242</ref> Following the failure of the revolt, Lin escaped to the remote Communist base areas, and joined [[Mao Zedong]] and [[Zhu De]] in the [[Jiangxi–Fujian Soviet]] in 1928.<ref name=":322">{{Cite book |last=Hammond |first=Ken |title=China's Revolution and the Quest for a Socialist Future |publisher=1804 Books |year=2023 |isbn=9781736850084 |location=New York, NY |pages=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=141}} After joining forces with Mao, Lin became one of Mao's closest supporters.<ref name="MMW140" />

Lin became one of the most senior military field commanders within the Jiangxi Soviet. He commanded the First Army Group, and achieved a degree of power comparable to that of [[Peng Dehuai]], who commanded the Third Army Group. According to [[Comintern]] representative [[Otto Braun (communist)|Otto Braun]], Lin was "politically{{nbsp}}... a blank sheet on which Mao could write as he pleased" during this period. After [[Ningdu Conference|Mao was removed from power in 1932]] by his rivals (the [[28 Bolsheviks]]), Lin frequently attended strategic meetings in Mao's name and openly attacked the plans of Mao's enemies.<ref>Hu Chi-hsi 253</ref>

Within the Jiangxi Soviet, Lin's First Army Group was the best-equipped and arguably most successful force within the [[Chinese Red Army|Red Army]]. Lin's First Army became known for its mobility, and for its ability to execute successful flanking maneuvers. Between 1930 and 1933, Lin's forces captured twice the number of prisoners of war and military equipment as the Third and Fifth Army Groups combined. The successes of Lin's forces are due partially to the division of labour within the Red Army: Lin's forces were more offensive and unorthodox than other groups, allowing Lin to capitalize on other Red Army commanders' successes.<ref>Hu Chi-hsi 263</ref>

During the Communists' defense against Chiang's 1933–34 [[Fifth Encirclement Campaign against Jiangxi Soviet|Fifth Encirclement Campaign]], Lin advocated a strategy of protracted guerilla warfare, and opposed the positional warfare advocated by Braun and his supporters. Lin believed that the best way to destroy enemy soldiers was not to pursue them or defend strategic points, but to weaken the enemy through feints, ambushes, encirclements, and surprise attacks. Lin's views generally conformed with the tactics advocated by Mao.<ref>Hu Chi-hsi 257–260</ref>

After Chiang's forces successfully occupied several strategic locations within the Jiangxi Soviet, in 1934, Lin was one of the first Red Army commanders to publicly advocate the abandonment of the Jiangxi Soviet, but he was opposed by most Red Army commanders, especially Braun and Peng Dehuai.<ref>Hu Chi-hsi 264</ref> After the Communists finally resolved to abandon their base, later in 1934, Lin continued his position as one of the most successful commanders in the Red Army during the [[Long March]]. Under the direction of Mao and Zhou, the Red Army finally arrived at the remote Communist base of [[Yan'an]], [[Shaanxi]], in December 1936.

Lin and Peng Dehuai were generally considered the Red Army's best battlefield commanders,<ref name=":322" />{{Rp|page=141}} and were not rivals during the [[Long March]]. Both of them had supported Mao's rise to ''de facto'' leadership at the [[Zunyi Conference]] in January 1935. Lin may have become privately dissatisfied with Mao's strategy of constant evasion by the end of the Long March, but continued to support Mao publicly.<ref>Salisbury 188</ref>

The American journalist [[Edgar Snow]] met Lin Biao in the Communist base of [[Shaanxi]] in 1936,<ref>Hu Chi-hsi 267</ref> and wrote about Lin in his book, ''[[Red Star Over China]]''. Snow's account focused more on the role of Peng than Lin, evidently having had long conversations with, and devoting two whole chapters to, Peng (more than any other individual apart from Mao). Though he said of Lin:

<blockquote>Lin Biao did not present the bluff, lusty face of Peng Dehuai. He was ten years younger, rather slight, oval-faced, dark, handsome. Peng talked with his men. Lin kept his distance. To many he seemed shy and reserved. There are no stories reflecting warmth and affection for his men. His fellow Red Army commanders respected Lin, but when he spoke, it was all business{{nbsp}}...

