Editing Operation Anaconda (section)

==Background==
On September 11, 2001, a group of Islamic terrorists [[September 11 attacks|attacked the United States]]. They were led by Osama bin Laden, who was the leader of a group called [[Al-Qaeda]]. It was suspected that bin Laden was hiding in Afghanistan, under the protection of the [[Taliban]].

To respond to this threat, the United States launched [[Operation Enduring Freedom]] on October 7, 2001. The goal was to remove the Taliban from power and eliminate Al-Qaeda. To achieve this, the US worked together with a rebel group in Afghanistan known as the [[Northern Alliance]]. The Northern Alliance was made up of people from different ethnic backgrounds, such as [[Tajiks]], [[Uzbeks]], and [[Hazaras]], who opposed the Taliban, which was primarily led by ethnic [[Pashtuns]].

The US used a combination of airstrikes and special ground forces to help the Northern Alliance in its fight against the Taliban. They were able to quickly capture Taliban strongholds, and on November 13, 2001, they successfully [[Fall of Kabul (2001)|took control]] of the capital city, [[Kabul]].

Around the same time, intelligence suggested that Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda leaders had taken refuge in a training camp located in the [[Tora Bora]] mountains near [[Jalalabad]], [[Nangarhar Province]] in Eastern Afghanistan.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Malkasian |first1=Carter |title=The American War in Afghanistan: A History |date=15 June 2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=76 |edition=1st |url=https://www.amazon.com/American-War-Afghanistan-History-ebook/dp/B0968MD26F/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= |language=English}}</ref> Unlike previous battle areas in Northern Afghanistan, this region was mainly inhabited by Pashtuns.

The United States wanted the Northern Alliance to help them attack Al-Qaeda in Tora Bora, but the Tajik and Uzbek warlords of the Northern Alliance refused. They were not willing to enter the hostile Pashtun areas in the east or south. So, the United States had to find other allies for the assault.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Malkasian |first1=Carter |title=The American War in Afghanistan: A History |date=15 June 2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |pages=66–67 |edition=1st |url=https://www.amazon.com/American-War-Afghanistan-History-ebook/dp/B0968MD26F/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= |language=English}}</ref>

They managed to bribe Pashtun militias in the areas to join forces with them, and called this group the "[[Eastern Shura|Eastern Alliance]]."<ref name="Dutton Caliber">{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda |date=7 March 2006 |publisher=Dutton Caliber |isbn=978-0-425-20787-1 |edition=Reprint |language=English}}</ref> Together, they launched an attack on the Al-Qaeda training camp in Tora Bora on November 30, 2001. However, these Eastern Alliance militias proved to be far less effective than the Northern Alliance had been. They didn't have the same level of animosity towards Al-Qaeda and would leave the battlefield each night to break their [[Ramadan]] fast.<ref name="Oxford University Press">{{cite book |last1=Malkasian |first1=Carter |title=The American War in Afghanistan: A History |date=15 June 2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=77 |edition=1st |url=https://www.amazon.com/American-War-Afghanistan-History-ebook/dp/B0968MD26F/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2602S4UWPS8A2&keywords=the+united+states+war+in+afghanistan+carter+malkasian&qid=1689862783&s=digital-text&sprefix=the+united+states+war+in+afghansitan+carter+malkasia%2Cdigital-text%2C165&sr=1-1 |language=English}}</ref> Due to the lack of effective cooperation with the Eastern Alliance militias, Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda leaders escaped from the [[battle of tora bora|Battle of Tora Bora]].<ref>{{cite web |last1=Wright |first1=Donald P. |last2=Dempsey |first2=Martin E. |title=A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001 - September 2005 |url=https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/gwot/DifferentKindofWar.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161230133024/https://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/GWOT/DifferentKindofWar.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=December 30, 2016 |publisher=Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS |language=en |date=July 2010}}</ref>

