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Normativity
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== Philosophy == {{main|Fact–value distinction|Normative ethics}} A '''normative''' or '''prescriptive''' statement is one that evaluates certain kinds of words, decisions, or actions as either correct or incorrect, or one that sets out guidelines for what a person "should" do. In [[philosophy]], normative theory aims to make moral judgments on events, focusing on preserving something they deem as morally good, or preventing a change for the worse.<ref>{{Citation|last=Strauss|first=Leo|title=What Is Political Philosophy? The Problem of Political Philosophy|date=2017-09-08|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351314367-5|work=Behavioralism in Political Science|pages=93–108|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9781351314367-5 |isbn=978-1-351-31436-7|access-date=2020-12-14|url-access=subscription}}</ref> The theory has its origins in Greece.<ref>{{Citation|last=Bauböck|first=Rainer|title=Normative political theory and empirical research|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511801938.004|work=Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences|year=2008 |pages=40–60|place=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/cbo9780511801938.004 |isbn=978-0-511-80193-8|access-date=2020-12-14|url-access=subscription}}</ref> Normative statements of such a type make claims about how institutions should or [[Is-ought problem|ought]] to be designed, how to [[Value theory|value]] them, which things are [[goodness and value theory|good]] or bad, and which [[Action (philosophy)|action]]s are [[right]] or [[wrong]].<ref>{{Cite book|last=Leftwich|first=Adrian|title=What is politics?: the activity and its study|publisher=Polity|year=2004|location=Oxford}}</ref> Claims are usually contrasted with [[Positive statement|positive]] (i.e. descriptive, [[explanation|explanatory]], or [[constative]]) claims when describing types of [[theory|theories]], [[belief]]s, or [[proposition]]s. Positive statements are (purportedly) factual, empirical statements that attempt to describe [[reality]].{{citation needed|date=November 2019}} For example, "children should eat vegetables", and "those who would sacrifice liberty for security deserve neither" are philosophically normative claims. On the other hand, "vegetables contain a relatively high proportion of vitamins", and "a common consequence of sacrificing liberty for security is a loss of both" are positive claims. Whether a statement is philosophically normative is logically independent of whether it is verified, verifiable, or popularly held. There are several schools of thought regarding the status of philosophically normative statements and whether they can be [[reason|rationally]] discussed or defended. Among these schools are the tradition of [[practical reason]] extending from [[Aristotle]] through [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]] to [[Jürgen Habermas|Habermas]], which asserts that they can, and the tradition of [[emotivism]], which maintains that they are merely expressions of emotions and have no cognitive content. There is large debate in philosophy surrounding whether one can get a normative statement of such a type from an empirical one (i.e. whether one can get an 'ought' from an 'is', or a 'value' from a 'fact'). Aristotle is one scholar who believed that one could in fact get an ought from an is. He believed that the universe was [[teleological]] and that everything in it has a purpose. To explain why something is a certain way, Aristotle believed one could simply say that it is trying to be what it ought to be.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Gray|first=J. W.|date=July 19, 2011|title=The Is/Ought Gap: How Do We Get "Ought" from "Is?"|url=https://ethicalrealism.wordpress.com/2011/07/19/the-isought-gap-how-do-we-get-ought-from-is/|access-date=December 14, 2020|website=Ethical realism}}</ref> On the contrary, [[David Hume]] believed one cannot get an ought from an is because no matter how much one thinks something ought to be a certain way it will not change the way it is. Despite this, Hume used empirical [[experiment]]al methods whilst looking at the philosophically normative. Similar to this was [[Henry Home, Lord Kames|Kames]], who also used the study of facts and the objective to discover a correct system of morals.<ref>Shaver, Robert. "Hume's Moral Theory?" History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 3, 1995, pp. 317–331., www.jstor.org/stable/27744669. Accessed 14 Dec. 2020.</ref> <!--last sentence/statement: i.e., objectivity vs. subjectivity(?)--> The assumption that 'is' can lead to 'ought' is an important component of the philosophy of [[Roy Bhaskar]].<ref>Leigh Price (2019) Introduction to the special issue: normativity, Journal of Critical Realism, 18:3, 221–238 [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14767430.2019.1638133]</ref> Philosophically normative statements and [[norm (philosophy)|norms]], as well as their meanings, are an integral part of human life. They are fundamental for prioritizing goals and organizing and planning. [[Thought]], [[belief]], [[emotion]], and [[Action (philosophy)|action]] are the basis of much ethical and political discourse; indeed, normativity of such a type is arguably the key feature distinguishing ethical and political discourse from other discourses (such as natural science).{{citation needed|date=November 2019}} Much modern moral/ethical philosophy takes as its starting point the apparent variance between peoples and cultures regarding the ways they define what is considered to be appropriate/desirable/praiseworthy/valuable/good etc. (In other words, variance in how individuals, groups and societies define what is in accordance with their philosophically normative standards.) This has led philosophers such as [[A. J. Ayer]] and [[J.L. Mackie]] (for different reasons and in different ways) to cast doubt on the meaningfulness of normative statements of such a type. However, other philosophers, such as [[Christine Korsgaard]], have argued for a source of philosophically normative value which is independent of individuals' subjective morality and which consequently attains (a lesser or greater degree of) objectivity.<ref>Korsgaard, C. (1992). "[https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/k/korsgaard94.pdf The Sources of Normativity]" (PDF). ''The Tanner Lectures on Human Value''.</ref>
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