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==History== {{more citations needed section|date=July 2018}} In 1967 the United States and the [[Soviet Union]] were in a race to be first to land a human on the [[Moon]]. The [[Soviet human lunar programs|N1/L3 program]] received formal approval in 1964, which required development of the N1 [[launch vehicle]], comparable in size to the American [[Saturn V]].<ref name="nasa-20171117">{{Cite web |last=Uri |first=John |date=17 November 2017 |title=50 Years Ago: Soviet's Moon Rocket's Rollout to Pad Affects Apollo Plans |url=https://www.nasa.gov/history/50-years-ago-soviets-moon-rockets-rollout-to-pad-affects-apollo-plans/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240118202507/https://www.nasa.gov/history/50-years-ago-soviets-moon-rockets-rollout-to-pad-affects-apollo-plans/ |archive-date=18 January 2024 |access-date=30 April 2023 |publisher=[[NASA]] }}</ref> On 25 November 1967, less than three weeks after the first Saturn V flight during the [[Apollo 4]] mission, the Soviets rolled out an N1 mockup to the newly constructed [[launch pad]] 110R at the [[Baikonur Cosmodrome]] in [[Soviet Kazakhstan]]. This Facilities Systems Logistic Test and Training Vehicle, designated 1M1, was designed to give engineers valuable experience in the rollout, launch pad integration, and rollback activities, similar to the Saturn V Facilities Integration Vehicle [[SA-500F]] testing at the [[Kennedy Space Center]] in [[Florida]] in mid-1966. While the crawler transported the Saturn V to the pad vertically, the N1 made the trip horizontally and was then raised to the vertical position at the pad β a standard practice in the [[Soviet space program]]. On December 11, after completion of various tests, the N1 rocket was lowered and rolled back to the assembly building. The 1M1 mockup was used repeatedly in the following years for additional launchpad integration tests. Although this test was carried out in secret, a US reconnaissance satellite photographed the N1 on the pad shortly before its rollback to the assembly building. [[James E. Webb|NASA Administrator James Webb]] had access to this and other similar intelligence that showed that the Russians were seriously planning crewed [[lunar missions]]. That knowledge influenced several key US decisions in the coming months. The satellite imagery appeared to show the USSR was close to a flight test of the N1, but did not reveal that this particular rocket was just a mockup and that the USSR was many months behind the US in the race to land a human on the Moon (though, at the very least, the [[CIA]], the [[National Reconnaissance Office|NRO]], and President [[Lyndon Johnson]] ''did'' know that the rocket was a mockup per the daily presidential briefing of 27 December 1967<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005974192.pdf|title=The President's Daily Brief 27 December 1967|publisher=Central Intelligence Agency|date=27 December 1967}}</ref>). The Soviets were hopeful that they could carry out a test flight of the N1 in the first half of 1968, but for a variety of technical reasons the attempt did not occur for more than a year. ===Early Soviet lunar concepts=== [[File:N1.stl|thumb|260x260px|Static [[3D model]] of the rocket]] In May 1961, the US announced the goal of landing a man on the Moon by 1970. During the same month, the report ''On Reconsideration of the Plans for Space Vehicles in the Direction of Defense Purposes'' set the first test launch of the N1 rocket for 1965. In June, Korolev was given a small amount of funding to start N1 development between 1961 and 1963. At the same time, Korolev proposed a lunar mission based on the new [[Soyuz spacecraft]] using an [[Earth orbit rendezvous]] profile. Several [[Soyuz (rocket)|Soyuz]] rocket launches would be used to build up a complete Moon mission package, including one for the Soyuz spacecraft, another for the lunar lander, and a few with cislunar engines and fuel. This approach, driven by the limited capacity of the Soyuz rocket, meant that a rapid launch rate would be required to assemble the complex before any of the components ran out of consumables on-orbit. Korolev subsequently proposed that the N1 be enlarged to allow a single-launch lunar mission. In NovemberβDecember 1961, Korolev and others tried to further argue that a super heavy lift rocket could deliver ultra heavy nuclear weapons, such as the just tested [[Tsar Bomba]], or many warheads (up to 17) as further justification for the N1 design.<ref name="rsw-n1icm">{{Cite web |last=Zak |first=Anatoly |date=3 November 2018 |title=Soviets mulled a colossal nuke on future Moon rocket |url=https://www.russianspaceweb.com/n1_icbm.