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Operation Bertram
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== Planning == [[File:Map of Operation Bertram.jpg|thumb|left|Map of Operation Bertram|alt=Outline map of Operation Bertram showing Allied and Axis lines between Qattara depression and the sea, and real and dummy Allied forming-up areas]] Bertram was devised by [[Dudley Clarke]] to [[Military deception|deceive]] [[Erwin Rommel]] about the timing and location of the expected allied attack by the [[Eighth Army (United Kingdom)|Eighth Army]].<ref name=Lucas123>{{harvnb|Lucas|1983|p=123}}</ref> It consisted of physical deceptions using dummies and [[camouflage]], concealing real movements, in particular of Montgomery's armour.{{sfn|Latimer|2002|p=155}} Bertram was accompanied by electromagnetic deceptions codenamed "Operation Canwell" using false radio traffic.{{sfn|Stroud|2012|p=193}} The front line was relatively short: it stretched from the Mediterranean Sea in the north, near El Alamein railway station, to the effectively impassable [[Qattara Depression]] in the south, a distance of only about {{convert|30|miles}}. It was therefore clear to the enemy that the attack must come in this space, and since the only road was in the north, surprise and full-scale attack in any other location might have been thought unlikely. The deceptions were planned to make the enemy believe that the attack would take place to the south, far from the coast road and railway, and about two days later than the real attack.<ref name=Lucas123/><ref name=Fisher>{{harvnb|Fisher|2005}}</ref> Soon after his arrival on 8 August 1942, the new Middle East commander, [[Harold Alexander]], visited [[Geoffrey Barkas]]'s [[Middle East Command Camouflage Directorate|camouflage unit]] at Helwan to assess its ability to implement Bertram. He looked at everything intently, but seemed most interested in the woodworking shop.{{sfn|Stroud|2012|pp=177, 179–180}} On 16 September 1942, [[Freddie de Guingand]], Montgomery's chief of staff, summoned Barkas and [[Tony Ayrton]] to Eighth Army headquarters near Borg-el-Arab. He told them this was to be top secret, that Alexander had been impressed by his visit to Helwan, and that he wanted Camouflage's advice. He introduced [[Charles Leslie Richardson|Charles Richardson]], who worked for Dudley Clarke's secretive 'A' Force and was to implement the deception Montgomery needed. Richardson had not been trained in deception planning, given the accelerated training of staff officers in 1940, nor had he ever prepared a deception plan before. He was determined it should succeed, since, as he wrote, "if it failed it would do far more damage than having no plan at all".{{sfn|Richardson|1985|p=113}} De Guingand outlined the basic plan: an attack in the north, along the line of the coast road, with a feint some {{convert|20|miles}} to the south. The tanks would take two days to move into battle position from their forming-up positions. Engineering work was already under way. He then astonished them by asking them to hide the hundreds of tanks and field guns, and the thousands of tons of ''matériel'', that were to be used for the decisive attack at El Alamein. Barkas had been hoping for such an opportunity, and now he was being offered the chance to camouflage perhaps the largest desert battle ever attempted.<ref name=StroudPlan>{{harvnb|Stroud|2012|pp=190–198}}</ref> Barkas and Ayrton went out onto the beach dunes to sit and think. Barkas recalled the sacked [[Jasper Maskelyne]], a stage magician who had briefly worked for him, saying he needed his vanishing tricks now. Ayrton agreed, suggesting they use Sunshields to make the tanks seem to be trucks, and ''vice versa''. By the end of that afternoon they had typed up a plan and presented it to de Guingand and Richardson. They proposed to create two dummy armoured brigades to deploy in the south. They would give the appearance of not being ready by making it seem the tanks had not moved from their forming-up areas (Murrayfield and Melting Pot). Dummy tanks would replace them there; while they would mimic trucks when they arrived in the forward Martello area.<ref name=StroudPlan/> Richardson asked if they could use something like [[Steven Sykes (artist)|Steven Sykes]]'s dummy railhead which had worked so well at Misheifa.{{sfn|Sykes|1990|pp=41–53}} Barkas answered that he intended to build a dummy water pipeline to go down south, and to be obviously not ready.<ref name=StroudPlan/> Within two weeks Barkas's plan was accepted, but with one change requested by Montgomery: the dummy armour was doubled to represent a whole armoured corps of over 600 vehicles.<ref name=StroudPlan/> Richardson integrated the camouflage plan with the main plans: in Barkas's words, Richardson "amplified it a great deal to fit in with all the other major considerations, which he knew and I didn't."{{sfn|Sykes|1990|p=98}} Barkas, a former film director, was set to work "on the task of providing props for the biggest 'film production' on which I ever expect to be engaged".{{sfn|Barkas|Barkas|1952|p=196}} Work began on 27 September, giving four weeks before the day of the attack.<ref name=StroudPlan/>
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