Editing Moore's paradox (section)

==The problem==
Since [[Jaakko Hintikka]]'s seminal treatment of the problem,<ref name="Hintikka">{{Cite book |first=Jaakko |last=Hintikka |year=1962 |title=Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions |url=https://archive.org/details/knowledgebeliefi00hint_0 |url-access=registration |location=Cornell, NY |publisher=Cornell University Press }}</ref> it has become standard to present Moore's paradox by explaining why it is absurd to assert sentences that have the logical form:
"P and NOT(I believe that P)" or "P and I believe that NOT-P."
Philosophers refer to these, respectively, as the omissive and commissive versions of Moore's paradox.

Moore himself presented the problem in two versions.<ref name="ReferenceA"/><ref>{{Cite book |first=G. E. |last=Moore |year=1991 |chapter=Russell's Theory of Descriptions |editor-first=P. A. |editor-last=Schilpp |title=The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell |series=The Library of Living Philosophers |volume=5 |location=La Salle, IL |publisher=Open Court Publishing |pages=177–225 }}</ref>

The more fundamental manner of stating the problem starts from the three premises following:
# It can be true at a particular time both that P, and that I do not believe that P.
# I can assert or believe one of the two at a particular time.
# It is absurd to assert or believe both of them at the same time.

I can assert that it is raining at a particular time. I can assert that I don't believe that it is raining at a particular time. If I say both at the same time, I am saying or doing something absurd. But the content of what I say—the [[proposition]] the sentence expresses—is perfectly consistent: it may well be raining, and I may not believe it. So why can I not assert that it is so?{{cn|date=January 2023}}

Moore presents the problem in a second, distinct, way:
# It is not absurd to assert the past-tense counterpart; e.g., "It was raining, but I did not believe that it was raining."
# It is not absurd to assert the second- or third-person counterparts to Moore's sentences; e.g., "It is raining, but ''you'' do not believe that it is raining," or "Michael is dead, but ''they'' do not believe that he is."
# It is absurd to assert the present-tense "It is raining, and I don't believe that it is raining."{{cn|date=January 2023}}

I can assert that I ''was'' a certain way—e.g., believing it was raining when it wasn't—and that you, he, or they ''are'' that way but not that I ''am'' that way.{{cn|date=January 2023}}

Subsequent philosophers have said that there is an apparent absurdity in asserting a first-person ''future-tense'' sentence such as "It will be raining, and I will believe that it is not raining."<ref>{{Cite journal |first=Luc |last=Bovens |year=1995 |title='P and I Will Believe that not-P': Diachronic Constraints on Rational Belief |journal=[[Mind (journal)|Mind]] |volume=104 |issue=416 |pages=737–760 |doi=10.1093/mind/104.416.737 }}</ref>