The contrast between Mao's top field commanders could hardly have been more sharp, but on the Long March they worked well together, Lin specializing in feints, masked strategy, surprises, ambushes, flank attacks, pounces from the rear, and stratagems. Peng met the enemy head-on in frontal assaults and fought with such fury that again and again he wiped them out. Peng did not believe a battle well fought unless he managed to replenish—and more than replenish—any losses by seizure of enemy guns and converting prisoners of war to new and loyal recruits to the Red Army.<ref>Salisbury 191–192</ref>

With Mao Zedong, Lin Biao shared the distinction of being one of the few Red commanders never wounded. Engaged on the front in more than a hundred battles, in field command for more than 10 years, exposed to every hardship that his men have known, with a reward of $100,000 on his head, he miraculously remained unhurt and in good health.

In 1932, Lin Biao was given command of the 1st Red Army Corps, which then numbered about 20,000 rifles. It became the most dreaded section of the Red Army. Chiefly due to Lin's extraordinary talent as a tactician, it destroyed, defeated or outmanoeuvered every Government force sent against it and was never broken in battle{{nbsp}}....

Like many able Red commanders, Lin has never been outside China, speaks and reads no language but Chinese. Before the age of 30, however, he has already won recognition beyond Red circles. His articles in the Chinese Reds' military magazines{{nbsp}}... have been republished, studied and criticised in [[Nanking]] (Nanjing) military journals, and also in Japan and Soviet Russia.<ref>Snow 135</ref>
</blockquote>  Within a year of Snow's reporting, Lin was seriously wounded.<ref name="MMW141">Mackerras, McMillen, and Watson 141</ref> A Red Army soldier shot him by mistake.<ref name=":Chatwin" />{{Rp|page=33}}

Lin and Mao generally had a close personal relationship,<ref>Snow 84</ref> but some accounts claim that Lin sometimes made disparaging comments about Mao in private, and that Lin's support of Mao was largely for the pursuit of power.<ref>Chang and Halliday 504</ref> After arriving in Yan'an, Lin became the principal of the newly founded [[Counter-Japanese University|Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political University]]. In 1937, Lin married one of the students there, a girl named Liu Ximin, who had earned the nickname "University Flower".<ref>Lee 170–171</ref>

===Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945)===
[[File:Lin Biao family.jpg|thumb|right|Lin Biao with wife [[Ye Qun]] and their children]]
In August 1937, Lin was named commander-in-chief of the 115th Division of the Communist [[8th Route Army]]<ref name="L&D" /> and ordered to aid [[Yan Xishan]]'s forces in repelling the Japanese invasion of [[Shanxi]]. In this capacity, Lin orchestrated the [[Battle of Pingxingguan|ambush at Pingxingguan]] in September 1937, which was one of the few battlefield successes for the Chinese in the early period of the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]] (known in China as the "War of Resistance Against Japan").

[[File:Zhou Enlai & Lin Biao.jpg|thumb|Lin with [[Zhou Enlai]] in [[National Revolutionary Army]] uniforms (1943)]]
In 1938, while he was still leading Chinese forces in Shanxi, Japanese soldiers who had joined the Communists and were serving under Lin's command presented Lin with a [[Imperial Japanese Army Uniforms|Japanese uniform]] and ''[[Shin guntō|katana]]'', which they had captured in battle. Lin then put the uniform and katana on, jumped onto a horse, and rode away from the army. While riding, Lin was spotted alone by a sharpshooter in Yan's army. The soldier was surprised to see a Japanese officer riding a horse in the desolate hills alone. He took aim at Lin and severely injured him.<ref name="Lee171">Lee 171</ref> The bullet grazed Lin's head, penetrating deep enough to leave a permanent impression on his skull.<ref name="HL4">Hannam and Lawrence 4</ref> After being shot in the head, Lin fell from his horse and injured his back.<ref name="Lee171" />

Recovering from his wounds and ill with [[tuberculosis]], Lin left for [[Moscow]] at the end of 1938, where he served as the representative of the Chinese Communist Party to the [[Executive Committee of the Communist International]]. He remained in Moscow until February 1942, working on [[Comintern]] affairs and writing for its publication.<ref name="L&D" /> Lin was accompanied by his wife, Liu Ximin, but their relationship deteriorated in Moscow, and Lin eventually returned to Yan'an without her.<ref name="Lee171" />

While in Moscow, Lin became infatuated with Zhou Enlai's adopted daughter, [[Sun Weishi]], who was studying in Moscow from 1938 to 1946.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://ohsnapnews.com/in-1945-sun-weishi-declined-lin-biaos-rationale-courtship/1817/|title=Lin Biao and Sun Weishi|website=ohsnapnews.com|access-date=4 June 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160406150641/http://ohsnapnews.com/in-1945-sun-weishi-declined-lin-biaos-rationale-courtship/1817/|archive-date=6 April 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> Before returning to China, in 1942, Lin proposed to Sun and promised to divorce his wife, from whom Lin had become estranged. Sun was not able to accept Lin's proposal, but promised to consider marrying Lin after completing her studies. Lin divorced Liu Ximin after returning to China, and married another woman, [[Ye Qun]], in 1943. The relationship between Sun and Ye was notably bad.<ref>Zhang 2</ref> After returning to Yan'an, Lin was involved in troop training and indoctrination assignments.

