Editing Lucy spy ring (section)

==History==
At the outbreak of World War II, Roessler was a political [[refugee]] from Bavaria who had fled to Switzerland when Hitler came to power. He was the founder of a small publishing firm, [[Vita Nova]] Verlag, producing copies of anti-Nazi [[Exilliteratur]] and other literary works in the [[German language]] strictly banned under [[censorship in Nazi Germany]], for [[smuggling]] across the border and [[black market]] distribution to [[dissident]] intellectuals. He was employed by Brigadier Masson, head of Swiss Military Intelligence, who employed him as an analyst with [[Swiss intelligence agencies|Bureau Ha]], overtly a press cuttings agency but in fact a covert department of Swiss Intelligence. Roessler was approached by two German officers, [[Fritz Thiele]] and [[Rudolph von Gersdorff]], who were part of a [[German resistance to Nazism|German resistance]] conspiracy to overthrow [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]], and had been known to Roessler in the 1930s through the [[Herrenklub]].{{clarify|date=January 2015}}

Thiele and Gersdorf wished him to act as a conduit for high-level military information, to be made available to him to make use of in the fight against Nazism. This they accomplished by equipping Roessler with a radio and an [[Enigma machine]], and designating him as a German military station (call-signed RAHS). In this way they could openly transmit their information to him through normal channels. They were able to do this as Thiele, and his superior, [[Erich Fellgiebel]] (who was also part of the conspiracy), were in charge of the [[Ministry of the Reichswehr|German Defence Ministry's]] communication centre, the [[Bendlerblock]]. This was possible, as those employed to encode the information were unaware of where it was going, while those transmitting the messages had no idea what was in them.

At first Roessler passed the information to [[Militärischer Nachrichtendienst|Swiss military intelligence]], via a friend who was serving in Bureau Ha, an intelligence agency used by the Swiss as a [[Cut-out (espionage)|cut-out]]. [[Roger Masson]], the head of Swiss MI, also chose to pass some of this information to the British [[Secret Intelligence Service|SIS]]. Later, seeking to aid the USSR in its role in the fight against Nazism, Roessler was able to pass on information to it via another contact who was a part of a Soviet ([[GRU (Soviet Union)|GRU]]) network run by [[Alexander Rado]]. Roessler was not a Communist, nor even a Communist sympathizer until much later, and wished to remain at arm's length from Rado's network, insisting on complete anonymity and communicating with Rado only through the courier, [[Christian Schneider (editor)|Christian Schneider]]. Rado agreed to this, recognizing the value of the information being received. Rado code-named the source "Lucy", simply because all he knew about the source was that it was in [[Lucerne]].
 
Roessler's first major contribution to Soviet intelligence came in May 1941 when he was able to deliver details of [[Operation Barbarossa]], Germany's impending invasion of the Soviet Union. Though his warning was initially ignored - as Soviet intelligence had received multiple false alarms about an impending German invasion - Roessler's dates eventually proved accurate. Following the invasion, in June 1941, Lucy was regarded as a VYRDO source, ''i.e.'' of the highest importance, and to be transmitted immediately. Over the next two years "Lucy" was able to supply the Soviets with high grade military intelligence. During the autumn of 1942, "Lucy" provided the Soviets with detailed information about [[Case Blue]], the German operations against [[Stalingrad]] and the [[Caucasus]]; during this period decisions taken in Berlin were arriving in Moscow on average within a ten-hour period; on one occasion in just six hours, not much longer than it took to reach German front line units. Roessler, and Rado's network, particularly [[Allan Foote]], Rado's main radio operator, were prepared to work flat out to maintain the speed and flow of the information. At the peak of its operation, Rado's network was enciphering and sending several hundred messages per month, many of these from "Lucy". Meanwhile, Roessler alone had to do all the receiving, decoding and evaluating of the "Lucy" messages before passing them on; for him during this period it became a full-time operation. In the summer of 1943, the culmination of "Lucy's" success came in transmitting the details of Germany's plans for [[Operation Citadel]], a planned summer offensive against the [[Kursk salient]], which became a strategic defeat for the German army&mdash;the [[Battle of Kursk]] gave the [[Red Army]] the initiative on the eastern front for the remainder of the war.

During the winter of 1942, the Germans became aware of the transmissions from the Rado network, and began to take steps against it through their counter-espionage bureau. After several attempts to penetrate the network they succeeded in pressuring the Swiss to close it down in October 1943, when its radio transmitters were closed down and a number of key operatives were arrested. Thereafter Roessler's only outlet for the "Lucy" information was through the Bureau Ha and Swiss Military Intelligence. Roessler was unaware his information was also going to the [[Allies of World War II|Western Allies]].

The Lucy spy ring came to an end in the summer of 1944 when the German members, who were also involved in other anti-Nazi activities, were arrested in the aftermath of the failed [[20 July plot]].