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240215022857/https://www.russianspaceweb.com/n1_icbm.html |archive-date=15 February 2024 |access-date=2 March 2021 |website=Russian Space Web }}</ref><ref name="utkin1999">{{Cite book |last=Utkin |first=V. F. |title=Otechestvennue Strategicheskie Raketnue Kompleksu |publisher=Nevskiy Bastion |year=1999 |location=St. Petersburg |language=ru |trans-title=National Strategic Missile Systems }}</ref> Korolev was not inclined to use the rocket for military uses, but wanted to fulfill his space ambitions and saw military support as vital. The military response was lukewarm β they thought the N1 had little military usefulness and was worried it would divert funds away from pure military programs. Korolev's correspondence with military leaders continued until February 1962 with little progress. Meanwhile, [[Vladimir Chelomey|Chelomey]]'s [[OKB-52]] proposed an alternate mission with much lower risk. Instead of a crewed landing, Chelomei proposed a series of circumlunar missions to beat the US to the vicinity of the Moon. He also proposed a new booster for the mission, clustering four of his existing UR-200s (known as the [[SS-10]] in the west) to produce a single larger booster, the UR-500.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.astronautix.com/p/proton.html | title=Proton }}</ref> These plans were dropped when Glushko offered Chelomei the RD-270, which allowed the construction of the [[UR-500]] in a much simpler "monoblock" design. He also proposed adapting an existing spacecraft design for the circumlunar mission, the single-cosmonaut [[LK-1]]. Chelomei felt that improvements in early UR-500/LK-1 missions would allow the spacecraft to be adapted for two cosmonauts. The Strategic Missile Forces of the Soviet military were reluctant to support a politically motivated project with little military utility, but both Korolev and Chelomei pushed for a lunar mission. Between 1961 and 1964, Chelomei's less aggressive proposal was accepted, and development of his UR-500 and the LK-1 were given a relatively high priority. ===Lunar N1 development starts=== [[Valentin Glushko]], who then held a near-monopoly on rocket engine design in the Soviet Union, proposed the [[RD-270]] engine using [[unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine]] (UDMH) and [[nitrogen tetroxide]] (N<sub>2</sub>O<sub>4</sub>) propellants to power the newly enlarged N1 design. These [[hypergolic]] propellants ignite on contact, reducing the complexity of the engine, and were widely used in Glushko's existing engines on various [[ICBM]]s. The full flow [[staged combustion cycle]] RD-270 was in testing before program cancellation, achieving a higher [[specific impulse]] than the [[gas-generator cycle]] [[Rocketdyne F-1]] despite the use of UDMH/N<sub>2</sub>O<sub>4</sub> propellants with lower potential impulse. The F-1 engine was five years into its development at the time and still experiencing combustion stability problems. [[Rocketdyne]] eventually solved the F-1 instability problems by adding copper dividers as baffles,<ref>{{cite web |last1=Anderson |first1=Colleen E. |title=A New View of the Rocketdyne F-1 Engine |url=https://airandspace.si.edu/stories/editorial/new-view-rocketdyne-f-1-engine |website=National Air and Space Museum |date=2 November 2022 |publisher=Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum |access-date=30 May 2024}}</ref> but the RD-270 still had unsolved instability problems when the N1 program was cancelled in 1974, long after the F-1 problems were solved.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Wade |first1=Mark |title=RD-270 |url=http://www.astronautix.com/r/rd-270.html |website=Astronautix |publisher=Mark Wade |access-date=30 May 2024}}</ref> Glushko pointed out that the US [[Titan II GLV]] had successfully flown crew with similar hypergolic propellants. Korolev felt that the toxic nature of the fuels and their exhaust presented a safety risk for crewed space flight, and that kerosene/LOX was a better solution. The disagreement between Korolev and Glushko over the question of fuels ultimately became a major issue that hampered progress.<ref name="astronautix-korolev">{{Cite web |last1=Wade |first1=Mark |title=Korolev, Sergei Pavlovich |url=http://www.astronautix.com/k/korolev.