===Liaoshen Campaign===
[[Image:Dongbei Ju in Harbin.jpg|thumb|Lin with high-ranking officers under his command (Harbin, 1946)|280px]]
[[File:Lin biao xiao.png|thumb|right|200px|Lin as commander-in-chief of the Manchurian Field Army (~1947–1948)]]
Lin was absent for most of the fighting during World War II, but was elected the sixth-ranking [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|Central Committee]] member in 1945 based on his earlier battlefield reputation.<ref name="MMW141" /> After the Japanese surrender, the Communists moved large numbers of troops to [[Manchuria]] (Northeast China), and Lin Biao relocated to Manchuria to command the new "Communist Northeast Military District". The Soviets transferred captured Japanese military equipment to the Communists, making Lin's army one of the most well-equipped Communist forces in China. By the time that units from the Kuomintang (Nationalists) were able to arrive in the major cities of Manchuria, Lin's forces were already in firm control of most of the countryside and surrounding areas.<ref>Leung 70–71</ref>

By the end of 1945, Lin had 280,000 troops in Manchuria under his command,<ref>Barnouin and Yu 103</ref> but according to Kuomintang estimates only 100,000 of these were regular forces with access to adequate equipment. The KMT also estimated that Lin also had access to 100,000 irregular auxiliaries, whose membership was drawn mainly from unemployed factory workers. Lin avoided decisive confrontations throughout 1945, and he was able to preserve the strength of his army despite criticism from his peers in the Party and the PLA.<ref>Lew 32–36</ref>

For the sake of bargaining with the Kuomintang in peace negotiations in 1946, Mao ordered Lin to assemble his army to take and defend key cities, which was against the previous strategy of the Red Army. Lin disagreed with this position, but was ordered by Mao to draw the KMT into a decisive battle and "not give an inch of land" around [[Battle of Siping|Siping, Jilin]]. On 15 April, Lin orchestrated an ambush and forced KMT forces there to withdraw with heavy casualties. When the local KMT commander, [[Du Yuming]], launched a counterattack on 18 April, Mao ordered the troops there to hold the city indefinitely. The fighting continued until Mao finally allowed Lin to withdraw on 19 May, which Lin did immediately, barely saving his army from encirclement and destruction.<ref>Lew 36</ref>

Du pursued Lin's forces to the south bank of the [[Songhua River]], where they halted due to Du's concerns about his army becoming overextended. According to Communist sources, Lin's army lost 15,000 soldiers in the fighting and withdrawal, but Nationalist sources claim that 25,000 soldiers also deserted or surrendered, and that Lin's force of 100,000 irregular auxiliaries suffered from mass desertion during the retreat. On 10 June, the two forces agreed to a ceasefire brokered by [[George Marshall]], and fighting temporarily ceased. Mao ordered Lin to counterattack that winter, but Lin refused, replying that his forces were exhausted and not logistically prepared to do so.<ref>Lew 36–37</ref>

When Du led the majority of his forces to attack Communist forces on the [[Korea]]n border in January 1947, Lin finally ordered 20,000 of his soldiers to cross the Songhua River, where they staged guerrilla raids, ambushed relief forces, attacked isolated garrisons, and avoided decisive confrontations with strong units Du sent to defeat them. While they did so, they looted large quantities of supplies and destroyed the infrastructure of the KMT-held territories that they passed through, including bridges, railroads, fortifications, electrical lines, and boats. When Du sent his forces back south, they were ambushed and defeated. When Du requested reinforcements from Chiang Kai-shek, his request was rejected.<ref>Lew 66–68</ref>

