Editing NSC 68 (section)

==Historical background==
[[File:Nitze, Paul.jpg|alt=US Navy portrait of Paul Nitze|thumb|NSC 68 was drafted under the guidance of [[Paul H. Nitze]], Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State, 1950–1953.]]
By 1950, U.S. national security policies required reexamination due to a series of events: the [[North Atlantic Treaty Organization]] (NATO) was operational, military assistance for European allies had begun, the Soviet Union had detonated an atomic bomb and the communists had solidified their control of [[China]].  In addition, a British sterling-dollar crisis in the summer of 1949 had brought home to U.S. officials that the [[Marshall Plan]] would not suffice to cure Western European economic ills by 1952, the Plan's scheduled end year, with the prospect that Western Europe would have no choice but to pursue [[autarky]], as it had in the 1930s, with all the attendant difficulties that would pose for the world economy generally and the U.S. economy particularly.<ref>Curt Cardwell, ''NSC 68 and the Political Economy of the Early Cold War'' (Cambridge, 2011).</ref> Similar problems were also plaguing Japan.<ref>William S. Borden, ''The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade policy, 1947–1955'' (Wisconsin, 1984)</ref>   With these threats to the U.S. and its allies expanding, on 31 January 1950 President Truman directed the [[United States Department of State|Department of State]] and [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] "to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans."  A State-Defense Policy Review Group was set up under the chairmanship of [[Paul Nitze]] of the State Department.<ref>Paul H Nitze, S Nelson Drew, Ed., ''NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment'', [https://books.google.com/books?id=K3XsqKRkjlUC&q=%22Brief+Chronology%22&pg=PP1 Brief Chronology], pp. 17–9.</ref>

Nitze, an advocate of [[rollback]], ensured that only the most severe claims about the Soviet Union were cited in the document. The analysis of top Kremlin experts like [[George Kennan]], [[Llewellyn Thompson]], and [[Charles Bohlen]], were categorically omitted. The Kennan–Thompson–Bohlen group maintained that Stalin's principal goal was to secure tight control of the USSR and its satellites, but that he had no plan to seek global domination (an assessment shared by most historians today). Nitze however, contended that the Soviets were determined to conquer the whole of Europe and most of Asia and Africa. [[Dean Acheson]], another [[hawkish]] adviser to Truman, wrote that the purpose of NSC 68 was to "bludgeon the mind of top government that not only could the president make a decision, but that the decision could be carried out."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Mitchell|first=Gordon R.|title=BY 'ANY MEASURES' NECESSARY: NSC-68 AND COLD WAR ROOTS OF THE 2002 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY|journal=Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh}}</ref>

The Defense Department representatives on the committee initially resisted proposals that would exceed the existing $12.5 billion ceiling on defense spending.<ref>Block, Fred L. "[https://books.google.com/books?id=_i153pbikldjfcoC&dq=nsc-68&pg=PA242  The Origins of International...]" Google Books. 28 April 2010. Web. 29 April 2010.</ref>

The report, designated NSC{{nbsp}}68, was presented to President Truman on 7 April 1950, who passed it on to the NSC for further consideration on 12 April 1950.<ref>Paul H Nitze, S Nelson Drew, Ed., ''NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment'', [https://books.google.com/books?id=K3XsqKRkjlUC&pg=PA18 Brief Chronology], pp. 17–9.</ref>

'''NSC Study Group:'''
* [[Paul Nitze]], Chair
* John P. Davis
* Robert Tufts
* Robert Hooker
* [[Dean Acheson]]
* [[Charles E. Bohlen]]
* Major General [[Truman Landon]], Joint Chiefs Representative
* Samuel S. Butano
* Robert Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Originally, President Truman did not support NSC{{nbsp}}68 when it was brought to him in 1950. He believed that it was not specific about which programs would be affected or changed and it also did not go well with his previous defense spending limits. Truman sent it back for further review until he finally approved it in 1951.<ref>[[Paul H. Nitze]], S. Nelson Drew, Ed., [https://books.google.com/books?id=K3XsqKRkjlUC&dq=NSC-68&pg=PP1 ''NCS-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment''], p. 6, National Defense University, Washington DC: 1994.</ref>

The document outlined the de facto national security strategy of the United States for that time (although it was not an official [[National Security Strategy (United States)|National Security Strategy]] in the form known today) and analyzed the capabilities of the Soviet Union and of the United States of America from military, economic, political, and psychological standpoints.{{Citation needed|date=August 2023}}

NSC 68 described the challenges facing the United States in cataclysmic terms. "The issues that face us are momentous," the document stated, "involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself."<ref>{{cite book|editor=Alfred Andrea and James Overfield|title=The Human Record: Sources of Global History, Volume II: Since 1500|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mK5_5l0pYkAC&pg=PA473|year=2011|publisher=Cengage Learning|pages=471–74|isbn=978-0495913085}}</ref>

The document was declassified in 1975.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian |url=https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/NSC68 |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=history.state.gov}}</ref>