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240211031622/http://www.astronautix.com/k/korolev.html |archive-date=11 February 2024 |access-date=19 January 2019 |website=astronautix }}</ref><ref name="lindroos2007">{{Cite web |editor-last=Lindroos |editor-first=Marcus |year=2007 |title=The Soviet Manned Lunar Program |url=https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/sts-471j-engineering-apollo-the-moon-project-as-a-complex-system-spring-2007/f497346756fdcce5dae17e9106e1083e_soviet_mand_lunr.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240223090852/https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/sts-471j-engineering-apollo-the-moon-project-as-a-complex-system-spring-2007/f497346756fdcce5dae17e9106e1083e_soviet_mand_lunr.pdf |archive-date=23 February 2024 |access-date=19 January 2019 |website=MIT OpenCourseWare |publisher=[[Massachusetts Institute of Technology]] }}</ref> Personal issues between the two played a role, with Korolev holding Glushko responsible for his incarceration at the [[Kolyma#Emergence of the Gulag camps|Kolyma Gulag]] in the 1930s and Glushko considering Korolev to be cavalier and autocratic towards things outside his competence. The difference of opinions led to a falling out between Korolev and Glushko. In 1962, a committee was appointed to resolve the dispute and agreed with Korolev. Glushko refused outright to work on LOX/kerosene engines, and with Korolev in general. Korolev eventually gave up and decided to enlist the help of [[Nikolai Dmitriyevich Kuznetsov|Nikolai Kuznetsov]], the [[Kuznetsov Design Bureau|OKB-276]] [[jet engine]] designer, while Glushko teamed up with other rocket designers to build the very successful [[Proton (rocket family)|Proton]], [[Zenit (rocket family)|Zenit]], and later [[Energia (rocket)|Energia]] rockets. Kuznetsov, who had limited experience in rocket design, responded with the [[NK-15]], a fairly small engine that would be delivered in several versions tuned to different altitudes. To achieve the required amount of thrust, it was proposed that 30 NK-15s would be used in a clustered configuration. An outer ring of 24 engines and an inner ring of six engines would be separated by an air gap, with airflow supplied via inlets near the top of the booster. The air would be mixed with the exhaust in order to provide some degree of [[air-augmented rocket|thrust augmentation]], as well as engine cooling. The arrangement of 30 rocket engine nozzles on the N1's first stage could have been an attempt at creating a crude version of a toroidal [[aerospike engine]] system; more conventional aerospike engines were also studied. ===N1-L3 lunar complex=== [[File:N-1 L3 lunar mission profile.svg|thumb|N-1/L3 lunar mission profile]] Korolev proposed a larger N1 combined with the new L3 lunar package based on the [[Soyuz 7K-L3]]. The L3 combined rocket stages, the modified [[Soyuz spacecraft|Soyuz]], and the new [[LK (spacecraft)|LK lunar lander]] were to be launched by a single N1 to conduct a lunar landing. Chelomei responded with a clustered UR-500-derived vehicle, topped with the [[LK-1]] spacecraft already under development, and a lander developed by his design bureau. Korolev's proposal was selected as the winner in August 1964, but Chelomei was told to continue with his circumlunar UR-500/LK-1 work. When Khrushchev was overthrown later in 1964, infighting between the two teams started anew. In October 1965, the Soviet government ordered a compromise; the circumlunar mission would be launched on Chelomei's UR-500 using Korolev's Soyuz spacecraft [[Soyuz 7K-L1]], aka [[Zond program|Zond]] (literally "probe"), aiming for a launch in 1967, the 50th anniversary of the [[Bolshevik Revolution]]. Korolev, meanwhile, would continue with his original N1-L3 proposal. Korolev had clearly won the argument, but work on the LK-1 continued anyway, as well as the Zond. Korolev lobbied in 1964 for a crewed circumlunar mission, which was at first rejected, but was passed with the 3 August 1964 [[Central Committee]] resolution titled "On work involving the study of the Moon and outer space", with the objective of landing a cosmonaut on the Moon in 1967 or '68.<ref name="lindroos2007" /> In January 1966, Korolev died due to complications of surgery to remove intestinal polyps that also discovered a large tumor.<ref name="esa-20070309">{{Cite web |date=9 March 2007 |title=Sergei Korolev: Father of the Soviet Union's success in space |url=https://www.esa.int/About_Us/ESA_history/50_years_of_humans_in_space/Sergei_Korolev_Father_of_the_Soviet_Union_s_success_in_space |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230601184411/https://www.esa.int/About_Us/ESA_history/50_years_of_humans_in_space/Sergei_Korolev_Father_of_the_Soviet_Union_s_success_in_space |archive-date=1 June 2023 |access-date=30 April 2023 |publisher=[[European Space Agency]] }}</ref> His work on N1-L3 was taken over by his deputy, [[Vasily Mishin]], who did not have Korolev's political astuteness or influence, and was reputed to be a heavy drinker. After a few years of setbacks and four failed launches, in May 1974 Mishin was fired and replaced by Glushko, who immediately ordered the cancellation of the N1 programme and the crewed lunar mission in general, despite Mishin's assertion that the rocket will be fully operational in under two years.