Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
MQV
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
==Description== Alice has a key pair <math>(A,a)</math> with <math>A</math> her public key and <math>a</math> her private key and Bob has the key pair <math>(B,b)</math> with <math>B</math> his public key and <math>b</math> his private key. In the following <math>\bar{R}</math> has the following meaning. Let <math>R = (x,y)</math> be a point on an elliptic curve. Then <math>\bar{R} = (x\, \bmod\, 2^L) + 2^L</math> where <math>L = \left \lceil \frac{\lceil \log_{2} n \rceil}{2} \right \rceil </math> and <math>n</math> is the order of the used generator point <math>P</math>. So <math>\bar{R}</math> are the first ''L'' bits of the first coordinate of <math>R</math>. {| class="wikitable" |- ! Step ! Operation |- | 1 | Alice generates a key pair <math>(X,x)</math> by generating randomly <math>x</math> and calculating <math>X=xP</math> with <math>P</math> a point on an elliptic curve. |- | 2 | Bob generates a key pair <math>(Y,y)</math> in the same way as Alice. |- | 3 | Now, Alice calculates <math>S_a = x + \bar{X} a</math> modulo <math>n</math> and sends <math>X</math> to Bob. |- | 4 | Bob calculates <math> S_b = y + \bar{Y} b</math> modulo <math>n</math> and sends <math>Y</math> to Alice. |- | 5 | Alice calculates <math>K = h \cdot S_a (Y + \bar{Y}B)</math> and Bob calculates <math>K = h \cdot S_b (X + \bar{X}A)</math> where <math>h</math> is the cofactor (see [[Elliptic curve cryptography#Domain parameters|Elliptic curve cryptography: domain parameters]]). |- | 6 | The communication of secret <math>K</math> was successful. A key for a [[symmetric-key algorithm]] can be derived from <math>K</math>. |} Note: for the algorithm to be secure some checks have to be performed. See Hankerson et al. ===Correctness=== Bob calculates: <math>K = h \cdot S_b (X + \bar{X}A) = h \cdot S_b (xP + \bar{X}aP) = h \cdot S_b (x + \bar{X}a)P = h \cdot S_b S_a P </math> Alice calculates: <math>K = h \cdot S_a (Y + \bar{Y}B) = h \cdot S_a (yP + \bar{Y}bP) = h \cdot S_a (y + \bar{Y}b)P = h \cdot S_b S_a P </math> So the shared secrets <math>K</math> are indeed the same with <math>K = h \cdot S_b S_a P </math>
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)