Editing Operation Biting (section)

== Background ==
After the end of the [[Battle of France]] and the evacuation of British troops from [[Dunkirk]] during [[Operation Dynamo]], much of Britain's war production and effort was channelled into [[RAF Bomber Command]] and the [[Strategic bombing during World War II|strategic bombing offensive against Germany]]. However, bomber losses on each raid began to increase during 1941, which British intelligence concluded was due to German use of advanced radar equipment.<ref>Millar, pp. 2–3.</ref>

The British and Germans had been competing in radar technology for nearly a decade at this point, with the German technology often at the same level as the British or surpassing them due to heavy investment in the fledgling technology.<ref>Cornwell, p. 262.</ref> By the beginning of the Second World War, Britain had devised effective radar systems, primarily through the work of [[Robert Watson-Watt]], although much of the technology was still rudimentary and Watson-Watt and other scientists had failed to devise an effective night-defence system in time for the German [[The Blitz|night-time bombing of Britain]] during 1940.<ref>Cornwell, p. 267.</ref>

Another British scientist working on radar systems and techniques was [[Reginald Victor Jones|R. V. Jones]], who had been appointed in 1939 as Britain's first scientific intelligence officer, and had spent the first years of the conflict researching how advanced German radar was in comparison to Britain,<ref>Cornwell, p. 268.</ref> convincing doubters that the Germans had radar.<ref>Jones, p. 192.</ref>

[[File:Limber Freya radar illustration.png|thumb|left|upright=1|A Limber ''Freya'' radar|alt=Pencil drawing of equipment standing on four legs]]
By examining leaked German documents, crashed {{lang|de|[[Luftwaffe]]}} bombers and [[Enigma machine|Enigma]] [[Encryption|decryptions]], and through German [[prisoner of war]] interrogations, Jones discovered that high-frequency radio signals were being transmitted across Britain from somewhere on the Continent, and he believed they came from a directional radar system.<ref>Cornwell, pp. 273–274.</ref> Within a few months of this discovery, Jones had identified several such radar systems, one of which was being used to detect British bombers; this was known as the "[[Freya radar|Freya-Meldung-Freya]]" array, named after the [[Freyja|ancient Norse goddess]].<ref name="Cornwell274">Cornwell, p. 274.</ref> 

Jones was finally able to see concrete proof of the presence of the Freya system after being shown several mysterious objects visible in reconnaissance pictures taken by the RAF near [[La Poterie-Cap-d'Antifer|Cap d'Antifer]] in [[Normandy]] – two circular emplacements in each of which was a rotating "mattress" antenna approximately {{cvt|20|ft|0}} wide. Having found proof of these Freya installations, Jones and the other scientists under his command could begin devising countermeasures against the system, and the RAF could begin to locate and destroy the installations themselves.<ref name="Cornwell274" />

Jones also found evidence of a second part of the Freya set-up, referred to in Enigma decrypts as "[[Würzburg radar|Würzburg]]", but it was not until he was shown another set of RAF reconnaissance photographs in November 1941 that he learned the nature of Würzburg. The Würzburg radar device consisted of a [[parabolic antenna]] about {{cvt|10|ft|0}} in diameter, which worked in conjunction with Freya to locate British bombers and then direct {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} [[night fighter]]s to attack them.<ref name="Cornwell275">Cornwell, p. 275.</ref> The two systems complemented each other: Freya was a long-range [[early-warning radar]] system but lacked precision, and  Würzburg had a much shorter range but was far more precise. Würzburg FuSE 62 D also had the advantage of being much smaller than the Freya system, and easier to manufacture in the quantities needed by the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} to defend German territory.<ref name="Cornwell275" /><ref name="Millar3">Millar, p. 3.</ref>

=== Prelude === 
To neutralise the Würzburg system by developing countermeasures against it, Jones and his team needed to study one of the systems or at least the more vital pieces of technology of which the system was composed. One site had recently been sighted by an RAF [[Supermarine Spitfire (early Merlin powered variants)#PR Mk I Types - Early Reconnaissance Versions|reconnaissance Spitfire]] from the [[No. 1 Photographic Reconnaissance Unit RAF|Photographic Reconnaissance Unit]] during a flight over part of the French [[English Channel]] coast near [[Le Havre]].<ref name="Harclerode208">Harclerode, p. 208.</ref>

