Editing Operation Dragoon (section)

==Background==

===Prelude===
The idea of invading Southern France had come in 1942 from [[General (United States)|General]] [[George Marshall]], the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|US Army Chief of Staff]]. It was supported by [[Joseph Stalin]] at the [[Tehran Conference]] in late 1943. In discussions with [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], Stalin advocated for the operation as an inherent part of the planned [[invasion of Normandy]], preferring to have the Allies in the far west instead of at an alternative landing in the [[Balkans]], which he considered to be in his zone of influence.{{sfnp|Tucker-Jones|2010|p=11}} Marshall insisted that the southern landing be included in the strategic planning, and Roosevelt found cancelling it to be unpalatable.{{sfnp|Tucker-Jones|2010|p=66}}

During planning the operation was known as "Anvil" to complement [[Operation Sledgehammer]] which was at the time the code name for the Normandy invasion. Both plans were later renamed: Sledgehammer to [[Operation Overlord]] and Anvil to Operation Dragoon. 

Operation Dragoon was controversial from the time it was proposed. The American military leadership and its British counterparts disagreed on the operation. [[Winston Churchill]] argued that it would divert military resources from Allied [[Italian Campaign (World War II)|operations in Italy]]. Instead, he favored an invasion of the oil-producing regions of the Balkans.{{sfnp|Yeide|2007|p=13}} Churchill reasoned that by attacking the Balkans, the Allies could deny Germany petroleum, forestall the advance of the [[Red Army]], and achieve a superior negotiating position in postwar Europe, all at a stroke.{{sfnp|Yeide|2007|p=13}}{{sfnp|Zaloga|2009|pp=6–8}}{{sfnp|Tucker-Jones|2010|p=62}}

When first planned, the landings were to take place simultaneously{{snd}}Overlord in Normandy and Anvil in the south of France. A dual landing was soon recognized as impossible to conduct with the forces available. The expansion of Overlord from a three- to a five-division front required many additional [[tank landing ship]]s (LSTs), which would have been needed for Anvil. Another Allied amphibious landing, in Italy, at [[Operation Shingle|Anzio]], had gone badly. All of these led the Allies to postpone Anvil.{{sfnp|Yeide|2007|p=13}}{{sfnp|Zaloga|2009|pp=6–8}}{{sfnp|Tucker-Jones|2010|pp=51–55}}

After the landing at Normandy, a revival of Anvil became increasingly attractive to Allied planners. The Normandy ports had insufficient capacity to handle Allied supply needs and French generals under [[Charles de Gaulle]] pressed for a direct attack on Southern France with participation of French troops. These factors led to a reconsideration of the plan. Despite Churchill's objections, the operation was authorized by the Allied [[Combined Chiefs of Staff]] on 14{{nbsp}}July, then renamed Dragoon on 1{{nbsp}}August. The landing was scheduled for 15{{nbsp}}August.{{sfnp|Yeide|2007|p=13}}{{sfnp|Zaloga|2009|pp=6–8}}{{sfnp|Tucker-Jones|2010|p=69}}

Churchill and his chiefs of staff had opposed Dragoon in favor of reinforcing the campaign in Italy, by capturing [[Trieste]], landing on the [[Istria]] peninsula, and moving through the [[Ljubljana Gap]] into Austria and Hungary. Then, on 4 August, Churchill proposed that Dragoon (less than two weeks away) should be switched to the coast of [[Brittany]]. Eisenhower, supported by Roosevelt, who (with his 1944 election campaign four months away) opposed diverting large forces to the Balkans, stood firm on the agreed plan despite long harangues from Churchill on 5 and 9 August.<ref>{{cite book |last=Smith |first=Jean Edward |author-link=Jean Edward Smith |title=Eisenhower in War and Peace |publisher=Random House |date=2012 |location=New York |pages=371–373 |isbn=978-0-679-64429-3}}
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===Planning===
[[File:Operation Dragoon - map.jpg|thumb|300px|A map showing the Allied amphibious landings and advance in Southern France, as well as German defensive positions]]
The chief objectives of Operation Dragoon were the important French ports of Marseille and Toulon, considered essential to supply the growing Allied forces in France.{{sfnp|Breuer|1996|p=46}} The Allied planners were cautious, taking heed of lessons learned from the Anzio and Normandy landings. They chose a location with no high ground controlled by the [[Wehrmacht]], conditions that had led to heavy casualties after the initial landings on [[Omaha Beach]] at Normandy. The choice for the disembarkation site was an area on the [[Var (department)|Var]] coast east of Toulon. A preliminary air campaign was planned to isolate the battlefield and cut the Germans off from reinforcement by destroying several key bridges. A large airborne landing was also planned in the center of the landing zone to quickly seize the high ground overlooking the beaches. Parallel to the invasion, several commando units were to take control of the islands off the coast.{{sfnp|Zaloga|2009|pp=34–35}}

