Editing Nothing (section)

==Philosophy==
===Western===
Some would consider the study of "nothing" to be absurd. A typical response of this type is voiced by the Venetian [[Giacomo Casanova]] in conversation with his landlord, one Dr. Gozzi, who also happens to be a priest:

{{cquote|As everything, for him, was an article of faith, nothing, to his mind, was difficult to understand: the Great Flood had covered the entire world; before, men had the misfortune of living a thousand years; God conversed with them; Noah had taken one hundred years to build the ark; while the earth, suspended in air, stood firmly at the center of the universe that God had created out of nothingness. When I said to him, and proved to him, that the existence of nothingness was [[absurdity|absurd]], he cut me short, calling me silly.<ref>Giacomo Casanova, ''The Story of My Life'', p. 29, translators: Stephen Sartarelli, Sophie Hawkes, Penguin Classics, 2001 {{ISBN|0-14-043915-3}}.</ref>
}}

"Nothingness" has been treated as a serious subject for a very long time. In philosophy, to avoid linguistic traps over the meaning of "nothing", a phrase such as ''not-being'' is often employed to make clear what is being discussed.

====Parmenides====
One of the earliest Western philosophers to consider nothing as a concept was [[Parmenides]] (5th century BCE), a Greek philosopher of the [[monist]] school. He argued that "nothing" cannot exist by the following line of reasoning: To speak of a thing, one has to speak of a thing that exists. If one can speak of a thing in the past, this thing must still exist (in some sense) now, and from this he concluded that there is no such thing as change. As a corollary, there can be no such things as ''coming-into-being'', ''passing-out-of-being'', or ''not-being''.{{sfn|Russell|1995|pp=66–70}}

Other philosophers, for instance, [[Socrates]] and [[Plato]]{{sfn|Russell|1995|pp=66–67}} largely agreed with Parmenides's reasoning on nothing. Aristotle differs with Parmenides's conception of nothing and says, "Although these opinions seem to follow logically in a dialectical discussion, yet to believe them seems next door to madness when one considers the facts."<ref>Aristotle, ''On Generation and Corruption'', '''I''':8, 350 BCE, translator H. H. Joachim, The Internet Classics Archive, [http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/gener_corr.1.i.html retrieved] 24 January 2009.</ref>{{sfn|Russell|1995|p=85}}<ref>Walter E. Wehrle, ''The Myth of Aristotle's Development and the Betrayal of Metaphysics'', p. 77, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001 {{ISBN|1461609879}}.</ref>

In modern times, [[Albert Einstein]]'s concept of [[spacetime]] has led many scientists, including Einstein himself, to adopt a position remarkably similar to Parmenides.<ref>[[Karl Popper]], ''The World of Parmenides: Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment'', p. 172, Routledge, 2013 {{ISBN|1317835018}}.</ref> On the death of his friend [[Michele Besso]], Einstein consoled his widow with the words, "Now he has departed from this strange world a little ahead of me. That signifies nothing. For those of us that believe in physics, the distinction between past, present and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion."<ref>[[Gary R. Mar|Gary Mar]], "Gödel's ontological dream", ch. 36 in Shyam Wuppuluri, Giancarlo Ghirardi (eds), ''Space, Time and the Limits of Human Understanding'', p. 469, Springer, 2016 {{ISBN|3319444182}}.</ref>

====Leucippus====
[[Leucippus]] (early 5th century BCE), one of the [[atomists]], along with other philosophers of his time, made attempts to reconcile this monism with the everyday observation of motion and change. He accepted the [[monist]] position that there could be no motion without a void. The void is the opposite of being. It is ''not-being''. On the other hand, there exists [[Something (concept)|something]] known as an absolute [[wikt:plenum|plenum]], a space filled with matter, and there can be no motion in a plenum because it is completely full. But, there is not just one monolithic plenum, for existence consists of a multiplicity of plenums. These are the invisibly small "atoms" of Greek atomist theory, later expanded by [[Democritus]] (c. 460–370 BCE), which allows the void to "exist" between them. In this scenario, macroscopic objects can ''come-into-being'', move through space, and pass into ''not-being'' by means of the coming together and moving apart of their constituent atoms. The void must exist to allow this to happen, or else the "frozen world" of Parmenides must be accepted.