The site was found on a clifftop immediately north of the village of Bruneval, {{cvt|12|mi}} north of Le Havre, and was the most accessible German radar site that had been found so far by the British; several other installations were further inland and others were as far away as Romania and Bulgaria.<ref name="Cornwell275" /><ref name="Millar3" /> A request for a raid on the Bruneval site to capture a Würzburg system was passed on to Admiral Lord [[Louis Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma|Louis Mountbatten]], the commander of Combined Operations.<ref name="Millar4">Millar, p. 4.</ref> Mountbatten, in turn, took the proposal to the [[Chiefs of Staff Committee]], who approved the raid after a brief debate.<ref name="Millar4" />

Having received permission to conduct the raid, Mountbatten and his staff studied the Bruneval installation and its defences, rapidly concluding that due to the extensive coastal defences in the area around the installation, it was too well-guarded to permit a seaborne commando raid. They considered that such a raid would result in high casualties among the attacking troops and would not be fast enough to capture the Würzburg radar before it was destroyed by the Germans.<ref name=Otway65>Otway, p. 65.</ref> 

Believing that surprise and speed were to be the essential requirements of any raid against the installation to ensure the radar was captured, Mountbatten saw an airborne assault as the only viable method. On 8 January 1942, he therefore contacted the headquarters of [[1st Airborne Division (United Kingdom)|1st Airborne Division]] and [[No. 38 Group RAF|38 Wing RAF]], asking if they were able to conduct the raid. The division's commander, Major-General [[Frederick Browning]], was particularly enthusiastic, as a successful operation would be an excellent morale boost to the airborne troops under his command, as well as a good demonstration of their value.<ref name=Otway66>Otway, p. 66.</ref>

[[File:Biting training.jpg|thumb|upright=1.4|Troops of the covering force and [[paratrooper]]s practise their withdrawal to the landing craft during training in Britain|alt=Men running down a cliff towards a waiting boat on the shore]]
The two commanders believed that training by airborne troops and aircrews could be completed by the end of February when there would be suitable meteorological conditions for the operation. Training for the raid was begun immediately, but encountered several problems. 38 Wing was a new unit still in the process of formation, so [[No. 51 Squadron RAF]] under [[Wing Commander (rank)|Wing Commander]] [[Percy Charles Pickard]] was selected to provide the aircraft and aircrew needed for the operation, although [[Group Captain]] [[Nigel Norman]] of 38 Wing would remain in overall command.<ref name=Otway66 /> Another problem encountered was the state of training of the unit of airborne troops chosen to raid the installation.

During this period, the 1st Airborne Division was composed of only two parachute battalions, of which only one ([[1st Battalion, Parachute Regiment|1st Parachute Battalion]]), was fully trained. Browning, wishing to keep the 1st Parachute Battalion intact for any larger operation the division might be selected for, ordered the  [[2nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment|2nd Parachute Battalion]] to provide a company for the operation. 'C' Company commanded by Frost was selected but the company had been so recently formed that Frost and many of his men had not yet completed their parachute jumping course.<ref name="Harclerode208" />

The level of security imposed on the planning for the raid was so high that when Frost was first briefed by a liaison officer from the headquarters of the 1st Airborne Division, he was informed that his company was to take part in an airborne warfare demonstration for the War Cabinet. He was also informed that C Company would be divided into four sections for the exercise, which was contrary to a plan Frost had devised for the exercise and confused him. It was only after Frost raised several objections with a more senior officer at headquarters that he was informed of the intended raid, after which he dropped his objections and turned his attention to training the company.<ref>Harclerode, pp. 208–209.</ref>

=== Training ===
The company spent time on [[Salisbury Plain]] in [[Wiltshire]] and then travelled to [[Inveraray]] in Scotland where they underwent specialised training on [[Loch Fyne]], practising night embarkations on landing craft to prepare the company for evacuation by sea after raiding the radar installation. After this, the unit returned to Wiltshire and began carrying out practice parachute drops with the aircraft and aircrews of 51 Squadron.