The Allied plan consisted of a three-division landing of US forces led by [[Major General]] [[Lucian Truscott]] to secure a beachhead on the first day. Their flanks were to be protected by French, American and Canadian commando units. Within 24 hours, 50,000–60,000 troops and 6,500 vehicles were to be disembarked. The airborne landings would concentrate in an area near [[Draguignan]] and [[Le Muy]], with the aim of taking these towns to prevent German counterattacks against the beaches. The bulk of the American force then had to advance quickly to the north along the Rhône, to take [[Lyon]] and [[Dijon]] and make contact with the Allied forces in northern France. After a successful initial landing, units of the [[First Army (France)|French Army{{nbsp}}B]] were to land, given the task of taking the French ports of Toulon and Marseille.{{sfnp|Vogel|1983|pp=582–584}}

Although the Germans expected another Allied landing in the Mediterranean, the advancing Red Army and the Allied landings in Normandy placed great strains on German resources, so little was done to improve the condition of Army Group G, occupying southern France. Given the advancing Allied forces in northern France, the Germans deemed a realistic defense in the south impossible. [[Johannes Blaskowitz]]'s Army Group{{nbsp}}G headquarters discussed a general withdrawal from southern France in July and August with the [[OKW|German High Command]], but the [[20 July plot]] led to an atmosphere in which any withdrawal was out of the question. Blaskowitz was quite aware that his scattered forces would be unable to ward off any serious Allied landing attempt. He planned to withdraw in secret, demolishing the ports, and to proceed in an orderly manner, covered by the [[11th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|11th Panzer Division]]. He intended to establish a new defense line at Dijon in central France. German intelligence was aware of the impending Allied landing, and on 13{{nbsp}}August, Blaskowitz ordered the 11th Panzer Division to move east of the Rhône, where the landing was expected.{{sfnp|Zaloga|2009|pp=32–34}}{{sfnp|Vogel|1983|pp=588–598}}

===Opposing forces===
{{main|Operation Dragoon order of battle}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-258-1324-18, Südfrankreich, Flak-Stellung an Küste.jpg|thumb|upright|German [[8.8 cm FlaK 18/36/37/41|88-mm gun]] on the coast in Southern France]]
The Western Naval Task Force was formed under the command of Vice Admiral [[Henry Kent Hewitt]] to carry the [[U.S. 6th Army Group]], also known as the "Southern Group" or "Dragoon Force," onto the shore. The 6th Army Group was formed in [[Corsica]] and activated on 1{{nbsp}}August, to consolidate the French and American forces slated to invade southern France. Admiral Hewitt's naval support for the operation included the American battleships ''[[USS Nevada (BB-36)|Nevada]]'', ''[[USS Texas (BB-35)|Texas]]'',<ref>{{Cite web |last=The History Guy |date=18 June 2021 |title=USS Texas and Operation Dragoon |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1pTLCnmZQ3Q |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211107/1pTLCnmZQ3Q |archive-date=7 November 2021 |url-status=live |access-date=18 June 2021 |website=[[YouTube]]}}{{cbignore }}</ref> and ''[[USS Arkansas (BB-33)|Arkansas]]'', the British battleship ''[[HMS Ramillies (07)|Ramillies]]'', and the French battleship {{ship|French battleship|Lorraine||2}}, with 20 [[cruiser]]s for [[gunfire support]] and naval aircraft from nine [[escort carrier]]s assembled as [[Task Force 88 (Operation Dragoon)|Task Force{{nbsp}}88]].{{sfnp|Potter|Nimitz|1960|pp=588–598}}

The main ground force for the operation was the [[US Seventh Army]] commanded by [[Alexander Patch]]. The US Army's [[U.S. VI Corps|VI Corps]], commanded by Major General Lucian Truscott, would carry out the initial landing and be followed by the French Army B under command of [[Général]] [[Jean de Lattre de Tassigny]].{{sfnp|Pogue|1986|p=227}} Accompanying the operation was a fully [[Motorized infantry|mobilized]] separate detachment called "Task Force Butler" consisting of the bulk of the Allied tanks, tank destroyers, and mechanized infantry.