<ref name="acta-astro-n1">{{Cite journal |last=Lardier |first=Christian |date=1 January 2018 |title=The soviet manned lunar program N1-L3 |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094576517307695 |journal=[[Acta Astronautica]] |volume=142 |pages=184β192 |bibcode=2018AcAau.142..184L |doi=10.1016/j.actaastro.2017.10.007 |issn=0094-5765 |url-access=subscription }}</ref> ===N1 vehicle serial numbers=== [[File:KH-8 N1.jpg|thumb|upright|N1 imaged by US [[KH-8 Gambit]] reconnaissance satellite, 19 September 1968]] * N1 1L β full scale dynamic test model, each stage was individually dynamically tested; the full N1 stack was only tested at 1/4 scale.<ref name="SFH_N1">{{Cite web |last=Avilla |first=Aeryn |date=21 February 2020 |title=N1: The Rise and Fall of the USSR's Moon Rocket |url=https://www.spaceflighthistories.com/post/n1-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-ussr-s-moon-rocket |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240223091415/https://www.spaceflighthistories.com/post/n1-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-ussr-s-moon-rocket |archive-date=23 February 2024 |access-date=30 April 2023 |website=Spaceflight Histories }}</ref> * N1 2L (1M1) β Facilities Systems Logistic Test and Training Vehicle (FSLT & TV); two first stages painted gray, third stage gray-white and L3 white.<ref>{{cite web|title=SL-X-15, N1-L3 (1M1) on the Launch Pad|url=https://irp.fas.org/imint/4_n1l_04.htm |publisher=Federation of American Scientists|access-date=30 April 2023}}</ref> * N1 3L β '''first launch''', engine fire, exploded at 12 km.<ref name="AxN1">{{Cite web |last=Wade |first=Mark |title=N1 (rocket) |url=http://www.astronautix.com/n/n1.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240207065630/http://www.astronautix.com/n/n1.html |archive-date=7 February 2024 |access-date=30 April 2023 |website=astronautix.com }}</ref> * N1 4L β Block A LOX tank developed cracks; never launched, parts from Block A used for other launchers; rest of airframe structure scrapped.<ref name="SFH_N1"/> * N1 5L β '''second launch''', partially painted gray; first night launch, launch failure demolished pad [[Baikonur Cosmodrome Site 110|110 East]].<ref name="AxN1"/> * N1 6L β '''third launch''', flown from the second pad 110 West, deficient roll control, destroyed after 51s.<ref name="AxN1"/> * N1 7L β '''fourth launch''', all white, engine cutoff at {{convert|40|km|nmi}} caused propellant line [[water hammer|hammer]]ing, rupturing the fuel system.<ref name="AxN1"/> * N1 8L and 9L β flight ready N1Fs with improved NK-33 engines in Block A, scrapped when the program was canceled.<ref name="AxN1"/><ref name="SFH_N1"/> * N1 10L β uncompleted, scrapped along with 8L and 9L.<ref name="SFH_N1"/> ===N1F=== Mishin continued with the N1F project after the cancellation of plans for a crewed Moon landing in the hope that the booster would be used to build the [[Zvezda (moonbase)|Zvezda moonbase]]. The program was terminated in 1974 when Mishin was replaced by Glushko. Two N1Fs were being readied for launch at the time, but these plans were canceled. The two flight-ready N1Fs were scrapped and their remains could still be found around Baikonur years later used as shelters and storage sheds. The boosters were deliberately broken up in an effort to cover up the USSR's failed Moon attempts, which was publicly stated to be a paper project in order to fool the US into thinking there was a race going on. This cover story lasted until ''[[glasnost]]'', when the remaining hardware was seen publicly on display. ===Aftermath and engines=== The program was followed by the "Vulkan" concept for a huge launch vehicle using [[Syntin]]/[[LOX]] propellants, later replaced by [[LH2]]/[[LOX]] on the 2nd and 3rd stages. "Vulkan" was superseded by the [[Energia (rocket)|Energia]]/[[Buran (spacecraft)|Buran]] program in 1976.<ref name="petrovitch-vulkan">{{Cite web |last1=Petrovitch |first1=Vassili |title=Vulkan Description |url=https://www.buran-energia.com/energia/vulcain-vulkan-desc.php |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240111071244/https://www.buran-energia.com/energia/vulcain-vulkan-desc.php |archive-date=11 January 2024 |access-date=31 January 2015 |website=Buran-Energia.com }}</ref><ref name="astronautix-vulkan">{{Cite web |last1=Wade |first1=Mark |title=Vulkan |url=http://www.astronautix.com/v/vulkan.