Despite the aircrews having no previous experience in dropping parachutists, these exercises proved to be successful.<ref name=Harclerode209>Harclerode, p. 209.</ref> The company's working-up was aided by the creation of a scale model of the radar installation and the surrounding buildings having been built by the Photographic Interpretation Unit.<ref>Jones, p. 239.</ref> During this period, Major Frost was introduced to [[Commander#Royal Australian Navy|Commander]] [[F. N. Cook]] of the [[Royal Australian Navy]] who would be commanding the naval force intended to evacuate the company after the raid, as well as to the detachment of 32 officers and men from [[No. 12 Commando]] who would arrive in the landing craft and cover the company as it withdrew from the beach.<ref>Chappell, p. 27.</ref><ref name="Otway67">Otway, p. 67.</ref>

Frost also met RAF [[Flight Sergeant]] C.W.H. Cox, who had volunteered to accompany C Company for the operation; as an expert radio electronics technician, it would be his job to locate the Würzburg radar set, photograph it, and dismantle part of it for transportation back to Britain.<ref>Millar, pp. 18–19.</ref> Derek Garrard of Jones' team asked Jones to obtain an Army uniform and identification number for Cox, as he would be the object of special attention from the Germans if he was captured in Air Force uniform, but the War Office were obdurate.<ref>Jones, p. 238.</ref>

Accompanying the strike force was a 10-man section of [[Royal Engineers]] of the 1st Air Troop led by Lt. Dennis Vernon.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.paradata.org.uk/unit/1st-air-troop-re|title=1st Air Troop RE &#124; ParaData|website=www.paradata.org.uk}}</ref> Six of the sappers would dismantle the radar device whilst four sappers would plant [[anti-tank mine]]s to protect the force from counter attack.

[[File:Würzburg.Radar.jpg|thumb|left|upright=1.3|[[Würzburg]] radar of the type installed at Bruneval, folded for transport|alt=Wheeled radar looks like a circle cut down the middle forming two semi circles]]
Information about the Bruneval radar installation was also gathered during this period, often with the help of the [[French Resistance]], without whom detailed knowledge of the disposition of the German forces guarding the installation would have been impossible. This information was gathered by [[Gilbert Renault]], known to the British by the code-name 'Rémy', and several members of his resistance network.<ref>Jones, pp. 236–237.</ref>

The installation was composed of two distinct areas; a villa approximately {{convert|100|yd|m}} from the edge of a cliff which contained the radar station itself, and an enclosure containing several smaller buildings which contained a small garrison. The Würzburg antenna was erected between the villa and the cliff.<ref name=Otway68>Otway, p. 68.</ref> The radar station was permanently manned by {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} radar technicians and was surrounded by guard posts and approximately 30 guards; the buildings in the small enclosure housed about 100 German troops, including another detachment of technicians.<ref name=Harclerode210 /> A [[platoon]] of German infantry was stationed to the south in Bruneval, and was responsible for manning the defences guarding the evacuation beach; these included a [[strongpoint]] near the beach as well as [[Pillbox (military)|pillboxes]] and [[Defensive fighting position|machine gun nests]] on the top of the cliff overlooking the beach. The beach was not land mined and had only sporadic barbed-wire defences, but it was patrolled regularly; a mobile reserve of infantry was believed to be available at one hour's notice and stationed some distance inland.<ref name=Otway68 />

Based on this information, Frost decided to divide the company into five groups of 40 men for the raid, each named after a famous Royal Navy admiral: '[[Horatio Nelson, 1st Viscount Nelson|Nelson]]', '[[John Jellicoe, 1st Earl Jellicoe|Jellicoe]]', '[[Sir Thomas Hardy, 1st Baronet|Hardy]]', '[[Francis Drake|Drake]]' and '[[George Brydges Rodney, 1st Baron Rodney|Rodney]]'.<ref name=Harclerode209 /> 'Nelson' would clear and secure German positions defending the evacuation beach, whilst 'Jellicoe', 'Hardy' and 'Drake' would capture the radar site, villa and the enclosure. 'Rodney' was the reserve formation, placed between the radar site and the main likely enemy approach to block any counterattack.<ref>Harclerode, pp. 209–210.</ref>

It was considered that the combination of a full moon for visibility, and a rising tide to allow the landing craft to manoeuvre in shallow water, was vital for the success of the raid, which narrowed the possible dates to four days between 24 and 27 February.<ref name=Harclerode209 /> On 23 February, a final rehearsal exercise took place, which proved to be a failure; despite ideal weather conditions, the evacuation landing craft grounded {{convert|60|yd|ft}} offshore and could not be shifted despite the efforts of the crews and troops.<ref name=Harclerode209 />