On 8 April, Lin moved his headquarters from [[Harbin]] to [[Shuangcheng, Harbin|Shuangcheng]] in order to be closer to the front. On 5 May, he held a conference with his subordinates and announced that his armies would change tactics, engage in a large-scale counterattack, and seek to defeat Du's forces in a decisive battle. On 8 May, Lin launched the first of his "three great campaigns", the Summer Offensive, intending to engage a large garrison at [[Huaide]] while a second force positioned itself to ambush the force that would predictably be sent to relieve it. On 17 May, they won a major victory and forced the survivors to retreat to Changchun and Siping. By the end of May 1947, Lin's forces had taken control of most of the countryside (everything except for the rail lines and several major cities), infiltrated and destroyed most KMT forces in Manchuria, and re-established contact with isolated Communist forces in southern [[Liaoning]] province.<ref>Lew 68–69</ref>

After the victory of the Summer Offensive, Lin's forces gained the initiative and Kuomintang defensive strategy became static and reactionary. Lin ordered his forces to besiege Siping, but they suffered very high casualties and made little progress, partially due to the defenders' strong entrenched position and air support, and due to the attackers' poor artillery support (Lin only had seventy pieces of artillery around Siping). Lin's forces broke into the city twice and engaged in street-to-street fighting, but were driven back both times with heavy casualties. By 19 June, Lin's assault troops had become increasingly exhausted, and Lin began to rotate them to prevent them from becoming completely ineffective. On 24 June, Nationalist reinforcements arrived from the south to lift the siege. Lin recognized that he did not have enough manpower left to defeat them, and on 1 July, he ordered his forces to retreat back to the north of the Songhua River.<ref>Lew 70–71</ref>

The Communists suffered over 30,000 losses at Siping, and may have suffered a desertion rate of over 20% during the withdrawal, while the Nationalist garrison at Siping fell from 20,000 to slightly over 3,000 before the siege was broken. Lin volunteered to write a self-criticism after the defeat. He also criticized his commander at Siping, [[Li Tianyou]], for demonstrating poor tactics and for lacking "revolutionary spirit". Despite the army's setbacks he reorganized the army, combining surviving regiments and raising local militia forces to the status of regular units. By the fall of 1947, he had 510,000 soldiers under his command, approximately equal to Nationalist forces in the region.<ref>Lew 71, 86</ref>

Before Du's replacement, [[Chen Cheng]], could cross north and begin an offensive, Lin moved his army south and began the Autumn Offensive, in which his forces destroyed rail lines and other infrastructure, attacked isolated Nationalist units, and attempted to provoke and ambush strong Nationalist forces. Chen's forces responded to the campaign by withdrawing into their city garrisons. The Communists were not able to provoke a decisive confrontation, and the Autumn Offensive ended in a stalemate.<ref>Lew 87–88</ref>

Chen's forces remained static and reactionary, at the end of 1947, Lin led his armies back south in his final Liaoshen Campaign, the Winter Offensive. His initial plan was to repeat the goal of his last offensive, to besiege Jilin City and ambush its relief force, but after reviewing Kuomintang troop dispositions he determined that southern Manchuria would be an easier target. On 15 December, Lin's forces attacked [[Fakui]], [[Zhangwu]], and [[Xinlitun]]. Chen sent reinforcements to relieve Fakui, and when the Communist ambush failed, Lin ordered his forces to withdraw and join in the siege of Zhangwu. When Chen did not intervene and the town fell on 28 December, Lin assumed the main part of the campaign was over and he dispersed his forces to rest and attack secondary targets.<ref>Lew 94</ref>

Chen saw Lin's withdrawal as an opportunity to seize the offensive. He ordered his forces to attack targets in northern Liaoning on 1 January 1948, and on 3 January, Lin successfully encircled the isolated Nationalist 5th Corps. Its commander, [[Chen Linda]], realized that he was being surrounded and requested reinforcements, but Chen Cheng only responded that he would "allow" Chen Linda to withdraw. The attempted breakout failed, and the 5th Corps was destroyed on 7 January. After this defeat, Chen Cheng was replaced with [[Wei Lihuang]] ten days later, but Wei was not able to prevent the Communists from capturing [[Liaoyang]] on 6 February, destroying the 54th division, and severing an important railroad that linked Wei's forces from their ports on the [[Bohai Sea]].<ref>Lew 94–95</ref>

