Editing MBT-70 (section)

==History==

=== Background ===

The joint German–US main battle tank program was the brainchild of [[US Secretary of Defense]] [[Robert McNamara]]. After serving in the [[United States Army Air Forces|US Army Air Forces]] during World War II, McNamara became a [[Whiz Kids (Ford)|"Whiz Kid"]] at [[Ford Motor Company]], where he later rose to become president. McNamara's interest in German engineering had been shown during his tenure as head of Ford. He had shepherded development of the abortive [[Ford Taunus P4|Ford Cardinal]] – a cancelled project involving the redevelopment for US and other international markets of a compact family car designed by engineers in both the US and Germany. This, it was hoped, would result in a new, competitive product for international markets, with reduced development costs.<ref name="King"/>{{Page range too broad|date=November 2023}}

As Defense Secretary, McNamara began to apply his methods of industrial management to military production. At the time, [[NATO]] member states fielded many different weapons systems and these generally lacked common ammunition, fuel and parts; few weapons were developed jointly, including tanks. While West Germany used American [[M48 Patton]]s, it had historically excelled in engineering armored fighting vehicles and was known to be proceeding with plans to design, develop and build its own tanks. McNamara regarded Germany as an increasingly important member of NATO and believed that joint development would yield superior weapons that could also be used by other NATO members,<ref name="King"/> as well as allies outside NATO.

In 1961, McNamara approached German Minister of Defence [[Franz Josef Strauss]] about beginning a collaborative main battle tank program. Strauss wrote off McNamara's idea and suggested that the U.S. should buy the [[Leopard 1]]. Germany, which was readying production of its indigenous Leopard 1 tank, had little interest in starting another main battle tank project. Strauss did however agree to a common component program. McNamara continued to press for Germany's cooperation in a common tank program, succeeding the next year in brokering a tentative agreement with the Germans.{{sfn|McNaugher|1981|p=4-5}}

The US [[Armor Branch]] had long been pressing the Pentagon to fast-track new main battle tank designs. Consequently, McNamara's seven-year timeline to production was opposed by senior armor officers, who believed an all-new MBT was more urgently needed. Others questioned McNamara's high regard for German engineering, arguing that Germany's collective abilities in tank design and engineering had dwindled and not kept pace with innovations since the end of World War II. Within US armored circles, it was believed that there would be a net [[technology transfer]] towards Germany and there was a common belief that the UK would make a better partner. However, McNamara's choice of Germany was also due to the country's excellent economic position, following its successful post-war rebuilding: the so-called "[[Wirtschaftswunder|economic miracle]]". Hence Germany was better positioned to financially commit to a project of this scale.<ref name="King"/>

In order to develop a tank that would meet the requirements of both armies, in August 1963, Germany and the United States signed a [[memorandum of understanding]] that specified certain desired characteristics and organized a Joint Engineering Agency and a Joint Design Team with equal representation from both countries. Despite these measures, conflicts between the differing engineering practices of each country would plague the MBT-70 project throughout its development.{{sfn|Hunnicutt|1990|p=117}}

=== Development of the MBT-70 ===
In 1963, General [[Welborn G. Dolvin]], a former tank commander, was chosen to lead the US team as project manager. Three contractors—[[Chrysler Defense]], [[General Motors]] and a joint venture of Ford and [[FMC Corporation|FMC]]—entered contention to become the contractor on the American side. Dolvin chose GM, anticipating the company would bring more fresh ideas to the table than longtime incumbent tank producer Chrysler. For the Germans, the German Development Corporation was formed as a joint venture of several German firms.<ref name="King" />

For the first phase of development, GM engineers would work alongside German engineers in [[Augsburg]]. For this part, Americans would manage Germans. For the second phase, the arrangement would be reversed: Germans would take over management at GM's factories in Detroit.<ref name="King" />

