Editing Operation Rolling Thunder (section)

==Gradually escalating action==
{{further|topic=the origins of American involvement in Vietnam|Gulf of Tonkin Incident}}

===Background===
In response to President [[Ngo Dinh Diem]]'s abrogation of the 1956 reunification election and suppression of communists during the late 1950s, [[Hanoi]] had begun sending arms and materiel to the [[Vietcong]] (VC), who were fighting an insurgency to topple the American-supported [[Saigon]] government.<ref>Karnow, pp. 237–239.</ref> To combat the VC and to shore up the government in the south, the U.S. initially delivered monetary aid, military advisors, and supplies.<ref>Spector, pp. 275–373.</ref> Between 1957 and 1963, the U.S. found itself committed, through its acceptance of the policy of [[containment]] and belief in the [[domino theory]], to defending South Vietnam from what it saw as expansive communist aggression.{{efn|In its public defense of its policies, the State Department argued that South Vietnam was "fighting for its life against a brutal campaign of terror and armed attack inspired, directed, supplied, and controlled by the communist regime in Hanoi. U.S. Department of State, p. 60.}}

U.S. policy was for a time dictated by its perception of improvement in the Saigon government.{{efn|The coup against President [[Ngo Dinh Diem]] had unleashed a maelstrom of political unrest and communist victories. Coup followed coup in Saigon as [[Army of the Republic of Vietnam]] (ARVN) generals vied for power. There were seven governments in Saigon in 1964, three between 16 August and 3 September alone. Gillespie, p. 63.}} No further commitment by the Americans would occur without tangible proof of the regime's survivability.<ref>Gravel, pp. 17–20.</ref> Events in South Vietnam, however, outpaced this plan. By the beginning of 1965, the policy was reversed in the belief that without further American action the Saigon government could not survive.<ref>Kahin, p. 272.</ref> As late as 8 February, however, in a cable to [[US Ambassador to South Vietnam]] [[Maxwell Taylor]], Johnson stressed that the paramount goal of a bombing campaign would be to boost Saigon's morale, not to influence Hanoi, expressing hope "that the building of a minimum government will benefit by ... assurances from us to the highest levels [of the South Vietnamese government] that we ... intend to take continuing action."<ref>{{cite web |title= Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam |url= http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/vietnam/showdoc.php?docid=52 |date= 8 February 1965 |access-date= 19 October 2015 |archive-date= 16 February 2005 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20050216215056/http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/vietnam/showdoc.php?docid=52 |url-status= dead }}</ref>{{efn|According to VanDeMark, Rolling Thunder failed to achieve any such objective. VanDeMark, p. 69.}}

Questions then arose among the U.S. administration and military leadership as to the best method by which Hanoi (the perceived locus of the insurgency) could be dissuaded from its course of action. The answer seemed to lie in the application of air power. By 1964 most of the civilians surrounding President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] shared the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]]'s collective faith in the efficacy of strategic bombing to one degree or another.<ref>Tilford, p. 92; Gillespie, pp. 64–69.</ref> They reasoned that a small nation like North Vietnam, with a tiny industrial base that was just emerging after the [[First Indochina War]], would be reluctant to risk its new-found economic viability to support the insurgency in the south.<ref>Tilford, p. 92.</ref> Constantly affecting this decision-making process were fears of possible counter moves or outright intervention by the Soviet Union, China, or both.<ref>Johnson, pp. 66–67.</ref> The civilians and the military were divided, however, on the manner of affecting Hanoi's will to support the southern insurgency. The civilians thought in terms of changing the regime's behavior while the military men were more concerned with breaking its will.<ref>Gillespie, p. 70.</ref>

In August 1964, as a result of the [[Gulf of Tonkin Incident]], in which U.S. naval vessels were attacked by North Vietnamese patrol boats, Johnson ordered retaliatory air strikes ([[Operation Pierce Arrow]]) launched against the north.{{efn|See Edwin E. Moise, ''Tonkin Gulf''.}} This did not, however, satisfy the military chiefs, who demanded a wider and more aggressive campaign.<ref>Clodfelter, p. 47.</ref>

===Implementation===
In March 1964 the [[United States Indo-Pacific Command|Commander in Chief Pacific]] (CINCPAC) began developing plans for a sustained eight-week air campaign designed to escalate in three stages. This was published at the end of August as CINCPAC OPLAN 37–64, which included the "94 target list". Bridges, rail yards, docks, barracks and supply dumps were all targeted, and selected based on a criterion system considering:

{{blockquote|(a) reducing North Vietnamese support of communist operations in Laos and South Vietnam, (b) limiting North Vietnamese capabilities to take direct action against Laos and South Vietnam, and finally (c) impairing North Vietnam's capacity to continue as an industrially viable state.<ref>Drew 1986; Van Staaveren, p. 46; Tilford, p. 93.</ref>}}

There was widespread concern that an air campaign could lead to a wider conflict involving the Chinese or Soviets. Westmoreland referred to "an almost paranoid fear of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union" and a "phobia" that the Chinese would invade.<ref name=Drew/> Johnson later noted:

{{blockquote|By keeping a lid on all the designated targets, I knew I could keep the control of the war in my own hands. If China reacted to our slow escalation by threatening to retaliate, we'd have plenty of time to ease off the bombing. But this control—so essential for preventing World War III—would be lost the moment we unleashed a total assault on the North—for that would be rape rather than seduction—and then there would be no turning back. The Chinese reaction would be instant and total.<ref name=Drew/>}}

For a time, no overt action was taken, and the plans continued to evolve. A further refinement of the plan was developed by [[William Bundy|William]] and [[McGeorge Bundy]] on 29 November 1964, with a more moderate target list, which the Joint Chiefs opposed. No action was taken while these, and other, plans were considered. But matters came to a head with the [[attack on Camp Holloway]] on 7 February 1965, which demanded immediate action, and resulted in a reprisal raid known as [[Operation Flaming Dart]]. A [[1965 Qui Nhơn hotel bombing|sapper raid against an American enlisted men's billet at Qui Nhon]] on the 10th<ref>{{cite journal |first= Richard |last= Fournier |title= Qui Nhon, 1965: Terrorism Takes A Toll |journal=VFW Magazine |date= February 2015}}</ref> led to Flaming Dart II. These small-scale operations were launched against the southern region of the country, where the bulk of North Vietnam's ground forces and supply dumps were located.<ref>McMaster, pp. 218–222.</ref>

[[File:KC-135A refuels F-105Ds over Vietnam 1965.jpg|thumb|F-105Ds refueling en route to North Vietnam in 1965]]

These actions led to the plans for a sustained air campaign being reconsidered. On 13 February a new plan was approved and given the name "Rolling Thunder", merging targets and priorities from the lists produced by the Bundys and the JCS. This campaign was not aimed at specific actions on the part of the North Vietnamese, but was intended as a larger response to the growing hostilities as a whole. Although some within the administration believed that the campaign would be costly, and that it might not work, they reasoned that it was "an acceptable risk, especially when considered against the alternative of introducing American combat troops."<ref>Morocco, p. 40.</ref>{{efn|For the Secretary of Defense's thoughts on the planning and implementation of the air campaign see McNamara, pp. 171–177.}} ''Rolling Thunder'' called for an eight-week air campaign consistent with the restrictions imposed by that Johnson and [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] McNamara. If the insurgency continued "with DRV support, strikes against the DRV would be extended with intensified efforts against targets north of the 19th parallel."<ref>McMaster, p. 226.</ref>

It was believed that selective pressure, controlled by Washington, combined with diplomatic overtures, would prevail and compel Hanoi to end its aggression.<ref>Schlight, ''A War Too Long'', p. 46.</ref> The military was still not satisfied, since, for the time being, the bombing campaign was to be limited to targets below the 19th parallel, each of which would have to be cleared individually by the President and McNamara.<ref>Morocco, p. 56.</ref>{{efn|The daily target selection meetings were soon replaced by weekly sessions and finally by the creation of bi-weekly "force packages."}}

The first mission of the new operation was launched on 2 March against an ammunition storage area near Xom Bang carried out by a strike package of 104 US aircraft containing [[Martin B-57 Canberra|B-57s]], [[Republic F-105 Thunderchief|F-105s]], and [[North American F-100 Super Sabre|F-100s]].<ref>{{cite web | url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d175 | title=Historical Documents - Office of the Historian }}</ref> On the same day, 19 RVNAF [[A-1 Skyraider]]s struck the [[Quang Khe Naval Base]]. The Americans were shocked when six of their aircraft were shot down during the mission.<ref>Van Staaveren, p. 86.</ref> Five of the downed crewmen were rescued, but it was a portent of things to come.<ref>Morocco, p. 54.</ref>