Editing Operation Torch (section)

==Background==
=== Allied strategy ===

When the United States entered the Second World War in December 7, British and Americans met at the [[Arcadia Conference]] to discuss future strategy. The principle of [[Europe first]] was agreed upon, but British and Americans had different views on how to implement it. Americans favoured a direct approach with first a limited landing in 1942 ([[Operation Sledgehammer]]), and then a follow-up main thrust in 1943 ([[Operation Roundup (1942)|Operation Roundup]]). The British pressed for a less ambitious plan. They realized the build-up of American forces ([[Operation Bolero]]) would take time, and there was not enough shipping available for large operations. [[Winston Churchill]] proposed to invade North Africa.{{Sfn|Pack|1978|pp=17-22}} The head of the [[United States Army]], General [[George Marshall]] and the head of the US Navy, [[United States Navy|Admiral]] [[Ernest King]] strongly opposed that plan, and were inclined to abandon the Germany first strategy if Churchill persisted. But President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] wanted to support the Russians and as any Pacific operation would be of no help to them, he agreed to the North-African operation.{{Sfn|Pack|1978|pp=17-22}}{{Sfn|Mackenzie|2014|pp=54–55}}{{Sfn|Husen|1999|p=1270}} On 14 August 1942 Lt. General [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] was appointed as Commander in Chief Allied expeditionary Force, and he set up his headquarters in London.{{Sfn|Morison|1947|p=180}}

Planners identified Oran, Algiers and Casablanca as key targets. Ideally there would also be a landing at Tunis to secure Tunisia and facilitate the rapid interdiction of supplies travelling via Tripoli to [[Erwin Rommel]]'s [[Afrika Korps]] forces in [[Italian Libya]]. A compromise would be to land at [[Bône]] in eastern Algeria, some {{convert|300|mi|km}} closer to Tunis than Algiers. Limited resources dictated that the Allies could only make three landings and Eisenhower, who believed that any plan must include landings at Oran and Algiers, had two main options: either the western option, to land at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers and then make as rapid a move as possible to Tunis some {{convert|500|mi|km}} east of Algiers once the Vichy opposition was suppressed; or the eastern option, to land at Oran, Algiers and Bône and then advance overland to Casablanca some {{convert|500|mi|km}} west of Oran. He favoured the eastern option because of the advantages it gave to an early capture of Tunis and also because the Atlantic swells off Casablanca presented considerably greater risks to an amphibious landing there than would be encountered in the Mediterranean. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, however, were concerned that should Operation Torch precipitate [[Spain during World War II|Spain]] to abandon neutrality and join the Axis, the Straits of Gibraltar could be closed cutting the entire Allied force's lines of communication. They therefore chose the Casablanca option as the less risky since the forces in Algeria and Tunisia could be supplied overland from Casablanca in the event of closure of the straits.{{sfn|Eisenhower|1948|pp=88–89}}{{Sfn|MacCloskey|1971|pp=36-41}}

The Morocco landings ruled out the early occupation of Tunisia. But with [[Second Battle of El Alamein|British forces advancing]] from Egypt, this would allow the Allies to carry out a [[pincer movement|pincer operation]] against Axis forces in North Africa by mid-January 1943.{{Sfn|MacCloskey|1971|p=41}}

===Intrigues with Vichy commanders===
{{Further|Operation Kingpin (World War II)|Henri Giraud}}
The Allies believed that the Vichy French [[Armistice Army]] would not fight, partly because of information supplied by the American [[Consul (representative)|Consul]] [[Robert Daniel Murphy]] in [[Algiers]]. The French were former members of the Allies and the American troops were instructed not to fire unless they were fired upon.{{sfn|Playfair|Molony|Flynn|Gleave|2004|pp=126, 141–42}} The [[Vichy French Navy]] were expected to be very hostile after the British [[Attack on Mers-el-Kébir]] in June 1940, and the [[Syria–Lebanon campaign]] in 1941.{{Sfn|Pack|1978|pp=56}}

Allied military strategists needed to consider the political situation in North Africa. The Americans had recognised [[Pétain]] and the Vichy government in 1940, whereas the British did not and had recognised General [[Charles de Gaulle]]'s [[French National Committee]] as a government-in-exile instead.{{Sfn|West Point|}} After his backing of British operations against the Vichy French in [[Dakar]] and Syria, de Gaulle did not have many supporters in North Africa.{{Sfn|Gelb|1992|p=65}} Hence the Allies decided to keep de Gaulle and his [[Free French Forces]] entirely out of the operation.{{Sfn|MacCloskey|1971|p=35}}

To gauge the feeling of the Vichy French forces, Murphy was appointed to the American consulate in Algeria. His covert mission was to determine the mood of the French forces and to make contact with elements that might support an Allied invasion. He succeeded in contacting several French officers, including [[General]] [[Charles Mast]], the French commander-in-chief in Algiers. These officers were willing to support the Allies but asked for a clandestine conference with a senior Allied general in Algeria.{{Sfn|West Point|}} Major General [[Mark W. Clark]], one of Eisenhower's senior commanders, was secretly dispatched to [[Cherchell]] in Algeria aboard the British submarine {{HMS|Seraph|P219|6}} and met with these Vichy French officers on 21 October 1942. Due to the need to maintain secrecy, the French officers were left in the dark about concrete plans, but they gave Clark detailed information about the military situation in Algiers. These officers also asked French General [[Henri Giraud]] be moved out of Vichy France to take the lead of the operation.{{Sfn|Gelb|1992|pp=157-165}}

Eventually the Allies [[Operation Kingpin (World War II)|succeeded in slipping]] Giraud out of Vichy France on HMS ''Seraph'' to Gibraltar, where Eisenhower had his headquarters, intending to offer him the post of commander in chief of French forces in North Africa after the invasion. However, Giraud would take no position lower than commander in chief of all the invading forces.{{sfn|Groom|2006|p=354}} When he was refused, he decided to remain "a spectator in this affair".{{sfn|Atkinson|2002|p=66}}