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==History and definition== No agreed standard method defines which states are middle powers, aside from the broad idea that middle powers are states that have a 'moderate' ability to influence the behaviour of other states, in contrast to small power, which have 'little' ability to influence. Some researchers use [[Gross National Product]] (GNP) statistics to draw lists of middle powers around the world. Economically, middle powers are generally those that are not considered too "big" or too "small", however that is defined. However, economy is not always the defining factor. Under the original sense of the term, a middle power was one that had some degree of influence globally, but did not dominate in any one area. However, this usage is not universal, and some define middle power to include nations that can be regarded as [[regional power]]s. According to academics at the [[University of Leicester]] and [[University of Nottingham]]: <blockquote>Middle power status is usually identified in one of two ways. The traditional and most common way is to aggregate critical physical and material criteria to rank states according to their relative capabilities. Because countries' capabilities differ, they are categorized as superpowers (or great powers), middle powers or [[small power]]s. More recently, it is possible to discern a second method for identifying middle power status by focusing on behavioural attributes. This posits that middle powers can be distinguished from superpowers and smaller powers because of their [[foreign policy]] behaviour – middle powers carve out a niche for themselves by pursuing a narrow range and particular types of foreign policy interests. In this way middle powers are countries that use their relative [[Diplomacy|diplomatic]] skills in the service of international peace and stability.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Hamill |first1=James |last2=Lee |first2=Donna |date=April 2001 |title=A Middle Power Paradox? South African Diplomacy in the Post-apartheid Era |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/004711701015004004 |journal=International Relations |language=en |volume=15 |issue=4 |pages=33–59 |doi=10.1177/004711701015004004 |s2cid=144967878 |issn=0047-1178|url-access=subscription }}</ref></blockquote> According to Eduard Jordaan of [[Singapore Management University]]: <blockquote>All middle powers display foreign policy behaviour that stabilises and legitimises the global order, typically through [[multilateralism|multilateral]] and cooperative initiatives. However, emerging and traditional middle powers can be distinguished in terms of their mutually-influencing constitutive and behavioural differences. Constitutively, traditional middle powers are wealthy, stable, [[Egalitarianism|egalitarian]], [[Social democracy|social democratic]] and not regionally influential. Behaviourally, they exhibit a weak and ambivalent regional orientation, constructing identities distinct from powerful states in their regions and offer appeasing concessions to pressures for global reform. Emerging middle powers by contrast are semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian and recently democratised states that demonstrate much regional influence and self-association. Behaviourally, they opt for reformist and not radical global change, exhibit a strong regional orientation favouring regional integration but seek also to construct identities distinct from those of the weak states in their region.<ref name="Jordaan 2003 pp. 165–181" /></blockquote> Another definition, by the [[Middle Powers Initiative]] (MPI), a program of the [[Global Security Institute]], is that "middle power countries are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that give them significant international credibility."<ref name="MPI">Middle Powers Initiative (2004) [http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/pubs/buildingbridges_0404.pdf Building Bridges: What Middle Power Countries Should Do To Strengthen the NPT] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070614193537/http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/pubs/buildingbridges_0404.pdf |date=14 June 2007 }}, ''GSI''</ref> Under this definition however, nuclear-armed states like India and Pakistan, and every state participant of the [[NATO]] [[nuclear sharing]], would not be middle powers. ===Middle power diplomacy=== According to Laura Neak of the [[International Studies Association]]: <blockquote>Although there is some conceptual ambiguity surrounding the term middle power, middle powers are identified most often by their international behavior–called 'middle power diplomacy'—the tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, the tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and the tendency to embrace notions of 'good international citizenship' to guide...diplomacy. Middle powers are states who commit their relative affluence, managerial skills, and international prestige to the preservation of the international order and peace. Middle powers help to maintain the international order through coalition-building, by serving as mediators and "go-betweens," and through international conflict management and resolution activities, such as UN peacekeeping. Middle powers perform these internationalist activities because of an idealistic imperative they associate with being a middle power. The imperative is that the middle powers have a moral responsibility and collective ability to protect the international order from those who would threaten it, including, at times, the great or principal powers. This imperative was particularly profound during the most intense periods of the Cold War.<ref name="Bishai">Bishai LS (2000) [http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/nal01/ From Recognition to Intervention: The Shift from Traditional to Liberal International Law] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20020228031316/http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/nal01/|date=28 February 2002|df=y }}</ref></blockquote> According to international relations scholar [[Annette Baker Fox]], relationships between middle powers and great powers reveal more intricate behaviors and bargaining schemes than has often been assumed.<ref>[[Annette Baker Fox|Fox, Annette Baker]], ''The Politics of Attraction: Four Middle Powers and the United States'' (Columbia University Press, 1977).</ref> According to Soeya Yoshihide, "Middle Power does not just mean a state's size or military or economic power. Rather, 'middle power diplomacy' is defined by the issue area where a state invests its resources and knowledge. The Middle Power States avoid a direct confrontation with great powers, but they see themselves as 'moral actors' and seek their own role in particular issue areas, such as human rights, environment, and arms regulations. Middle powers are the driving force in the process of transnational institutional-building."