Editing Military dictatorship (section)

== Formation ==
=== Formation process ===
[[File:Piłsudski May 1926.jpg|thumb|Polish dictator [[Józef Piłsudski]] and fellow military officers during the [[May Coup (Poland)|May Coup]] in 1926|alt=A general walks in military uniform flanked by other officers]]
Most military dictatorships are formed after a ''[[coup d'état]]'' has overthrown the previous government. These coups typically take place when there is a perceived threat to the military or its interests as an institution, including cuts to military funding or civilian interference in military affairs.{{Sfn|Acemoglu|Ticchi|Vindigni|2010|pp=1, 4}}{{Sfn|Ezrow|Frantz|2011|p=103}} Military officers have a vested interest in having increased pay and benefits while preventing political intervention in promotions, and failure to address these issues may cause interest in military-led [[regime change]]. These coups are most common in the [[developing world]], where a lack of democracy often necessitates such events for changes in leadership.{{Sfn|Ezrow|Frantz|2011|p=105}}

Not all dictatorships taken through military force are military dictatorships, for in many cases a [[Civilian dictatorship|civilian dictator]] will take power following a coup and relegate military officers.{{Sfn|Geddes|Wright|Frantz|2018|p=11}} In other cases, a civilian leader will exceed the powers granted by a constitution with the backing of the military.{{Sfn|Acemoglu|Ticchi|Vindigni|2010|p=5}} In some cases, the military is invested with dictatorial powers during a [[popular uprising]].{{Sfn|Geddes|Wright|Frantz|2018|p=7}} The military is well-equipped to seek and maintain political power, as it is often more [[modernized]] than other institutions in a given country, with access to resources and training not available to civil leaders.{{Sfn|Ezrow|Frantz|2011|p=35}}

A [[regime]] can also be formed by an [[insurgency]], or an informal group of [[Militant|militants]] that attempt to seize power in a government. When insurgents form a dictatorship, they are not constrained by formal military procedures, but their lack of organization can increase the likelihood of opposing factions developing within the group.{{Sfn|Geddes|Wright|Frantz|2018|p=40}} Insurgencies sometimes grant military titles to their leaders, but they do not adopt the structure of a true military.{{Sfn|Geddes|Wright|Frantz|2018|p=194}} Regimes created by insurgencies may or may not be recognized as military dictatorships.{{Sfn|Geddes|Frantz|Wright|2014|p=154}}

Several justifications can be offered by military leadership for seizing power, including improper behavior of the civilian government, a threat of [[communist]] takeover, or disorder in politics.{{Sfn|Wintrobe|1990|p=861}} These justifications are often given for any formation of military rule, even if the personal motivations of the officers involve greed, ambition, [[Political faction|factionalism]], or [[ethnic conflict]].{{Sfn|Onwumechili|1998|p=40}} An increase of the [[military budget]] is a common goal across regimes.{{Sfn|Wintrobe|1990|p=861}} As the military is expected to be apolitical, military dictators may consider themselves to be neutral parties who are better fit to maintain stability during times of political crisis.{{Sfn|Cheibub|Gandhi|Vreeland|2010|p=85}} Military rulers will often justify their intervention as a way to protect the people from political repression or as a response to economic failure.{{Sfn|Onwumechili|1998|p=38}} In some cases, an active or former military officer will be asked to seize power as a last resort to end the rule of a worse government, though it is not necessarily the case that a military dictatorship brings about the promised improvement and stability.{{Sfn|Assensoh|Alex-Assensoh|2002|pp=82–83}}

=== Factors ===
The military's purpose in a given country may affect whether it attempts to seize power. International opponents may prompt stronger national defense. This makes the military more willing to comply with a [[Civil authority|civilian government]] as the civilian government is likely to provide for the military.{{Sfn|Acemoglu|Ticchi|Vindigni|2010|p=37}} When these opponents are neighboring countries that present territorial threats, however, it can weaken democracy and incentivize the creation of a stronger military. Both of these factors increase the likelihood of a military dictatorship.{{Sfn|Kim|2018|pp=865–866}} All of these factors are aggravated in countries with significant natural resources, as these provide an additional financial incentive for the military to seize power.{{Sfn|Acemoglu|Ticchi|Vindigni|2010|p=37}} Military dictatorships almost universally form in [[peacetime]], with [[Kemalist]] Turkey being the only notable exception by 1980.{{Sfn|Andreski|1980|p=3}} The economic prosperity of a country does not necessarily indicate the likelihood of military dictatorship.{{Sfn|Geddes|Frantz|Wright|2014|p=151}}

The previous form of government is also a factor in whether a military dictatorship forms. [[Democracies]] are most at risk of becoming military dictatorships shortly after their formation. When a new [[democracy]] is formed, the government's institutions are fragile and civil government may not have established control over the military.{{Sfn|Acemoglu|Ticchi|Vindigni|2010|pp=2–3}} This impending civilian control of the military provides further incentive for military officers to seize power in newly-formed democracies.{{Sfn|Acemoglu|Ticchi|Vindigni|2010|pp=36–37}} [[Oligarchies]] prevent military dictatorships by maintaining an equilibrium, keeping the military strong enough to maintain the oligarchy while providing incentives to encourage loyalty.{{Sfn|Acemoglu|Ticchi|Vindigni|2010|pp=2–3}}

The [[risk assessment]] process for military officers considering dictatorial rule is distinct from that of other potential dictators. Military officers engaging in a coup face lower risks compared to other attempts to establish dictatorships, as most officers are typically allowed to retain their positions if the dictatorship does not survive. Only the military dictator and the highest ranking officers face significant risk.{{Sfn|Geddes|Wright|Frantz|2018|p=207}} Instead, officers in professionalized militaries will consider the risk to the military in its entirety rather than their individual risk, as institutional risk is much higher.{{Sfn|Ezrow|Frantz|2011|p=59}}

Some factors can mitigate the chance of a military dictatorship forming that can be implemented in regions where military dictatorships are common. Constitutional provisions can be enacted to enforce penalties for military officers involved in coups, [[paramilitaries]] may be created to act independently of the conventional military, military officers may be given positions in civil government, or the military may be reduced in size and resources. Such measures have had mixed success.{{Sfn|Onwumechili|1998|pp=75–77}}