Editing Mutual assured destruction (section)

==Theory==
{{Conflict resolution sidebar}}
Under MAD, each side has enough nuclear weaponry to destroy the other side. Either side, if attacked for any reason by the other, would retaliate with equal or greater force. The expected result is an immediate, irreversible escalation of hostilities resulting in both combatants' mutual, total, and assured destruction. The doctrine requires that neither side construct shelters on a massive scale.<ref name=":0">{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17026538|title=How did we forget about mutually assured destruction?|last=Castella|first=Tom de|date=2012-02-15|work=BBC News|access-date=2017-09-19|language=en-GB}}</ref> If one side constructed a similar system of shelters, it would violate the MAD doctrine and destabilize the situation, because it would have less to fear from a [[second strike]].<ref>Freeman Dyson, ''Disturbing the Universe'', Chapter 13, ''The Ethics of Defense'', Basic Books, 1981.</ref><ref>''Weapons and Hope'', Freeman Dyson, Harper Collins, 1985</ref> The same principle is invoked against [[missile defense]].

The doctrine further assumes that neither side will dare to launch a [[Pre-emptive nuclear strike|first strike]] because the other side would [[launch on warning]] (also called [[fail-deadly]]) or with surviving forces (a [[second strike]]), resulting in unacceptable losses for both parties. The payoff of the MAD doctrine was and still is expected to be a tense but stable global peace. However, many have argued that mutually assured destruction is unable to deter conventional war that could later escalate. Emerging domains of [[Cyber spying|cyber-espionage]], proxy-state conflict, and [[Prompt Global Strike|high-speed missiles]] threaten to circumvent MAD as a deterrent strategy.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Jones|first1=Seth G.|last2=Hicks|first2=Kathleen H.|last3=Cancian|first3=Mark F.|last4=Friend|first4=Alice Hunt|last5=Harrison|first5=Todd|last6=Hersman|first6=Rebecca K.C.|last7=Hunter|first7=Andrew P.|last8=Karako|first8=Thomas|last9=Schaus|first9=John|last10=Williams|first10=Ian|last11=Daniels|first11=Seamus P.|date=2018|title=The Return of Political Warfare|journal=Defense Outlook 2018|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22448.10|pages=30–32}}</ref>

The primary application of this doctrine started during the [[Cold War]] (1940s to 1991), in which MAD was seen as helping to prevent any direct full-scale conflicts between the United States and the [[Soviet Union]] while they engaged in smaller [[proxy war]]s around the world. MAD was also responsible for the [[arms race]], as both nations struggled to keep nuclear parity, or at least retain [[second-strike capability]]. Although the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, the MAD doctrine continues to be applied.

Proponents of MAD as part of the US and USSR strategic doctrine believed that [[Nuclear warfare|nuclear war]] could best be prevented if neither side could expect to survive a full-scale nuclear exchange as a functioning state. Since the credibility of the threat is critical to such assurance, each side had to invest substantial [[capital (economics)|capital]] in their nuclear arsenals even if they were not intended for use. In addition, neither side could be expected or allowed to adequately defend itself against the other's nuclear missiles.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/mutual-assured-destruction |website=[[Encyclopedia Britannica]] |title=mutual assured destruction |access-date=23 March 2024 |date=9 February 2024}}</ref> This led both to the hardening and diversification of nuclear delivery systems (such as nuclear [[missile silo]]s, [[ballistic missile submarine]]s, and nuclear [[bomber]]s kept at [[fail-safe]] points) and to the [[Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty]].

This MAD scenario is often referred to as [[strategic deterrence|rational nuclear deterrence]].

When the possibility of nuclear warfare between the United States and Soviet Union started to become a reality, theorists began to think that mutual assured destruction would be sufficient to deter the other side from launching a nuclear weapon. [[Kenneth Waltz]], an American political scientist, believed that nuclear forces were in fact useful, but even more useful in the fact that they deterred other nuclear threats from using them, based on mutually assured destruction. The theory of mutually assured destruction being a safe way to deter continued even farther with the thought that nuclear weapons intended on being used for the winning of a war, were impractical, and even considered too dangerous and risky.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Danilovic|first=Vesna|url=http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015056796371|title=When the stakes are high :deterrence and conflict among major powers /|publisher=Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press|year=2002|isbn=978-0-472-11287-6|pages=10|hdl=2027/mdp.39015056796371}}</ref> Even with the Cold War ending in 1991, deterrence from mutually assured destruction is still said to be the safest course to avoid nuclear warfare.<ref>{{Citation|last=DELPECH|first=THÉRÈSE|title=Introduction|date=2012|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1103rc.5|work=Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century|pages=1–8|series=Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy|publisher=RAND Corporation|jstor=10.7249/mg1103rc.5|isbn=978-0-8330-5930-7|access-date=2021-04-02}}</ref>

===Effectiveness of the theory according to empirical studies===

A study published in the ''[[Journal of Conflict Resolution]]'' in 2009 [[quantitative research|quantitatively evaluated]] the nuclear peace [[hypothesis]] and found support for the existence of the [[stability-instability paradox]]. The study determined that nuclear weapons promote [[strategic stability]] and prevent large-scale wars but simultaneously allow for more [[low intensity conflict|low intensity conflicts]]. If a nuclear monopoly exists between two states, and one state has nuclear weapons and its opponent does not, there is a greater chance of war. In contrast, if there is mutual nuclear weapon ownership with both states possessing nuclear weapons, the odds of war drop precipitously.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Rauchhaus |first=Robert W. |title=Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=53 |issue=2 |pages=258–277 |year=2009 |doi=10.1177/0022002708330387 |s2cid=145065008 |url=http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/53/2/258.short |url-access=subscription }}</ref>