Editing Niger uranium forgeries (section)

== Abbreviated timetable ==
The first report of these documents was in a [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA) Senior Executive Intelligence brief dated 18 October 2001, entitled: "Iraq: Nuclear Related Procurement Efforts". This information was not considered to be certain and not much was done to promote this claim right away.{{citation needed|date=November 2023}}

These documents were sent to the CIA office in [[Rome]] by [[SISMI]].

On 10 May 2002, the CIA's Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis (NESA) in the [[Central Intelligence Agency#Directorate of Analysis|Directorate of Intelligence]] (DI) prepared a Principals Committee briefing book updating the status of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. The document noted that a "foreign government service says Iraq was trying to acquire 500 tons of uranium from Niger".

On 22 July 2002, the [[United States Department of Energy]] (DOE) published an intelligence product ("Daily Intelligence Highlight, Nuclear Reconstitution Efforts Underway?") which highlighted the intelligence on the Iraq-Niger uranium deal as one of three indications that Iraq might be reconstituting its nuclear program.<ref name="Intelligence">{{cite book|author=United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence|title=Report on the Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 9, 2004, Ordered Reported on July 7, 2004|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FhxVroTCvuQC&pg=PA48|publisher=Government Printing Office|pages=48–|id=GGKEY:ZQL5FY25BSB}}</ref>

=== Second and third dissemination ===
{{unreferenced section|date=March 2017}}
There was a second and third dissemination of these forged documents to the United States by SISMI in early September 2002. One source was a suspicious "ex-agent" of SISMI who occasionally worked on and off for them, who was selling the documents.

[[File:Yellowcake (03010301).jpg|thumb|[[Yellowcake]] powder]]
Far more officially, [[Nicolò Pollari]], chief of SISMI, brought the Niger yellowcake story directly to the [[Executive Office of the President of the United States|White House]], meeting secretly in Washington on 9 September 2002, with then–[[Deputy National Security Advisor]] [[Stephen Hadley]]. In that month, the claims of Saddam trying to buy yellowcake uranium from Niger became much stronger. In September 2002, the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] (DIA) published an intelligence assessment ("Defense Intelligence Assessment, Iraq's Reemerging Nuclear Program") which outlined Iraq's recent efforts to rebuild its nuclear program including uranium acquisition. On this issue, the assessment said "Iraq has been vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake."

On 11 September 2002, [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]] (NSC) staff contacted the CIA to clear language for possible use by President Bush. The language cleared by the CIA said, "Iraq has made several attempts to buy high strength aluminum tubes used in centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. And we also know this: within the past few years, Iraq has resumed efforts to obtain large quantities of a type of uranium oxide known as yellowcake, which is an essential ingredient of this process."

In October 2002 the Intelligence Community (IC) produced a [[Classified information|classified]], 90-page [[National Intelligence Estimate]] (NIE) on Iraq's WMD programmes which cited reports that Iraq began "vigorously trying to procure" more uranium from Niger, as well as Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Yellowcake and Niger were not specifically mentioned in this speech. There are many reports of a struggle about this, saying the Niger uranium claims were initially in this Cincinnati speech but taken out by the insistence of the [[Director of Central Intelligence|CIA Director]] [[George Tenet]].