After the Tora Bora operation, there was a perception that the reason Osama bin Laden escaped was because there were no US forces in place to stop Al-Qaeda from fleeing into [[Pakistan]]. The commanders on the ground had asked for 800 [[United States Army Rangers]] to be sent to block these escape routes, but [[United States Central Command|CENTCOM]], the military authorities, declined their request.<ref name="Oxford University Press"/> This perceived failure to deploy blocking forces would have a significant impact on the planning of Operation Anaconda.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Kugler |first1=Richard |title=Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA463075.pdf |language=en}}</ref>

Around mid-January 2002, US officials received intelligence reports indicating that enemy forces, including Al-Qaeda, were gathering in the Shah-i-kot valley in [[Paktia Province]], which was located about 60 miles south of [[Gardez]]. The Lower Shah-i-kot region was close to the [[Federally Administered Tribal Areas|Pakistani tribal lands]], where many Al-Qaeda fighters were thought to have fled after the Tora Bora operation. As January progressed, US military officials started considering a potential attack on the Shah-i-kot valley.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Kugler |first1=Richard |title=Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA463075.pdf |language=en}}</ref><ref>Neville, Leigh, '' Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military)'', Osprey Publishing, 2015  {{ISBN|978-1472807908}}, p.50</ref>

The Shah-i-kot Valley, meaning 'the Place of the King' in [[Pashto]], is about 9 kilometers long and 5 kilometers wide at its widest point. It consists of two main areas, the Lower Shah-i-kot and the Upper Shah-i-kot, running roughly parallel to each other. In the lower Shah-i-kot, there are several imposing mountains, with [[Takur Ghar]] being the most prominent at the southeastern end, and [[Tsapare Ghar]] to the northeast, which controls the northern entrance to the valley.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Kugler |first1=Richard |title=Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA463075.pdf |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command |date=1 September 2015 |publisher=St. Martin's Press |url=https://www.amazon.com/Relentless-Strike-History-Special-Operations-ebook/dp/B00TDTR5ZW/ref=sr_1_1?crid=32D53O3R2LC14&keywords=relentless+strike&qid=1689866735&s=digital-text&sprefix=relentless+strike%2Cdigital-text%2C200&sr=1-1 |language=English}}</ref>

The valley is quite defendable, as its high ridges offer natural caves, crevasses, and other protected spots where guerrilla fighters can position themselves to shoot at the valley floor and access routes.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Kugler |first1=Richard |title=Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA463075.pdf |language=en}}</ref> During the [[Soviet–Afghan War|Soviet-Afghan War]], this area was also a battleground, as the Soviets fought [[Afghan mujahideen|mujahideen]] [[Guerrilla warfare|guerillas]]. The mujahideen, who opposed the [[Red Army]] in southeast Afghanistan, strategically positioned their defenses in Paktia province, mainly along the central mountain range. One critical highway between Gardez and [[Khost]] was a major supply route for the Soviet forces stationed in Khost. However, in 1981, the Afghan fighters successfully blocked this road and [[Siege of Khost|laid siege]] to Khost, forcing the Soviets to rely on airlift for resupply. The siege continued for seven years, and eventually, the Soviets were forced to retreat from the area.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Wright |first1=Donald P. |last2=Dempsey |first2=Martin E. |title=A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001 - September 2005 |url=https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/gwot/DifferentKindofWar.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161230133024/https://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/GWOT/DifferentKindofWar.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=December 30, 2016 |publisher=Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS |language=en |date=July 2010}}</ref>