Lin continued his advance, defeating all garrisons in western Manchuria or inducing them to defect by late February. On 26 February Lin reorganized his forces as the [[Northeastern Field Army]] and began preparations to return and take Siping, whose garrison had been transferred elsewhere by Chen Cheng and never re-strengthened. Lin began the general assault on the city on 13 March, and took the town one day later. The capture of Siping ended Lin's Winter Offensive. The KMT nearly lost all of Manchuria by the end of the campaign and suffered 156,000 casualties, most of which survived as prisoners of war that were indoctrinated and recruited into Lin's forces. By the end of winter 1948 the Kuomintang had lost all of its territory in the Northeast, except for Changchun, [[Shenyang]], and an area connecting the rail line from Beiping to those cities.<ref>Lew 95–97</ref>

Following Lin's Winter campaign, Mao wanted him to attack targets farther south, but Lin disagreed because he did not want to leave a strong enemy at his back, and he believed the defeat of a strong city would force Chiang to abandon the Northeast. By 25 May 1948, the Northeastern Field Army had completely encircled Changchun, including its airfield, and for the rest of the siege the Nationalist commander, [[Zheng Dongguo]], depended entirely on supplies airdropped into the city. On 19 May, Lin submitted a report to Mao in which he expected heavy casualties. By 20 July the siege was at a stalemate, and Lin deferred to Mao, allowing some of his army to attack [[Jinzhou]] farther south, beginning the [[Liaoshen Campaign]]. When Chiang airlifted reinforcements to defend Jinzhou, Lin ordered his army to abandon the siege and return to Changchun, but Mao disagreed and overruled him, and Lin was ordered to engage the defenders in a decisive confrontation. On 14 October, the Northeast Field Army began its assault on Jinzhou with 250,000 men and the bulk of Lin's artillery and armor. After nearly 24 hours of fighting, Lin's forces were victorious, suffering 24,000 casualties but capturing the enemy commander, [[Fan Hanjie]], and 90,000 enemy soldiers.<ref>Lew 108–112</ref>

After hearing the news about the defeat at Jinzhou, a KMT army from Yunnan and its commander, [[Zeng Zesheng]], defected and abandoned its position on the outskirts of Changchun on 14 October. This doomed the remaining Nationalist forces in the city, and [[Zheng Dongguo]] was forced to surrender two days later. Chiang ordered the 9th army of 110,000 men under General [[Liao Yaoxiang]] to travel west and retake Jinzhou, but Lin directed nearly all of his forces to stop them, and they began to encircle the relief unit on 21 October. After a week of fighting, the Nationalist army was destroyed on 28 October. Remaining KMT garrisons in the Northeast attempted to break out of the region and flee south, but most were unsuccessful. After Changchun, the only major KMT garrison in the Northeast was Shenyang, where 140,000 KMT soldiers were eventually forced to surrender. By the end of 1948 all of Northeast China was under Communist control.<ref>Lew 112–114</ref>

===Defeating the Kuomintang===
After taking control of the [[Manchuria]]n provinces, Lin then swept into [[North China]]. Forces under Lin were responsible for winning two of the three major military victories responsible for the defeat of the Kuomintang. Lin suffered from ongoing periods of serious illness throughout the campaign.<ref name="MMW141" /> Following the victory in Manchuria, Lin commanded over a million soldiers, encircling Chiang's main forces in northern China during the [[Pingjin Campaign]], taking [[Beijing]] and [[Tianjin]] within a period of two months. Tianjin was taken by force, and on 22 January 1949 General [[Fu Zuoyi]] and his army of 400,000 men agreed to surrender Beijing without a battle, and the PLA occupied the city on 31 January. The Pingjin Campaign saw Lin remove a total of approximately 520,000 enemy troops from the enemy's battle lines. Many of those who surrendered later joined the PLA.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 116</ref>

After taking Beijing, the Communists attempted to negotiate for the surrender of the remaining KMT forces. When these negotiations failed, Lin resumed his attacks on the KMT in the southeast. After taking Beijing, Lin's army numbered 1.5 million soldiers. He crossed the [[Yangtze River]] in the Spring of 1949 and decisively defeated the defending KMT army stationed in central China during the [[Yangtze River Crossing Campaign]]. Lin's armies continued to defeat KMT armies farther south, finally occupying all KMT positions on mainland China by the end of 1949. The last position occupied by Lin's forces was the tropical island of [[Hainan]].<ref>Tanner (2013) 207</ref>

Lin Biao was considered one of the Communists' most brilliant generals after the founding of the People's Republic of China, in 1949. Lin was the youngest of the "[[Yuan shuai#People's Republic of China|Ten Marshals]]" named in 1955, a title that recognized Lin's substantial military contributions.<ref name="MMW141" />