[[Bertrand Russell]] points out that this does not exactly defeat the argument of Parmenides but, rather, ignores it by taking the rather modern scientific position of starting with the observed data (motion, etc.) and constructing a theory based on the data, as opposed to Parmenides' attempts to work from pure logic. Russell also observes that both sides were mistaken in believing that there can be no motion in a plenum, but arguably motion cannot ''start'' in a plenum.{{sfn|Russell|1995|pp=85-87}} Cyril Bailey notes that Leucippus is the first to say that a "thing" (the void) might be real without being a body and points out the irony that this comes from a materialistic atomist. Leucippus is therefore the first to say that "nothing" has a reality attached to it.<ref>Cyril Bailey, ''The Greek Atomists and Epicurus: A Study'', pp. 75–76, The Clarendon Press, 1928.</ref>

====Aristotle, Newton, Descartes====
[[Aristotle]] (384–322 BCE) provided the classic escape from the logical problem posed by Parmenides by distinguishing things that are ''matter'' and things that are ''space''. In this scenario, space is not "nothing" but, rather, a receptacle in which objects of matter can be placed. The true void (as "nothing") is different from "space" and is removed from consideration.<ref>Aristotle, ''Categories'', '''I''':6, 350 BCE, translator, E. M. Edghill, The Internet Classics Archive [http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/categories.1.1.html retrieved] 24 January 2009.</ref><ref>Aristotle, ''Categories'', '''III''':7, 350 BCE, translator, J. L. Stocks, The Internet Classics Archive [http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/heavens.3.iii.html retrieved] 24 January 2009.</ref> This characterization of space reached its pinnacle with [[Isaac Newton]] who asserted the existence of absolute space. [[René Descartes]], on the other hand, returned to a Parmenides-like argument of denying the existence of space. For Descartes, there was matter, and there was extension of matter leaving no room for the existence of "nothing".{{sfn|Russell|1995|p=87}}

The idea that space can actually be empty was generally still not accepted by philosophers who invoked arguments similar to the plenum reasoning. Although Descartes' views on this were challenged by [[Blaise Pascal]], he declined to overturn the traditional belief, ''[[Horror vacui (physics)|horror vacui]]'', commonly stated as "nature abhors a vacuum". This remained so until [[Evangelista Torricelli]] invented the [[barometer]] in 1643 and showed that an empty space appeared if the mercury tube was turned upside down. This phenomenon being known as the Torricelli vacuum and the unit of vacuum pressure, the [[torr]], being named after him. Even Torricelli's teacher, [[Galileo Galilei]], had previously been unable to adequately explain the sucking action of a pump.{{sfn|Pieper|Wald|2006|pp=237–238}}

====John the Scot====
John the Scot, or [[Johannes Scotus Eriugena]] (c. 815–877) held many surprisingly heretical beliefs for the time he lived in for which no action appears ever to have been taken against him. His ideas mostly stem from, or are based on his work of translating [[pseudo-Dionysius]]. His beliefs are essentially [[pantheist]] and he classifies evil, amongst many other things, into ''not-being''. This is done on the grounds that evil is the opposite of good, a quality of God, but God can have no opposite, since God is everything in the pantheist view of the world. Similarly, the idea that God created the world out of "nothing" is to be interpreted as meaning that the "nothing" here is synonymous with God.{{sfn|Russell|1995|pp=396–401}}