During the Soviet–Afghan War, Mujahideen leader Malawi Nasrullah Mansoor was in charge of the valley and invited foreign jihadists to base themselves in the Lower Shah-i-kot. Mansoor fortified the valley, digging trench systems, building bunkers and firing positions into the ridgelines, many of which would be put into effect during the operation.<ref>Neville, Leigh, '' Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military)'', Osprey Publishing, 2015  {{ISBN|978-1472807908}}, p.50-51</ref> Malawi Nasrullah Mansoor later joined the Taliban, becoming governor of [[Paktia Province]] before being killed in a battle with a rival warlord. Using his family's connections in the region Nasrullah Mansoor's son, [[Saif-ur-Rehman Mansoor]], became the leading Taliban commander of [[Zurmat District]] in Paktia Province by 2002.<ref name="roggio">{{Cite news|url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2021/03/taliban-celebrates-2002-battle-in-which-it-defended-al-qaeda.php |title=Taliban celebrates 2002 battle in which it defended Al Qaeda |author=Bill Roggio |work=[[Long War Journal]] |date=17 March 2021 |access-date=25 March 2021}}</ref> The mujahideen fighters had successfully defeated the Soviet Army twice in this valley, and the Taliban-Al-Qaeda coalition expected events here to pan out in a similar fashion.<ref>{{cite journal|journal=Field Artillery|volume=September–October 2012|url=https://sill-www.army.mil/FAMAG/2012/SEP_OCT_2002/SEP_OCT_2012_PAGES_5_9.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304114309/http://sill-www.army.mil/FAMAG/2012/SEP_OCT_2002/SEP_OCT_2012_PAGES_5_9.pdf|url-status=live|archive-date=2016-03-04|title=Fire Support for Operation Anaconda|author=Robert H. McElroy|location=Fort Sill|access-date=2013-04-04}}</ref>

Increasing signals and human intelligence indicated a strong presence of Taliban, [[Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan|IMU]] and al-Qaeda fighters in the Shah-i-Kot Valley; approximately 200 to 250 fighters were believed to be wintering and possibly preparing for a spring offensive in the valley.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda |date=7 March 2006 |publisher=Dutton Caliber |isbn=978-0-425-20787-1 |pages=64–65 |edition=Reprint |language=English}}</ref> The signal intelligence also raised the possibility that high-value targets (HVTs) were present in the valley among which were not only Saif Rehman, but also [[Tohir Yuldeshev]], co-founder of the terrorist organization Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and [[Jalaluddin Haqqani]], whose tribal network controlled the area.<ref name="Vintage Digital">{{cite book |last1=Fairweather |first1=Jack |title=The Good War: Why We Couldn't Win the War or the Peace in Afghanistan |date=3 December 2014 |publisher=Vintage Digital |url=https://www.amazon.com/Good-War-Couldnt-Peace-Afghanistan-ebook/dp/B00KCRNJFY/ref=sr_1_1?crid=192MIZ06KDMGK&keywords=the+good+war+jack+fairweather&qid=1689868664&s=digital-text&sprefix=the+good+war+jack+fairweathe%2Cdigital-text%2C213&sr=1-1 |language=English}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda |date=7 March 2006 |publisher=Dutton Caliber |isbn=978-0-425-20787-1 |pages=138–139 |edition=Reprint |language=English}}</ref>

Jalaluddin Haqqani had a history of fighting against the Soviets with support from the CIA and Pakistan's intelligence agency, [[Inter-Services Intelligence|ISI]]. He was once seen as a potential alternative leader among the Pashtuns, apart from the Taliban. The CIA linked the Haqqani family to Osama bin Laden's escape from Tora Bora, an allegation that the family strongly denied. As a result, the Haqqani family became a target for American airstrikes, leading most of its members to flee across the border into Pakistan. However, despite their departure, Al-Qaeda fighters who had sought shelter in the family's tribal lands remained in the Shah-i-kot Valley.<ref name="Vintage Digital"/>