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240214140449/http://www.astronautix.com/v/vulkan.html |archive-date=14 February 2024 |access-date=31 January 2015 |website=Astronautix.com }}</ref> About 150 of the upgraded engines for the N1F escaped destruction. Although the rocket as a whole was unreliable, the [[NK-33]] and [[NK-43]] engines are rugged and reliable when used as a standalone unit. In the mid-1990s, Russia sold 36 engines for [[USD|$]]1.1 million each and a license for the production of new engines to the US company [[Aerojet General]].<ref name="dawson2016">{{Cite book |last=Dawson |first=Linda |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=94ePDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA14 |title=The Politics and Perils of Space Exploration |date=22 November 2016 |publisher=[[Springer Science+Business Media|Springer]] |isbn=978-3-319-38813-7 |page=14 |doi=10.1007/978-3-319-38813-7 |lccn=2016948726 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230910154449/https://books.google.com/books?id=94ePDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA14 |archive-date=10 September 2023 |url-status=live }}</ref> The US company [[Kistler Aerospace]] worked on incorporating these engines into a new rocket design with the intention of offering commercial launch services, but the company eventually went into bankruptcy before seeing a single launch. Aerojet also modified the NK-33 to incorporate thrust vector control capability for [[Orbital Sciences Corporation|Orbital Science]]'s [[Antares (rocket)|Antares]] launch vehicle. Antares used two of these modified AJ-26 engines for first stage propulsion. The first four launches of the Antares were successful, but on the fifth launch the rocket exploded shortly after launch. Preliminary failure analysis by Orbital pointed to a possible turbopump failure in one NK-33/AJ-26. Given Aerojet's previous problems with the NK-33/AJ-26 engine during the modification and test program (two engine failures in static test firings, one of which caused major damage to the test stand) and the later in-flight failure, Orbital decided that the NK-33/AJ-26 was not reliable enough for future use.<ref name="sfi-20141124">{{Cite web |last1=Rhian |first1=Jason |date=24 November 2014 |title=Orbital's Cygnus β on a SpaceX Falcon 9? β SpaceFlight Insider |url=http://www.spaceflightinsider.com/missions/commercial/orbitals-cygnus-spacex-falcon-9/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303002135/http://www.spaceflightinsider.com/missions/commercial/orbitals-cygnus-spacex-falcon-9/ |archive-date=3 March 2016 |access-date=13 February 2016 |website=Spaceflight Insider }}</ref> In Russia, N1 engines were not used again until 2004, when the remaining 70 or so engines were incorporated into a new rocket design, the Soyuz 3.<ref name="harvey2007">{{Cite book |last1=Harvey |first1=Brian |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kmTz6Phf5WYC&pg=PA201 |title=The Rebirth of the Russian Space Program |series=Springer Praxis Books |date=25 November 2007 |publisher=[[Springer Science+Business Media|Springer]] |isbn=978-0-387-71356-4 |edition=1st |location=New York |page=201 |doi=10.1007/978-0-387-71356-4 |lccn=2007922812 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230910154449/https://books.google.com/books?id=kmTz6Phf5WYC&pg=PA201 |archive-date=10 September 2023 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="rsw-soyuz-3">{{Cite web |last1=Zak |first1=Anatoly |title=The history of the Soyuz-3 launch vehicle. |url=https://www.russianspaceweb.com/soyuz3_lv.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240215021421/https://www.russianspaceweb.com/soyuz3_lv.html |archive-date=15 February 2024 |access-date=27 January 2015 |website=russianspaceweb.com }}</ref> {{As of|2005}}, the project was frozen due to the lack of funding. Instead, the NK-33 was incorporated into the first stage of a [[Soyuz-2-1v|light variant of the Soyuz rocket]], which was first launched on 28 December 2013.<ref name="s101">{{Cite web |title=Soyuz 2-1v |url=https://spaceflight101.com/spacerockets/soyuz-2-1v/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230422152435/https://spaceflight101.com/spacerockets/soyuz-2-1v/ |archive-date=22 April 2023 |access-date=28 December 2013 |website=Spaceflight 101 }}</ref>
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