====G. W. F. Hegel====
[[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel]] (1770–1831) is the philosopher who brought the [[dialectic]]al method to a new pinnacle of development. According to Hegel in ''[[Science of Logic]]'', the dialectical methods consists of three steps. First, a thesis is given, which can be any [[proposition]] in [[logic]]. Second, the antithesis of the thesis is formed and, finally, a synthesis incorporating both thesis and antithesis. Hegel believed that no proposition taken by itself can be completely true. Only the whole can be true, and the dialectical synthesis was the means by which the whole could be examined in relation to a specific proposition. Truth consists of the whole process. Separating out thesis, antithesis, or synthesis as a stand-alone statement results in something that is in some way or other untrue. The concept of "nothing" arises in Hegel right at the beginning of his ''Logic''. The whole is called by Hegel the "Absolute" and is to be viewed as something spiritual. Hegel then has:{{sfn|Russell|1995|pp=701–704}}
* [[Thesis]]: the absolute is pure being
* [[Antithesis]]: the absolute is nothing
* [[Thesis, antithesis, synthesis|Synthesis]]: the absolute is becoming

====Existentialists====
The most prominent figure among the [[existentialism|existentialists]] is [[Jean-Paul Sartre]], whose ideas in his book ''[[Being and Nothingness]]'' (''L'être et le néant'') are heavily influenced by ''[[Being and Time]]'' (''Sein und Zeit'') of [[Martin Heidegger]], although Heidegger later stated that he was misunderstood by Sartre.<ref>Heidegger, "Letter on 'Humanism'", ''Pathmarks'' (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 250–251.</ref> Sartre defines two kinds of "being" (être). One kind is ''être-en-soi'', the brute existence of things such as a tree. The other kind is ''être-pour-soi'' which is consciousness. Sartre claims that this second kind of being is "nothing" since consciousness cannot be an object of consciousness and can possess no essence.<ref>Robert C. Solomon, ''From Hegel to Existentialism'', pp. 286–287, Oxford University Press US, 1989, {{ISBN|0-19-506182-9}}.</ref> Sartre, and even more so, [[Jaques Lacan]], use this conception of nothing as the foundation of their atheist philosophy. Equating nothingness with being leads to creation from nothing and hence God is no longer needed for there to be existence.<ref>Conor Cunningham, ''A Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of Nothing and the Difference of Theology'', pp. 251–255, Routledge, 2002 {{ISBN|0-415-27694-2}}.</ref>

===Eastern===
{{Expand section|date=May 2009}}
The understanding of "nothing" varies widely between cultures, especially between Western and Eastern cultures and philosophical traditions. For instance, ''[[Śūnyatā]]'' (emptiness), unlike "nothingness", is considered to be a [[Philosophy of mind|state of mind]] in some forms of [[Buddhism]] (see [[Nirvana]], [[mu (negative)|mu]], and [[Bodhi]]). Achieving "nothing" as a state of mind in this tradition allows one to be totally focused on a thought or activity at a level of intensity that they would not be able to achieve if they were [[consciousness|consciously]] thinking. A classic example of this is an archer attempting to erase the mind and clear the thoughts to better focus on the shot. Some authors have pointed to similarities between the Buddhist conception of nothingness and the ideas of Martin Heidegger and existentialists like Sartre,<ref>Steven William Laycock, ''Nothingness and Emptiness: A Buddhist Engagement with the Ontology of Jean-Paul Sartre'', SUNY Press, 2001 {{ISBN|0-7914-4909-2}}.</ref><ref>Charles B. Guignon, ''The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger'', pp. 293–325, Cambridge University Press, 2006 {{ISBN|0-521-82136-3}}.</ref> although this connection has not been explicitly made by the philosophers themselves.

In some [[Eastern philosophy|Eastern philosophies]], the concept of "nothingness" is characterized by an [[Egolessness|egoless]] state of being in which one fully realizes one's own small part in the cosmos.{{dubious|reason=Lack of ego does not prima facie equate to nothingness. A small part is nevertheless finite and therefore not nothing.|date=July 2022}}

The [[Kyoto School]] handles the concept of nothingness as well.

====Taoism====
[[Laozi]] and [[Zhuang Zhou|Zhuangzi]] were both conscious that language is powerless in the face of the ultimate. In [[Taoist philosophy]], however real this world is, its main characteristic is [[impermanence]], whereas the [[Tao]] has a permanence that cannot be described, predetermined, or named. In this way the Tao is different from any thing that can be named. It is nonexistence, in other words, nothing.

Taoists also have the related concept of ''[[wu wei]]''.