In late January and February, a plan was developed to attack the Shah-i-kot Valley. The operation involved Afghan military forces (AMF) supported and guided by US special operators. Major General [[Franklin L. Hagenbeck]] was assigned to lead the [[Combined Joint Task Force Mountain]] responsible for the operation. The strategy was to have Afghan Pashtun militias launch an attack on the valley, similar to what had happened at Tora Bora. But this time, US special forces would be positioned in the eastern mountains to block any potential escape routes into [[Pakistan]].  The expectation was that Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters would retreat in the face of the Afghan militias' assault, and the US forces would be able to capture them as they fled.<ref name="Call">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ObYsOXiEtxgC|title=Danger Close: Tactical Air Controllers in Afghanistan and Iraq|author=Steve Call|pages=57–86|publisher=Texas A&M University Press|year=2007|isbn=978-1-58544-624-7}}</ref>

The US decided to place its trust in a Pashtun warlord named Zia Lodin to lead the Afghan tribal forces. The operation officer of Task Force Dagger, [[Mark Rosengard]], explained why they chose to rely on the Afghan militias that had previously disappointed them during the Battle of Tora Bora. First, there were reports suggesting that the Al-Qaeda forces in Shah-i-kot Valley were mixed among 1000 Afghan civilians. In such a situation, it was crucial to have troops who could distinguish between local civilians and jihadist foreign fighters. There was concern about accidentally killing civilians and repeating the Soviet forces' mistakes, which led to the Afghans viewing them as occupiers. Another reason was to foster a sense of "ownership" among the Afghans over the victory. Rosengard wanted the local people to feel like they were the ones who had driven out the foreign Al-Qaeda fighters from their country. When asked whether such a concept could be embraced on a national level in a country as ethnically diverse as Afghanistan, Mark Rosengard responded that at least Zia Lodin seemed to grasp the idea.<ref name="Dutton Caliber"/>

An important element in the operation was a group called [[Advanced Force Operations]] (AFO), reporting to Task Force 11 (TF 11). Their role was to carry out risky reconnaissance missions deep within enemy territory. AFO was not a fixed organization; it was a concept coordinated by a special operations headquarters cell that could draw personnel from various special operations units based on the mission's needs. Pete Blaber was chosen to lead AFO's efforts in Afghanistan.<ref name="Dutton Caliber"/> It was decided to use U.S. conventional infantry. The forces used, consisting of the [[187th Infantry Regiment]] ("Rakkasans") of the [[101st Airborne Division (United States)|101st Airborne Division]], led by Colonel [[Frank Wiercinski]], and soldiers of 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, [[10th Mountain Division (United States)|10th Mountain Division]], led by Lieutenant Colonel [[Paul LaCamera]], were to be inserted by [[CH-47D Chinook|CH-47D Chinooks]], supported by six [[AH-64A Apache]] helicopters and secure these blocking positions.<ref>Neville, Leigh, '' Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military)'', Osprey Publishing, 2015  {{ISBN|978-1472807908}}, p.52</ref> In keeping with established strategy in Afghanistan, fire support was to be provided by [[United States Air Force]] units, rather than artillery. Further air support was provided by [[United States Navy|U.S. Navy]] units and [[French Air Force]] [[Mirage 2000D]]s.<ref>Holmes, Tony. "F-14 Tomcat Units of Operation Enduring Freedom", 2013</ref>{{page needed|date=April 2022}} The amount of conventional assets allowed in Afghanistan was limited by [[United States Central Command]] (CENTCOM) and civilian defense leadership.<ref name="ReferenceA">Naylor, Sean. "Not a Good Day to Die" Penguin Group (New York), 2014:</ref> The final plan foresaw two major forces: TF Hammer and TF Anvil. TF Hammer consisted of Afghan militias and a small number of US special operators as the primary effort to assault the Shah-i-Kot Valley; their objective was to enter the valley from the north, assaulting through the villages of Serkhankheyl and Marzak, where intelligence indicated that the enemy was concentrated, and channel fleeing enemy into the TF Anvil, the Rakkasan blocking positions.<ref>Neville, Leigh, '' Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military)'', Osprey Publishing, 2015 {{ISBN|978-1472807908}}, p.29-31 p.52</ref> TF Anvil consisted of TF Rakkasan and the 1–87 to set up blocking positions and prevent enemy forces from escaping.