<ref name="Yoshihide">{{cite web|last=Yoshihide|first=Soeya|title=Middle Power Diplomacy|url=http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/tiberg/Poli%20322-2006-Middle%20Power%20Diplomacy.rtf|access-date=18 May 2007}}{{dead link|date=August 2023|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref> At the same time, scholars have identified relations of antagonism and competition between middle powers, as well as their ability to use [[soft power]] to attain their goals, as in the case of [[Egypt]]-[[Israel]]i rivalry in [[Africa]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Siniver |first1=Asaf |last2=Tsourapas |first2=Gerasimos |date=2023 |title=Middle Powers and Soft-Power Rivalry: Egyptian–Israeli Competition in Africa |journal=Foreign Policy Analysis |volume=19 |issue=2 |doi=10.1093/fpa/orac041 |issn=1743-8586|doi-access=free }}</ref> Characteristics of middle power diplomacy include:<ref name="Yoshihide"/> *Commitment to [[multilateralism]] through global institutions and allying with other middle powers.<ref name="JamesKasoff2008">{{cite book|author1=Patrick James|author2=Mark J. Kasoff|title=Canadian studies in the new millennium|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7_LHcv89nW4C&pg=PA265|year=2008|publisher=University of Toronto Press|isbn=978-0-8020-9468-1|page=265|access-date=24 February 2016}}</ref> *High degree of [[civil society]] penetration in the country's foreign policy. *A country that reflects and forms its national identity through a 'novel foreign policy': [[Peacekeeping]], [[Human security|Human Security]], the [[International Criminal Court]], and the [[Kyoto Protocol]] The [[Middle Powers Initiative]] highlights the importance of middle powers diplomacy. Through MPI, eight international non-governmental organizations are able to work primarily with middle power governments to encourage and educate the nuclear weapons states to take immediate practical steps that reduce nuclear dangers, and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. Middle power countries are particularly influential in issues related to arms control, being that they are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the [[nuclear arms race]], a standing that gives them significant political credibility. ===Self-defined by states=== The term first entered Canadian political discourse after [[World War II]]. [[Prime Minister of Canada|Prime Minister]] [[Louis St. Laurent]], for example, called [[Canada]] "a power of the middle rank" and helped to lay out the classical definition of Canadian middle power diplomacy. When he was advocating for Canada's election to the [[United Nations Security Council]], he said that while "...the special nature of [Canada's] relationship to the United Kingdom and the United States complicates our responsibilities," Canada was not a "[[Satellite state|satellite]]" of either but would "continue to make our decisions objectively, in the light of our obligations to our own people and their interest in the welfare of the international community."<ref>H.H. Herstien, L.J. Hughes, R.C. Kirbyson. ''Challenge & Survival: The History of Canada'' (Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall, 1970). p 411</ref> Canadian leaders believed Canada was a middle power because it was a junior partner in larger alliances (e.g. [[NATO]], [[North American Aerospace Defense Command|NORAD]]), was actively involved in resolving disputes outside its own region (e.g. [[Suez Crisis]]), was not a former colonial power and therefore neutral in anti-colonial struggles, worked actively in the [[United Nations]] to represent the interests of smaller nations and to prevent the dominance of the superpowers (often being elected to the [[United Nations Security Council]] for such reasons), and because it was involved in humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts around the world. In March 2008, [[Australia]]n [[Prime Minister of Australia|Prime Minister]] [[Kevin Rudd]] defined his country's foreign policy as one of "middle power diplomacy" along the lines of similar criteria. Australia would "influence international decision-makers" on issues such as "global economic, security and environmental challenges."<ref name="Shanahan">Shanahan D (2008) [http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23437898-2702,00.html Time to go global, urges Rudd] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080517072447/http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23437898-2702,00.html |date=17 May 2008 }}, ''The Australian''</ref> === Significance in the 21st century === American political analyst [[Cliff Kupchan]] describes middle powers as "countries with significant leverage in [[geopolitics]]" but that are "less powerful than the world’s two superpowers—the United States and China."<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |last=Kupchan |first=Cliff |date=2023-06-06 |title=6 Swing States Will Decide the Future of Geopolitics |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/06/geopolitics-global-south-middle-powers-swing-states-india-brazil-turkey-indonesia-saudi-arabia-south-africa/ |access-date=2023-06-21 |website=Foreign Policy |language=en-US}}</ref> Nevertheless, Kupchan argues that middle powers—particularly in the [[Global South]]—have more power, agency, and "geopolitical heft" in the 21st century (namely the 2020s) than at any time since the Second World War. He identifies Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey as leading middle powers and describes them as "swing states" that are capable of creating new power dynamics due to their nonalignment with most great powers.<ref name=":0" /> Among the shared characteristics of these six nations are membership in the [[G20]]; large and fast-growing economies; and active diplomatic involvement in major events, such as the [[Russian invasion of Ukraine]] and international climate action.<ref name=":0" /> Kupchan attributes the emergence of stronger middle powers to several historical developments in the [[International order|international system]], including the weaker bipolarity between the U.S. and China (as opposed to the stricter allegiances of the Cold War and the subsequent U.S. hegemony following the [[Collapse of the soviet union|collapse of the Soviet Union]]) and the gradual trend of [[deglobalization]], which has fostered regionalized geopolitical and [[Geoeconomics|geoeconomic]] relationships wherein middle powers have comparatively greater influence; for example, the fragmenting of the international energy market has purportedly given Saudi Arabia, a major energy exporter, far more weight in now-smaller regional markets. Kupchan also notes the ability of these middle powers to capitalize on rivalries between the major powers in order to further their own influence, interests, or foreign policy initiatives.
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