The [[French Resistance]] played a major role in the fighting. As the Allies advanced into France, the resistance evolved from a guerilla fighting force to a semiorganized army called [[French Forces of the Interior]] (FFI). The FFI tied down German troops by sabotaging bridges and communication lines, seizing important traffic hubs and directly attacking isolated German forces. They were aided by Allied special forces from the [[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS), who supplied the Allies with vital intelligence.{{sfnp|Zaloga|2009|pp=8, 29}}

The Allied ground and naval forces were supported by a large aerial fleet of 3,470 planes. The majority of them were stationed on Corsica and [[Sardinia]]. The tactical bombers and fighters had to support the landings directly, while the strategic element had to bomb German targets deep into France. The strategic bombing started well before the landing, and targeted airports, traffic hubs, railroads, coastal defenses, and communication lines.{{sfnp|Vogel|1983|pp=584–586}}

Opposing the Allies was the German Army Group G (''Heeresgruppe{{nbsp}}G''). Although nominally an army group, Army Group G had at the time of the invasion only one army under its command: the [[19th Army (Wehrmacht)|19th Army]], led by [[Friedrich Wiese]]. As Southern France had never been important to German planning, their forces there had been stripped of nearly all their valuable units and equipment over the course of the war. Due to the Allied threat in Normandy, Army Group G's units were continuously sent north until the Dragoon landings. The remaining 11 divisions were understrength and only one panzer division was left, the 11th.{{sfnp|Vogel|1983|pp=588–598}} In early August, the 11th Panzer Division had sent one of its two panzer battalions to Normandy shortly before the landing.{{sfnp|Clarke|Smith|1993|p=63}}

The troops were positioned thinly along the French coast, with an average of {{convert|90|km|mi|abbr=on}} per division. Generally, the troops of the German divisions were only second- and third-rate. This meant that over the course of the war, the divisions were thinned out and soldiers were replaced with wounded old veterans and ''[[Volksdeutsche]]'' from Poland and [[Czechoslovakia]]. Numerous units were also replaced by ''[[Ostlegionen]]'' and ''Ostbataillone''. These units were volunteers from Eastern Europe, mainly the Soviet Union, and had a generally low fighting morale. The equipment of those troops was in poor shape, consisting of old weapons from various nations, with French, Polish, Soviet, Italian and Czech guns, artillery, and mortars. Four of the German divisions were designated as "static", which meant that they were stripped of all of their mobile capabilities and unable to move from their positions. The only potent unit inside Army Group G was the 11th Panzer Division, which was commanded by [[Wend von Wietersheim]].{{sfnp|Vogel|1983|pp=588–598}}{{sfnp|Zaloga|2009|pp=16–19}}

The German chain of command was overly complex, with parallel chains for the occupation forces, the land forces, the [[Luftwaffe]] and the [[Kriegsmarine]]. The Luftwaffe, with 200 aircraft, and the Kriegsmarine, with 45 small ships, played a negligible role in the operation.{{sfnp|Vogel|1983|pp=588–598}}{{sfnp|Zaloga|2009|pp=20–22}} The German defense was aided by extensive coastal artillery placements which had been constructed in the years before the landing. After the [[Fall of France]], the [[Vichy France|Vichy French]] regime greatly improved the coastal defenses to appease the Germans. Along the coast, about 75 coastal guns of heavy and medium calibers were emplaced. Toulon was protected by a complex of heavy {{convert|340|mm|abbr=on|1}} gun artillery batteries in mounted turrets. After their military [[Case Anton|take-over in November 1942]], the Germans improved the coastal defense further by repairing damaged and outdated turrets, as well as moving in additional guns. This included the {{convert|340|mm|abbr=on|1}} guns taken from the dismantled French battleship'' [[French battleship Provence|Provence]]''.{{sfnp|Tucker-Jones|2010|p=78}}