There were disputes over almost every part of the design: the gun, the engine, and the use of both [[Metric system|metric]] and [[Society of Automotive Engineers|SAE]] units in the separately manufactured components of the tank. This last dispute was, by far, the most contentious. The disagreement rose to McNamara and German Defense Minister [[Kai-Uwe von Hassel]], who were also unable to settle on a common measurement system. An agreement was made for both sides to use their own preferred measurements on parts they designed. The Americans conceded that metric be used on all fastening points.<ref name="King" /> This was settled by an agreement to use a common metric standard in all interface connections. The resulting complexity contributed to delays in the development schedule, and an inflated project budget.{{sfn|Hunnicutt|1990|p=117}} Another national difference was [[Multiview orthographic projection|different methods of projection]]. In production, confusion over which projection method was being used could result in fabrication errors such as holes placed in the wrong side.<ref name="King" />

The Americans were taken aback by the German's approach to [[intellectual property]]. The German firms jealously guarded their trade secrets from the Americans and pushed aggressively for the use of their products in the final product. This cultural confusion stemmed from differences in the procurement system of both countries. In the US, the Pentagon footed the expenses for most research and development. In return, the government kept complete ownership of the product of the research.<ref name="King"/> German firms conducted research and development under government contracts like in the US,{{sfn|McNaugher|1981|p=13-14}} but retained all the rights to their design. There was thus a great incentive for German firms to solicit orders for their designs.<ref name="King"/>

Dolvin stepped down in October 1966 to assume command of an armored division. The program was considered to be at least moderately successful when Major General Edwin H. Burba took over the project.<ref name="King"/>

Nevertheless, many problems with the tank's political future arose in the US. When a design was finalized in 1965, US program costs were estimated at $138 million. With a production decision looming in 1968, this rose to $303 million. The following year critics came up with a different estimate of more than half a billion by accounting for other additional costs.<ref name="King"/>

Programmatic complexity and growing costs contributed to Germany's disillusionment with the joint project. Germany was concerned about the design differences that were emerging between the two teams. Germany regarded the unconventional American engine as unproven and believed the American gun/launcher as a design that would add costs and complexity to the design while offering only marginal gains in accuracy at ranges beyond 2000 meters (while being worse at ordinary ranges). The use of non-metric fasteners, insisted upon by the Americans, was also believed by Germany to have been an unnecessary compromise.<ref name="500 Germany" /> In 1965, Germany reduced its financial commitment to the program, claiming it was unable to pay for its half of the expenses.{{sfn|McNaugher|1981|p=23-24}} By 1969, Germany had reduced its involvement with the project, which was becoming a political embarrassment within the Bundeswehr. Germany reduced its Detroit office presence to a mere skeleton crew. Germany sought to reduce the size of its KPz-70 purchase, originally 500 tanks, if not cancel it altogether.<ref name="500 Germany" >{{cite book |editor1-last=Pretty |editor1-first=R. T. |editor2-last=Archer |editor2-first=D. H. R. |title=Jane's Weapon Systems 1969–1970 |publisher=B. P. C. Publishing |location=London |year=1969 |isbn=0-354-00516-2 |pages=191–192, 211–212 |edition=1st |chapter=Land Platforms |url=https://archive.org/details/janesweaponsyste0000unse_m9k0}}</ref>

Many Americans both inside and outside the project, including General [[Creighton Abrams]], hoped for an amicable end to German involvement in the program. Burba was succeeded by Brigadier General Bernard R. Luczak in mid-1968. Luczak agreed that the German partnership was not working out. Luczak found support from Deputy Secretary [[David Packard]], who brokered an agreement to end the tank partnership in January 1970.<ref name="King"/>

===Concurrent developments===
By 1965 the German [[Leopard 1]] and the US [[M60 tank|M60]] were the newest main battle tanks in their respective country's service. They were armed with the [[M68 (tank gun)|M68]] 105&nbsp;mm rifled gun (developed from the [[Royal Ordnance L7|British 105mm L7]]) and designed to counter Soviet [[T-54/55]] tanks, which they successfully did, according to Israeli combat experience. But it became very clear that due to the same experience the next generation of [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] tanks would have increased firepower and protection, and both designs would be placed at a disadvantage by the new [[smoothbore]] gun in the [[T-62]]. An upgrade project for the Leopard was planned,<ref name="DerSpiegel" /> but it appeared this model would not be enough of an advance to be worthwhile.