Editing Logical positivism (section)

==Origins==

Logical positivism emerged in [[Germany]] and [[Austria]] amid a cultural background characterised by the dominance of [[Hegelian metaphysics]] and the work of Hegelian successors such as [[F. H. Bradley]], whose [[metaphysics]] portrayed the world without reference to [[observation|empirical observation]].<ref name="Suppe2">{{cite book |title=Scientific Inquiry |editor=Robert Klee |last=Suppe |first=Frederick |chapter=The Positivist Model of Scientific Theories |pages=16-24 |year=1999 |publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref> The late 19th century also saw the emergence of [[neo-Kantianism]] as a philosophical movement, in the [[Rationalism|rationalist]] tradition.<ref name=uebel3>{{harvnb|Uebel|2008}} 3.7</ref>

The logical positivist program established its theoretical foundations in the [[empiricism]] of [[David Hume]], [[Auguste Comte]] and [[Ernst Mach]], along with the [[positivism]] of Comte and Mach, defining its exemplar of science in [[Albert Einstein|Einstein]]'s [[general theory of relativity]].<ref>{{cite book |title=A Dictionary of Philosophy |last=Flew|first=Antony G|page=156 |chapter=Science: Conjectures and refutations |year=1984|publisher=St Martin's Press|location=New York|editor= Andrew Bailey}}</ref><ref name=uebel3/> In accordance with Mach's [[phenomenalism]], whereby [[material object]]s exist only as [[sense data|sensory stimuli]] rather than as observable entities in the [[reality|real world]], logical positivists took all scientific knowledge to be only sensory experience.<ref>{{cite book |last=Ray |first=Christopher |chapter=Logical Positivism |date=September 2017 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781405164481.ch37 |title=A Companion to the Philosophy of Science |pages=243–251 |editor-last=Newton-Smith |editor-first=W. H. |access-date=2023-10-19 |edition=1st |publisher=Wiley |doi=10.1002/9781405164481.ch37 |isbn=978-0-631-23020-5}}</ref> Further influence came from [[Percy Bridgman]]'s [[operationalism]]—whereby a concept is not knowable unless it can be measured experimentally—as well as [[Immanuel Kant]]'s perspectives on [[a priori|aprioricity]].<ref>{{cite journal |title=The Myth of Operationism |first=Thomas H. |last=Leahey |journal=The Journal of Mind and Behavior |volume=1 |issue=2 |year=1980 |pages=127-143}}</ref><ref name=uebel3/>

[[Ludwig Wittgenstein]]'s ''[[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus]]'' established the theoretical foundations for the [[verifiability principle]].<ref> ''Tractatus''  Proposition 4.024 bears resemblance to Schlick's statement, "To state the circumstances under which a proposition is true is the same as stating its meaning".</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Schlick |first=Moritz |year=1932 |title=Positivismus und realismus |journal=Erkenntnis |volume=3 |issue=1 |pages=1-31 |doi=10.1007/BF01886406}} English translation in: {{cite book |title=Logical Empiricism at its Peak: Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath |editor-last=Sarkar |editor-first=Sahotra |page=38 |year=1996 |location=New York |publisher=Garland Publishing}}</ref> His work introduced the view of philosophy as "critique of language", discussing theoretical distinctions between intelligible and nonsensical discourse. ''Tractatus'' adhered to a [[correspondence theory of truth]], as opposed to a [[coherence theory of truth]]. Logical positivists were also influenced by Wittgenstein's interpretation of [[probability]] though, according to [[Otto Neurath|Neurath]], some objected to the metaphysics in ''Tractatus''.<ref>{{cite book |last=Rand |first=Rose |title=Entwicklung der Thesen des "Wiener Kreises" |year=1933}}</ref>